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Fisheries are among the most complex and tightly coupled social-ecological systems. This
thesis develops new perspectives on the spatial features of fisheries, and on common pool re-
sources in general. The central model of the work is the Distributed Commons, a commons
spread across space with local and cross-boundary interactions. The model is founded in
evidence from historical analysis and complexity theory, and offers insights for management
and broader sustainable development policy. The second part of the thesis uses empiri-
cal analysis, applying Bayesian and econometric techniques, to study the spatial features
exposed by the model. Finally, a computational model is calibrated for exploring the conse-
quences of this theory through experiments. The implications of the Distributed Commons
model are relevant to many areas of sustainable development, including atmospheric pollu-
tion, environmental degradation, and the use of ecosystem resources.
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Preface
This thesis is the first of five planned books intended to consolidate my work and progres-
sively building a framework for understanding the connections between the food system,
biodiversity, policy, and human interactions. Tentatively, the remaining volumes are:
Crop Circles: Dynamic Feedbacks in Agriculture
Combines statistical and biological models for investigating the impacts of weather
shocks on agriculture, and studies the spatially correlated and temporally extended
effects of the ENSO cycle.
Growing Models: A New Foundation for Food System Modeling
Applies insights from computer science to scientific research in the realm of agricul-
tural modeling, by describing a new structure for distributed modeling.
Eating away at the Edges: Integrated Modeling of Food System Choices
Develops a spatial, dynamic, multi-scale, data-driven, and policy-explicit model of
how the food system has evolved and will continue to evolve.
Planet on a Plate: Protecting Biodiversity through the Food System
Studies the interconnections between biodiversity and agriculture, and how biodiver-
sity can be enhanced through policy choices.
The ultimate goal of this research agenda is to provide new tools to inform policy for
the global food system, while building an approach that can be applied to a wide variety of
other systems and inform the scientific approach generally. To do so, three major challenges
must be resolved at the leading edge of both theory and practice.
The first challenge is to identify better approaches for bringing empirical data into












Figure 1: Conceptual relationships between the five proposed books. The spatial fisheries and dynamic
agricultural studies (representing books 1 and 2) are building blocks for the integrated model (book 4).
However, before this model is developed, the tools for distributed modeling (book 3) form a foundation for
it. Finally this model is used to inform broader questions of biodiversity policy (book 5).
dynamics of integrated systems makes data difficult to analyze and interpret. This is a
central concern in this volume, where exogenous forcings, statistical models, and process
models are all brought to bear on disentangling the effects of fisheries ecology and fisheries
management.
The second challenge is to provide frameworks for developing detailed and comprehen-
sive models. Models that include many elements, feedback loops, and ultimately different
perspectives, are important both for understanding policy implications and to support the
advancement of knowledge within the scientific community. This volume uses a number of
tools designed with this concern at the fore, but the ultimate solutions to this problem will
not be explored until volume three, under the heading of distributed modeling.
The third challenge is to bring together empirics and distributed modeling, and to
develop a truly broad and insightful model of the global food system. While this will be
the central focus of the fourth volume, the foundations are laid in this work. The models
of spatial dynamics refined here provide a basis to ensure that the strong link between the





1.1 A New York story
Boats crossing the bay were escorted by schools of playful whales, seals, and
porpoises. Twelve-inch oysters and six-foot lobsters crowded offshore waters,
and so many fish thrived in streams and ponds that they could be taken by
hand.
These words describe New York Bay, the ocean entrance to what would become New
York City, as experienced by early explorers in the 17th century (Burrows and Wallace,
1998). By 1900, the city’s marine waters were a vast dead zone (Jackson et al., 2011, p.
195). Landings of oysters in New York State declined from over 6000 MT in 1887-1926, to
45 MT in 1967 (McHugh, 1972), and lobster throughout the region is now considered unsafe
to eat (NYS DOH, 2015).
Many fisheries in this area share similar histories of degradation, which are further shared
by fisheries in many regions of the globe. The case of hard clams in the nearby Great South
Bay of Long Island offer an example of these trends, and set a scene for the broad themes of
this dissertation. The hard clam (northern quahog) received its scientific name, Mercenaria
mercenaria, from its common use among the local Lenape tribes, famously for money. By
1950, after the decline of the more profitable oyster fishery due to overfishing, Great South






















































































































































Figure 1.1: Reproduced from Kirby (1884, p. 25).
2
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
in 2005, landings in Great South Bay were about 1% of their 1967 peak (Kraeuter et al.,
2008).
Overfishing and pollution drove this decline, but other features of the system reinforced
the trend in ways that are relevant to this study. Pressure on the clam has precipitated
a regime shift in the Great South Bay ecosystem. When clams were in high abundance,
they could filter 40% of the water in the Bay daily (Kassner, 1993). Overharvesting of
clams decreased this capacity to filter the water, leading to algal blooms and an increased
dominance of lower trophic-level species. At the same time, the elimination of top predators
allowed the clam’s predators, such as starfish and blue crab, to proliferate (Polyakov et al.,
2007). Finally, migratory species provided an important connection between the open ocean
and the bay, which weakened as these species also declined (Nuttall et al., 2011). In short,
the decline of the clam fishery was a combined consequence of fishing effort and internal
system feedbacks, in which ecosystem interactions and cross-boundary dynamics play a
central role.
The core solution explored by this dissertation is spatial management, which is also
an integral part of the clam fishery’s story. Starting in 2002, the Nature Conservancy
(TNC) purchased underwater rights to 22% of the Great South Bay. Within the area,
TNC constructed 70 spawner sanctuaries, each a 0.4 Ha marine reserve stocked with adult
clams. Rather than relying on 24-hour patrols, TNC developed partnerships with local
communities and a system of incentives. As a result, in 2008, juvenile clams soared 4000 %
throughout the central Great South Bay region (LoBue and Udelhoven, 2013).
While the story of the Great South Bay clam is remarkable, its features are common
and addressed throughout this dissertation. Overfishing is a common feature of modern
fisheries, and some of the responsibility can be placed on historical approaches to fisheries
management, as discussed in chapter 2. The central premise of this thesis is that fisheries
are best thought of as spatial bioeconomic systems, and that systemic feedbacks drive their
behavior. More specifically, these spatial dynamics have cross-scale features, as shown in
the emergence of a regime shift precipitated by losses of clams and explored in chapter 3.
Cross-boundary issues, such as the effect of migratory fish on clam ecosystems, are an im-
mediate consequence of this perspective, and explored in chapter 4. Species interactions are
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also central to the dynamics of the system, as with clams and their interactions with plank-
ton and predators, and inferring their characteristics from data is an important problem
studied in chapter 5. One beneficial consequence of cross-boundary effects and ecosystem
interactions is the powerful potential of marine reserves, like the TNC’s, and the extent of
this potential is studied in chapter 6. Within this context, spatial management methods
like TNC’s have considerable potential for intervening in the system, and experiments to
understand these opportunities better are studied in chapter 7.
1.2 Big fish
Fisheries are among the most economically and socially important, ecologically diverse,
and chaotically dynamic systems on the planet. With the popularity of books like Cod:
A Biography of the Fish that Changed the World, and the effectiveness of campaigns by
Greenpeace and the Monterey Bay Aquarium, it hardly seems necessary to point out the
importance of our oceans. These motivations tend to fall into two camps, to which I will
suggest a third.
First, fisheries form an important contribution to the global food system. Fish provide
roughly 20% of global protein consumption (Hartmann, 1994), and are an essential source
of protein for many coastal communities. Wild-caught fish account for half of global fish
harvests, and the remaining half produced by aquaculture is vitally supported by 22% of
wild catch (Tuominen et al., 2003). The contribution of fisheries to food will become more
pressing as the global population and food demand increase (Tilman et al., 2011). Fish can
continue to be an important source of nutrients even as populations increase, but only if
fish resources are sustainably managed (Merino et al., 2012).
Fisheries are the bedrock of communities in many regions, particularly in many develop-
ing countries. Wild-catch fisheries and aquaculture can either support economic growth if
properly managed (Kent, 1997, World Bank, 2005), or cause deep disruptions when ecosys-
tem services are degraded (Cullather, 2010). Proper nutrition is essential for health and
economic growth in developing countries (Dixon et al., 2001), and a productive food sector
supports the structural changes which drive industrial development (Rostow, 1990, Diamond
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and Ordunio, 1997, World Bank, 2007).
Second, marine ecosystems include some of the most vibrant remaining biodiversity
hotspots on earth, a source of intrinsic value. Mesopelagic fish alone likely represent 11 000
to 15 000 million tons of the biomass of the ocean (Irigoien et al., 2014), dwarfing an esti-
mated 960 million tons of land vertebrates (Smil, 2003, p. 186). While the biodiversity of
the oceans is much less well understood than that of land, it has long been a source of fasci-
nation, as the wood cuts used throughout this thesis from Kirby (1884) show. Food webs in
marine ecosystems are also longer and more complex than terrestrial food webs, spanning
seven orders of magnitude in species size (Azam et al., 1983). The slower impact of hu-
manity on marine ecosystems has resulted in an estimated 36 times fewer anthropogenically
influenced marine extinctions than terrestrial ones (McCauley et al., 2015).
Third, the interaction between fishing communities and vibrant ecosystems provides
a perfect context to explore the consequences of complexity in sustainable development.
Fisheries are often treated as the archetypical commons, and produce a “social trap” where
short-term motivations for individual fishers are at odds with the long-term interests of the
fishing community (Anderson and Seijo, 2011). This feature is shared by global atmosphere
and many other social-ecological systems, and solutions for better fisheries management have
implications for a broad range of common resources. Fisheries are also a prime example of
our reliance on ecosystem services, and one of the few areas where humans depend explicitly
on wild ecosystems. Fisheries are among the most tightly coupled of all social-ecological
systems, where slight changes in management can quickly produce significant consequences
and win-win management is possible but often lost. And finally, the open ocean could be a
poster-child for uncertainty due to both chaos and our lack of knowledge about their state
and dynamics. All of these issues are central to sustainable development, and finding better
opportunities in fisheries can facilitate progress in many other areas. Fisheries provide a
vibrant case study for the development of new bioeconomic perspectives and models.
The importance of fisheries is all the more significant because of the rate at which they
are being lost. An ongoing debate looks at the evidence for fisheries collapse (Worm et al.,
2006) against the weight of uncertainty and examples of effective management in developed
countries (Costello et al., 2008, Pauly et al., 2013). While there is no consensus, and this
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work will not contribute directly to that debate, a few points seem clear.
Many regions have experienced significant and long-term loss of biomass and biodiver-
sity. An estimated 63% of assessed fish stocks are in need of rebuilding (Worm et al., 2009).
Sharks and rays (Dulvy et al., 2008), groupers (Sadovy de Mitcheson et al., 2013), diadro-
mous fish (Limburg and Waldman, 2009), and marine mammals (Davidson et al., 2012)
are all at heightened risk of extinction. Marine biodiversity is also threatened by invasive
species, which continue to spread around the globe (Bax et al., 2003).1
In many cases these trends have coincided with regime shifts. A regime shift occurs
when a system enters a new stable state. Among fisheries, this new, post-disruption state
is often characterized by reduced biodiversity and the abundance of a few low trophic-level
species, such as algae and jellyfish, at the expense of higher trophic levels (Folke et al.,
2004). Although this process is not clear in the trends of the trophic levels of global catches
(Branch et al., 2010), historical ecology suggests that shifts in trophic levels are already long
entrenched (Jackson et al., 2001, Sumaila and Pauly, 2011). Importantly, once a regime
shift occurs, reversing it can be very difficult.
The stressors on marine ecosystems have continued to expand. These include tempera-
ture increases, implicated in coral bleaching events (Lesser, 2011), and ocean acidification
(Kroeker et al., 2013), both of which are driven by anthropogenic climate change, and are
much better understood than a decade ago. Also, the extent of fishing has continued to in-
crease, in the Pacific (Berkes et al., 2006), Atlantic (Alder and Sumaila, 2004), and globally
(Watson et al., 2013).
Fisheries management is intended to safeguard against over-exploitation, to minimize the
possibility of collapse and maximize the potential of the fishery. All fisheries management
aims to control how much of which resources are harvested, whether through a scientifically
set quota or by alleviating impacts on non-target species and specific age ranges through
gear management and seasonal closures. These approaches have clear benefits over an
absence of management and can stop fishery collapse in many cases (Costello et al., 2008).
Many developed countries now use robust and active management practices, and global
1San Francisco Bay harbors over 200 invasive species, and New York Bay probably has a similar number
(Ruiz et al., 1997).
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fisheries production appears to have stabilized.
However, the situation for many areas continues to worsen, and this dissertation is
motivated by this continuing crisis. These failures stem from many sources. Strong drivers
foster the conditions that lead to over-exploitation. Uncertainty in the biological state
of the stock, the rest of its ecosystem, and the true extent of fishing make it difficult to
set catch limits. An accidental over-estimation of the stock can lead to a vicious cycle
of smaller breeding populations and louder lobbying from fishing communities fighting for
their immediate needs. Maintaining stocks at their optimum has been likened to “keeping
a marble on top of a dome fastened to the deck of a rolling ship seen through salt-sprayed
goggles” (Roughgarden and Smith, 1996).
Fisheries are extremely complex social-ecological systems, operating across spatial scales
spanning from tenths of micrometers to hundreds of kilometers (Azam et al., 1983) and
impacted by both tiny fishing communities and vast industrial fleets. Fish stocks naturally
have erratic population fluctuations that span decades, with wide variation of stock levels
observed in the natural record of ocean floor deposits (e.g., Baumgartner et al., 1992). They
are impacted by a wide range of human impacts outside of fishing, including climate change,
ocean acidification, dead-zones, pollution, and invasive species movements.
On top of this, management practices vary widely. While many developed regions and
some of the most productive fisheries have strong management, around 80% of global catch
comes from developing regions (Hance). Few fisheries in the developing world have the
capacity to perform stock assessments at all, much less on a regular basis. Few have the
capacity to enforce catch limits informed by recent assessments, or to enforce protected
areas. Few have open and trusted communication channels between fishing community,
scientists, and external government managers. Fishing communities have local knowledge
that is difficult to incorporate into region-wide management. Under the stress of falling
catches and increasing costs, they oppose policies that would further reduce their catch,
particularly given the erratic history of management.
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1.3 Fish in space
This thesis focuses on the importance of spatial understandings of fisheries, a perspective
that is growing in prominence. Fisheries are no longer alone in their demand on the oceans
resources. Wind farming, oil exploration, fiber optic lines, and new political jostling is
threatening to carve up what is left of the oceans once unfathomable abundance.
A growing number of economists and scientists now believe that carving up the oceans–
an approach called spatial management– may be the most effective way to balance these
competing demands. Designating a kind of property rights on segments of ocean can ensure
that regulated profit and marine conservation both have their space.
This thesis argues that if we are to embrace this approach, we need new institutions
of spatial management, because enclosure as it was performed on land will result in even
more dysfunctional relationships with the underlying environment than those that the land
enclosure process produced.2 The spatial features of fisheries have long been underappre-
ciated. This has been as much due to our traditionally impoverished conceptual models as
our lack of information. The traditional economic view of a fishery is as a single, well-mixed
stock, for which spatial boundaries are meant to describe hulls within which populations
never leave (e.g. Gordon, 1991). Even where newer multispecies ecosystem models are used,
the potential for effects from outside the fishery boundary is ignored (e.g. May et al., 1979).
We need new paradigms of spatial management that embrace the fluidity of the marine
medium. Creating these new paradigms requires a closer look at the spatial features of
fisheries. Recent work that studies spatial features of fisheries finds that space matters in a
number of surprising ways.
New studies of fish movements have found many species to both have more site fidelity
than expected, and travel much further than expected. Block et al. (2011) finds that top
predators tagged within the California Current large marine ecosystem often traveled more
than 2000 km from it, but also returned to it with over 40% of species spending more than
80% of their time there. While individuals of some species always stay within a “home
2Land enclosure has both benefits and costs, but in many cases has disrupted social-ecological systems
that supported communities in with sophisticated institutions. For a survey of the consequences of land
enclosure, see Scott (1998).
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range” (e.g. Booth et al., 2013), the extent of forays taken by other species from their home
ranges can be idiosyncratic to the individual fish (Meyer et al., 2000). These studies has
been used to show that even very small MPAs can be effective, but also that the movement
occurs within much larger “meta-populations” (Grimm et al., 2003).
The spatial connectivity of a species population is an important ingredient in resilience
and population health. As individual patches of a fish environment become degraded, or
the path between them is obstructed, the resilience and long-term survivability of the entire
population decreases (Hughes et al., 2005). Spatial features can also hasten collapse among
species with high levels of site-fidelity (Elmhirst et al., 2009). Even if the total stock across
a region is high, smaller areas can experience functional extinction of a species, resulting
in a regime shift where the species can no longer attain its previous position within the
ecosystem.
A recent literature has emerged around spatial bioeconomic models, finding that proper
management often relies on understanding the spatial features of both the ecological and
economic systems. Much of this literature has emphasized the differences in optimal man-
agement with and without space Smith and Wilen (2003), Sanchirico and Wilen (2005).
However, spatial fisheries management can also offer new opportunities. Marine spatial
planning (MSP) has risen to prominence in the past 15 years as an essential part of the
fisheries management process (Douvere, 2008). This reflects the increased possibility of
conflict in the seas across its multiple uses, as well as the new emphasis on ecosystem-
level management. Understanding the short-term and long-term impacts of marine spatial
planning on stakeholders can improve this process (Smith et al., 2010).
Marine protected areas (MPAs) are one of the most common forms of spatial manage-
ment, where setting aside even small areas from fishing can produce benefits throughout a
region. No-take marine reserves are like national parks, but with a crucial difference. In
an ocean pushed to its limit, excluding areas from exploitation can actually result in more
resources for everyone. I study these effects in chapter 6.
Unlike catch limits, which are a species-specific intervention, marine protection is an
intervention for the entire ecosystem. MPAs allow ecosystems to recover, but the benefits
of protection stem more from what we do not know than from what we do know. If we
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could count the fish in the sea, and predict the consequences of fishing them down to any
given level, quotas would capture the requirements of management perfectly.
In contrast, it is difficult to target or even to predict what the consequences of protection
will be. In the absence of human intervention, species dominance can shift in complex ways.
Invasive species can expand, and new top predators can find an attractive home. In addition,
the effects of pollution, eutrophication, and climate change cannot be excluded. Despite
these many uncertainties, marine reserves have been shown to greatly benefit fish stocks. A
global study of the effects of reserves found that, on average, fish biomass increases 450%,
fish size increases 28%, and species richness increase 21% (Lester et al., 2009). While some
fisheries saw decreases in each of these, the general result is robust across the vast majority
of studies and regions.
However, marine spatial planning is complicated by two effects that have recently become
more clear. Fish populations are not stationary, and climate change is causing even general
ranges to shift. Populations in temperate regions have moved toward the poles in both the
northern (Doney et al., 2012) and southern (Last et al., 2011) hemispheres. As different
species respond differently to climate change, and do so at different stages in their life cycle,
the potential for ecosystem disruption increases (Edwards and Richardson, 2004).
Population shifts are one form of cross-boundary effects, which are becoming a greater
concern as the spatial extent of fish interactions is mapped. Fish do not respect political
boundaries, so one country can impact another through its fisheries management. These
“straddling stocks” have become a growing source of conflict (Miles and Burke, 1989). In-
dustrial and local communities also experience cross-boundary conflict, as fleets of industrial
ships fishing for the international market can deplete an entire region’s resources.
1.4 Fishing for answers
This thesis seeks a deeper understanding of the opportunities for spatial policy in fisheries.
Two main threads are intertwined. First, I seek to contribute to an understanding of spatial
management that goes beyond the creation of area closures and ownership. Second, I want
to engage seriously the issue of cross-boundary flows, as both a consequence of spatial
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perspectives and an opportunity for benefits and conflict.
New approaches in data analysis and computational modeling have much to inform
these issues. Progressively more data is becoming available on the spatial features of fish-
eries. Fisheries scientists need models incorporating this new knowledge and capturing its
dynamics.
I present an approach peppered with computational models. The chapters below in-
clude a Bayesian MCMC, discussions of cellular automata, a network dynamics model, a
physically-based diffusion model, and an agent-based model. These methods are by no
means the purpose or motivation for the work presented here, but they do play an im-
portant role. While analytical and statistical models (which are also applied below) can
provide exact solutions, computational models are mostly beneficial for their dynamics and
simulations. They allow us to incorporate a broader range of factors, and make sense of
the behaviors that result through their use in multiple experiments and under different
assumptions.
Investigating spatial interactions begs for a revisiting of the idea of the commons and
its application to fisheries. Fishing areas are often considered quintessential common pool
resources, but the cross-boundary effect and complex dynamics described above require a
more nuanced vision. A central goal of this dissertation is to fill out such a vision.
The first part of the thesis explores qualitative arguments around spatial commons, cul-
minating in a new conceptual model of the “Distributed Commons”. The second part seeks
to ground this model in empirical analyses, which together inform a concrete, computational
model of the Distributed Commons presented in the last chapter. This final model provides
new opportunities for many experimenting with policy changes and applications to specific
contexts.
Developing a new conceptual model of the commons requires revisiting the origins of
the current one. The second chapter describes the development of the concept of the fishery
commons through the history of the World Bank fishery projects.
The third chapter considers the large-scale, emergent consequences of local interactions
in fisheries. To do so, it studies the model of self-organized criticality and looks at its past
and potential treatment in fisheries.
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The fourth chapter develops a theoretical model of distributed commons, which pro-
vides a new perspective on spatial fishery management. This model expands the idea of
a commons, and builds on a broader understanding of cross-scale and cross-boundary in-
teractions. This model will be returned to from a computational perspective, after the a
number of other techniques are applied to ground the model in data.
Starting the second part, the fifth chapter studies the use of catch-only models for
studying spatial movements of fisheries. These results will be used to parameterize fish
diffusion in the computational model.
The sixth chapter analyzes the benefits of marine protected areas for exploited fisheries.
This will draw upon the fish population distributions from appendix 2 and the logistic
model studied in chapter 4. The results will further inform the way that unfished areas
affect fished areas in the computational model.
The seventh chapter will present and calibrate the computational model of distributed
commons, and perform a number of experiments considering different features of it.
Combined, these perspectives provide a rigorous sketch aimed at informing the evolution
of fisheries management. Fisheries science has been engaging progressively more with these
features: the systemic feedbacks between fishers and ecosystems, the spatial structure of
fishery systems, and the management implications of these features.
There remains a gap between the material studied here and active fisheries management.
The political economy of management decisions is only considered in a theoretical light, and
the models of fish ecology are consistently simplistic. It remains a task for future work and
the broader management community to understand how applicable these results and models
are to real contexts.
At the same time, as studies of spatial features in tightly coupled socio-ecological sys-
tems, these studies have applicability beyond just fisheries. Each chapter has two parallel
aims: to inform fisheries policy and to identify broader implications for spatial complexity
in sustainable development. In this context, the simplicity of the models used here is a
strength, lending them to general results and methods for non-fisheries research. It is my




We are living through a global crisis in fisheries management. Increased demands on
fisheries now impact every corner of the ocean, with collapsing fish populations in many
regions. Tradable catch shares have grown to well-justified prominence just as the single-
stock approach that underlies them is being undermined. This year, the US’s landmark
fishery management policy, the Magnuson-Stevens Act, is being debated in congress to be
reauthorized and amended, amidst a confusing mix of skepticism and institutional learning,
of failures and successes. I believe that the Distributed Commons has much to inform this
debate, and paves the way for a much longer scientific inquiry into the spatial domain in
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Creating the Fishery Commons
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Figure 2.1: Reproduced from Kirby (1884, p. 68).
Published as Creating the Commons: Fisheries and the World Bank, Ris-
ing (2014), with thanks to Dr. Michele Alacevich.
This chapter provides a close inspection of the conceptual foundations of fisheries man-
agement. One of the central goals of this thesis is to develop new understandings of fisheries,
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and common resources in general, to open up new opportunities for research and policy. The
economic perspective on fishery commons developed out of a historical process which con-
tinues to shape the ideas in this work. Better understanding that process can inform new
conceptual opportunities.
The tragedy of the commons is one of the most pervasive and insidious problems in
social science. Forests, fisheries, clean water, and greenhouse gases, for example, can each
act as open-access resources fraught with difficulties related to the tragedy of the commons.
According to both economic theory and numerous case studies, many of the commons in
the international arena and in developing countries are particularly difficult to manage, due
to weak ownership rights, unpredictable dynamics, and widely dispersed resources (Ostrom,
2009).
Since its introduction by Garrett Hardin in 1968, the concept of the tragedy of the
commons has evolved and achieved a central role in resource management. In 1979, ac-
cording to Godwin and Shepard, the commons was “the dominant framework within which
social scientists portray environmental and resource issues.” Thirty years later, the World
Development Report of 2010 claimed, without further justification, that “climate change
is a crisis of the commons” (World Bank, 2010). However, the hegemony of the commons
idea is debatable. Political scientists critique the commons as a vast simplification, inappro-
priately abstracting across diverse resource types and institutions (Godwin and Shepard,
1979). Historians point out that its founding myth is based on faulty history (Cox, 1985).
Elinor Ostrom and others, through case study work, have identified countless local ex-
periences that are inconsistent with the commons story, due to diverse local institutions
that support the sustainable management of common resources (Ostrom, 1990, Dietz et al.,
2003). This has led to backlash against Hardin’s characterization, reframing the discourse
as a “comedy of the commons” and arguing that both commons and their management
opportunities provide intrinsic benefits (Rose, 1986, McCay, 1996). Even so, there remains
a consensus that although “communal property” regimes can viably support sustainable
resource usage, “open-access” regimes cannot (Feeny et al., 1990).
In this article, I will explore how this paradigm achieved its current position by examin-
ing the World Bank’s role in fisheries development. Fisheries are of interest both as a tool
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for economic development and as a key concern for sustainability science. They have poten-
tial for helping poor communities and supporting country-wide nutrition. Unfortunately,
they exhibit many characteristics where tragedies of the commons would be most expected,
such as pervasive uncertainty and mobile stocks (Schlager, 1994), strong outside pressures
(Alder and Sumaila, 2004), and large and poorly-constrained communities (Ostrom, 2009).
Globally, fisheries show a startling mix of robust traditional management practices and
devastating collapse. Better understanding of the role of the concept of the commons in the
formation of institutions can both help explain this variation and improve planning for the
future.
This paper makes some assumptions concerning a partial theory of history. It holds that
society, through its actors and institutions, is constantly creating ideas that are simultane-
ously shaping the perspectives taken by their adherents. As the West developed its idea of
“the commons,” it changed how it advised other countries to manage their “open resources”.
This economics-motivated vision of the commons is limited, and management through it
can be culturally and environmentally disruptive. This paper does not attempt to analyze
the empirical power of the idea of the commons. Tragedies of the commons frequently arise
in the realms where economic theory predicts them. However, it is unclear how many of
these problems result from the perspectives that resource management institutions bring
to their tasks. By understanding the blind-spots inherent in our ideas of the commons, we
can recognize greater possibilities for managing these systems.
The key historical agent in this study is the World Bank’s rural development groups,
through the concerns and designs of their projects and loans as described in World Bank
documents on early fisheries projects, between 1963 and 1994. These documents are listed
in table 2.1, along with citation names used throughout the paper.
The first section provides an overview of the intellectual developments that followed
Hardin’s work. The second section provides a framework for understanding the history of
fisheries projects at the World Bank over this period. These two histories are then juxta-
posed to explain the shifts in awareness of commons problems and the debate concerning
the role of equity, in sections three and four. The documents concerning fishery projects in
Panama are used as a case-study of these shifting concerns in section five.
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Year Report or Discussion Paper Citation
1956 Iceland: Mission report WBS Iceland 1956
1963 China - Deep-Sea Fisheries Project WBP China 1963
1966 Korea - The economy (Vol. 4 of 8): Fisheries WBS Korea 1966
1967 China - Second Deep-Sea Fisheries Product Project WBP China 1967
1969 Ghana - Fisheries Project WBP Ghana 1969
1970 Senegal - The current economic situation and prospects (Vol. 4 of 7): Fisheries WBS Senegal 1970
1971 Panama - Fisheries Project WBP Panama 1971
1971 Mauritania - The current economic situation and prospects (Vol. 3 of 4): Fisheries WBS Mauritania 1971
1973 Iceland - Fishing Harbors Rehabilitation Project WBP Iceland 1973
1975 Panama - Fishing Port Project WBP Panama 1975
1977 India - Gujarat Fisheries Project WBP India 1977
1977 Panama - Second Fisheries Project WBP Panama 1977
1978 India - Andhra Pradesh Fisheries Project WBP India 1978
1979 People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen - Second Fisheries Development Project WBP
1979 Maldives - Fisheries Project WBA Maldives 1979
1979 Panama - First Fisheries Project Audit WBA Panama 1979
1979 Philippines - Fishery Training Project WBA Philippines 1979
1980 Yemen Arab Republic - Fisheries Development Project WBP Yemen 1980
1980 Rethinking artisanal fisheries development: Western concepts, Asian experiences WBR 1980
1983 Maldives - Second Fisheries Project WBP Maldives 1983
1983 Panama - Second Fisheries Project Audit WBA Panama 1983
1984 Somalia - Fisheries Exploration - Pilot Project WBP Somalia 1984
1987 India - Gujarat Fisheries Project WBP
1989 Tunisia - Second Fisheries Project WBP
1992 Fisheries development, fisheries management, and externalities WBR 1992
1992 Maldives - Second Fisheries Project Completion Report WBP Maldives 1992
1992 Yemen - Fisheries Development Project Completion Report WBA Yemen 1992
1994 Managing fishery resources: proceedings of a symposium WBR
1994 World fisheries: avoiding a natural resource disaster WBR
1994 Mauritania - Fisheries sector review WBS Mauritania 1994
1994 Managing redundancy in overexploited fisheries WBR
1994 Fisheries in the Maldives and Yemen WBA Maldives/Yemen 1994
1995 Fisheries Subsector Capacity Building Project - Development Credit Agreement WBR
1996 Managing transboundary stocks of small pelagic fish: problems and options WBR
Table 2.1: World Bank published documents concerning fisheries, 1956 - 1996. The documents are classified
by their citation as follows: WBS are economic or sector reports, WBP are project reports, WBA are project
audits, and WBR are staff discussion working papers and institutional reports. The project reports are often
treasure troves of supplemental documents, including descriptions of concurrent UNDP/FAO projects and
institutional structures, and documents from national institutions.
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2.1 A short history of tragedy of the commons
Concern over the management of the commons has had a long history in the West.1 Hardin
was inspired by Lloyd (1833), who asked, “Why are the cattle on a common so puny
and stunted? Why is the common itself so bare-worn and cropped so differently from the
adjoining enclosures?” Within fisheries, the debate reaches back at least to the identification
of the problem in Grotius, Mare Liberum (lit. The Free Sea, 1609), and the political and
economic solution in Selden, Mare Clausum (lit. The Closed Sea, 1635). During the 1950s,
seminal works applied economic theory to fisheries, and argued that severe inefficiencies are
inevitable without property rights (Gordon, 1954, Scott, 1955, Schaefer, 1957).
The “tragedy of the commons” was coined by Hardin in 1968:
Picture a pasture open to all. [A group of herdsmen uses the pasture, and it
initially provides more than enough for all of their sheep.] ... The rational
herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add
another animal to his herd. And another.... But this is the conclusion reached
by each and every rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy.
Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without
limit– in a world that is limited. ... Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.
The necessary elements of a commons tragedy include that (1) the commons are “open”: an
agent’s increased use of it is not restricted; (2) resources are limited: one agent’s use of them
diminishes the resources available to other agents; (3) agents want to increase their use of it
for their individual benefit, despite the collective loss. In the absence of strong management
which changes these conditions, the common resource will be excessively depleted. The
tragedy of the commons is not simply that it is over-used, but that there is no individual
incentive to maintain it.
However, not all commons are subject to the tragedy of the commons. Since Hardin’s
paper, hidden assumptions and key distinctions have been identified to explain a growing list
of common-pool resource with robust management regimes. Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop
1Dietz et al. (2002) provides a more complete survey of the intellectual history of commons.
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(1975) described the difference between open-access regimes (res nullius), the classic “free-
for-all” situation, and common property (res communes). Common property can support
a variety of management institutions within the group that shares a given resource. This
distinction was further explored by Ostrom and Ostrom (1977) by recognizing a spectrum
between high and low “subtractability of use” and high and low “difficulty of exclusion”.
“Open-access resources” are those with both high subtractability and high difficulty of
exclusion, and not all “common-pool resources” are open-access.2 Levine (1986) argued
that the economic theory of the commons is far from self-evident, and its unexpressed
assumptions include that “individual rationality [runs] counter to ‘group rationality” and
that “behavior in a commons system [is] independent of social and historical context”.
Furthermore, the source and composition of the rights held by resource users varies widely.
Institutional arrangements can endow different users with the right to access (or enter) a
resource, to withdraw resource products, to manage or alter the resource system, to exclude
other users, and to alienate by selling or leasing other collective-choice rights (Schlager and
Ostrom, 1992, Ostrom, 2000).3
Concurrent with the development of a better understanding of the commons, many au-
thors investigated policy implications for proper management. The core economic solution
to common-pool problems is privatization, later expanded to include a variety of methods of
“restricting access and creating incentives” (Ostrom et al., 1999). Modern theory focuses on
the variety of factors which influence whether the expected benefits of managing a commons
exceed the perceived costs, and on the complex relationship between governments and local
management institutions. The interactions between resource users within social-ecological
systems and their institutional context are complex and varied, producing a wide variety
of potential common property regimes. As a result, no “one-size-fits-all” solution exists for
managing the commons (Ostrom, 2010).
2While historically, “common property theory” was the economic study of open-access resources, I will re-
serve the term “common property” for resources managed by an exclusive group, and use the terms “common-
pool” and “the commons” for resources that admit both open-access and common property regimes.
3Ostrom (2009) identifies the size of the resource system, its productivity, its predictability, the mobility
of its units, the number of users, leadership, norms and social capital, knowledge, importance of the resource,
and the ability to create rules as important factors determining the capacity of users to self-organize.
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The major approaches to adjusting this cost-benefit balance are closing the commons
through property rights, and encouraging self-organization of user communities by enforcing
boundaries on the commons. Higher-level institutions can strengthen local ones, through
state legitimization, enabling legislation, cultural revitalization, capacity building, and in-
stitution building (Pinkerton, 1989, Berkes, 2002).
However, centralization and higher-level management also has the potential to under-
mine local institutions. The centralization of decision-making, increased role of science and
economics, development policies aimed at growth, and market forces have all been shown
to undermine local governance of commons (Berkes, 2002). Furthermore, de jure regimes
can have complex relationships with the de facto rules under which resource users act. For
example, when many countries nationalized their natural resources in the 1960s, community
management practices lost their legal standing and many resources became de facto open-
access when governments lacked the capacity to manage the resources themselves (Ostrom,
2000). Klooster (2000) makes the role of development organizations explicit:
Analysts acknowledge that these complex resource management systems are
often susceptible to break down following intervention from the state, commer-
cialization, land degradation, population pressures, encroachment, and the ex-
propriation of disproportionate shares of common resources by a few members
of the community. A common lament equates the development process with
enclosure. The “real tragedy of the commons” is the destruction of common
pool resource management systems and subsequent degradation following the
intrusion of modernizing states and modern economic relationships.
This dynamic plays a key role in the present study, as the history of the economic devel-
opment of commons resources has gone hand-in-hand with the undermining of traditional
management and subsequent resource collapse. As a central document in this study, WBR
1980, argues, “As commercialization proceeds... restraining norms may collapse, competi-
tion may intensify, and fishing effort may escalate. Development projects themselves may
accelerate this process.”4
4An extensive literature discusses open-access resources in international development (e.g., Norton, 2004,
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2.2 Fisheries at the World Bank
The World Bank’s approach to agriculture in general and fisheries in particular has shifted
multiple times in the past 50 years. For clarity, I divide the time between 1963 and 1994
into four periods based on the attitudes as reflected fisheries projects (see figure 2.2).
Roughly speaking, the World Bank focused on capital-intensive projects until the early
1970s; then emphasized small-holder poverty during McNamara’s tenure as World Bank
president; shifted to land reform during the 1980s; and finally integrated a vision fisheries
management starting in 1992. This section provides a general overview of these attitudes.
Woods McNamara
Capital Poverty Land Reform Management
Black Clausen Conable Preston WolfensohnWB President:
Agriculture Emphasis:
1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s
Fisheries Documents:
 0%  2.1%  1.1%  0.6%  0.9%Fishery Funds (% of Ag.):
Sector report Project report Project audit Discussion paper
Figure 2.2: World Bank presidents (lower blue bar), attitudes within agriculture (upper blue bar), and
fishery projects (vertical lines). The “Agricultural Emphasis” titles are only suggestive simplifications. The
bottom row shows the portion of agricultural funding from the World Bank used on fishery projects, from
Kapur et al. (1997).
The World Bank public archives list only 32 documents on fisheries before 2001, includ-
ing 15 project reports and 5 fishery sector studies. This reflects the World Bank’s early
sense of its “comparative advantage” in supporting capital-intensive projects (Kapur et al.,
1997). Early fisheries documents display this bias, financing large ship purchases (WBP
China 1963, WBP China 1967, WBP Panama 1971) and port infrastructure (WBP Ghana
1969, WBP Iceland 1973, WBP Panama 1975).
The Bank began to push agricultural development in 1963 with the inauguration of
George Woods, which coincides with the earliest World Bank fishery project (WBP China
1963). The objective of most early World Bank fishery projects was to support economic
growth and increase national fish consumption, in support of national agencies with these
Dasgupta, 2009).
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objectives.5 Early World Bank documents suggest a “command and control” view of fish-
eries. Their text focuses on quantities of ships to add or kinds of equipment to modernize
(WBP China 1963, WBP Ghana 1969, WBP Panama 1971). These discussions are engaged
with government needs, with very little indication of communication with existing fishing
communities.
Some word choices from the documents of this period are particularly evocative: projects
aim to support the fishing “industry”, and see it as a useful “source of animal protein” (e.g.,
WBP Panama 1971). Management during this time period appears to have been considered
a process of managing biomass, rather than managing a fishery system consistent of fish-
ing communities and ecosystems.6 These assumptions undermined project planning as the
World Bank failed to anticipate the role that local communities would have in project im-
plementation, and led to an under-appreciation for the “international dimensions” of fishery
projects (WBA Panama 1983). Within agriculture, three groups debated and collaborated
on agricultural projects: the technical agriculturalists, generalist operators, and redistri-
butional reformists. WBA Panama 1983 suggests that the lack of integration of different
camps is to blame for much of the failure in fishery projects, particularly where engineering
expertise and policy expertise where not combined.
During the 1970s, the emphasis displayed in fishery projects shifted to focus on a wider
range of needs in poor communities, to “increasing the flow of benefits to the rural popu-
lation and raising the standard of living of the fishermen’s families” (WBA Panama 1983).
McNamara’s tenure, 1968 - 1981, increased lending to agricultural and rural development
5The growth of productivity in agriculture is considered a foundational stage of economic growth (e.g.,
Rostow, 1991). Agricultural policies in development have reflected the concerns of many time periods. Near
the end of the colonial era, irrigation and other agricultural projects took on a simultaneously massive scale
and limited scope, typically aiming at a single cash crop and replacing local institutions (Westad, 2005). In
the 1950s African leaders sought an agricultural sector that was “economically strong and politically weak”,
and developed collectivist farming practices which ultimately failed across the continent (Cooper, 2002).
6Another interesting issue surrounds “fishing cooperatives” (e.g., WBS Korea 1966). In modern man-
agement literature, cooperatives are considered foundational to solving commons problems. However, in
the World Bank documents, the cooperatives are considered solely as serving the economic needs of fishers,
such as constructing joint deals with buyers. They seem to not have had a role in reacting to over-fishing
problems, although both cooperatives and over-fishing are frequently discussed in the same documents.
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projects. In this, McNamara emphasized projects that favored smallholders and the very
poor. Kapur et al. (1997) asserts that “McNamara’s antipoverty agenda delivered resources
to a large number of needy people, and many small cultivators achieved lasting gains in
productivity.”
However, Kapur et al. (1997) also critiques McNamara’s agricultural and rural devel-
opment interventions for delaying the development of self-reliant institutions. By provid-
ing external support for external policies, the World Bank undermined the potential for
self-organization. In this way, the World Bank acted analogously to government agencies
intervening into local fishery commons.
World Bank fishery projects in the 1970s had a consistently poor track record for their
stated goals (WBA Panama 1983). Of the 7 projects audited before 1982, one was canceled,
two were left mostly unimplemented, and three were implemented approximately halfway
(the remaining one was completed). The rate of return for the six implemented projects
was zero or negative for half, and low and substantially supported by an unintended use
of funds in two others. In addition, catches per fisherman are reported to have dropped or
otherwise under-performed in four.
Year Project Name Completion Cost Ratio Returns Ratio Catches
1968 Ecuador - Fisheries Project 4 of 12 ships 1.02 negative “much lower than expected”
1969 Ghana - Fisheries Project 10 of 40 ships 0.78 0.2 “limited landings”
1970 Indonesia - First Fisheries Project incomplete 1.93 negative “far below targets”
1971 Panama - First Fisheries Project 26 of 40 ships 1.01 0 decreased catch per vessel
1971 Tunisia - First Fisheries Project 187 of 335 boats 0.94 1.2 high prices offset low catches
1973 Yemen - First Fisheries Project complete 1.48 0.4 (not mentioned)
1974 Iran Fisheries Project unimplemented N/A N/A N/A
Table 2.2: Project audit summaries from WBA Panama 1983. Cost and return ratios are relative to the
expected values at project initiation.
Throughout the World Bank’s history, it has “expressed an appreciation of the organiz-
ing and efficiency-enhancing capacity of self-adjusting, or only lightly regulated, markets”,
while recognizing the need for legal supporting institutions and government intervention
in cases of market failures (Kapur et al., 1997). Open-access tragedies are one form of
market failure, although the aim of the government intervention encouraged by pro-market
economists is predominantly to better support market functioning, from which more direct
benefits are expected.
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The World Bank’s advocacy of private ownership has shifted over its existence, centered
around a key distinction between private firms and the market. During the 1950s and
1960s, the World Bank aimed its policies at supporting markets composed primarily of
private firms. However, McNamara’s tenure introduced a decade-long distinction between
the ownership and control of industries, recognizing that firm decisions depend more on
public and private bureaucrats than legal owners. In light of this, the World Bank recognized
that “country mixes of ownership reflected local histories, ideologies, and politics, and, given
the liberation of markets, interveners such as the Bank should be slow to second-guess local
ownership choices” (Kapur et al., 1997). Some fishery projects in the 1970s, most notably
in Panama, operated in the context of an existing history of local management techniques,
which the World Bank did not attempt to critique until reviews in the 1980s. However,
internally, the World Bank never had a unified perspective, and the markets-ownership
distinction was rejected by many of the Bank’s staff (Kapur et al., 1997).
This market-ownership distinction was abandoned with the Berg Report, in 1981 (Accel-
erated Development of Sub-Saharan Africa). This report argued that government agencies
were inherently inefficient, and privatization of state enterprises became a norm. In agri-
culture and fisheries, the World Bank, along with many other institutions, began to argue
that governments should withdraw from economic management (Kapur et al., 1997). The
rise of adjustment lending in the 1980s also drove a decline in money available for fishing
projects.
This change was reflected within rural development as a push for decentralization and
land reform. Access rights began to be emphasized across all sectors of development, and
fishery project reports during this time period show this concern.
Two key ideas are conflated in this shift, as it relates to the commons. Private ownership
is held up as a means to secure efficient markets and accelerate development. Private own-
ership is also upheld within commons, as a solution to an open-access problem. However,
the situation is different in these two cases. In the case of agency privatization, bringing
an institution into the market with private ownership is said to produce monetary benefits.
In the case of commons management, a resource already in a market is in a state of legal
ambiguity, and benefits are to be gained by affirming some ownership rights while deny-
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ing others. Privatization transfers ownership from a government to a firm, while access
restriction transfers ownership from a community to a firm.
This distinction makes the drive for governments to cease their interventions in the
commons in the 1980s difficult to interpret. It is unclear if government withdrawal entailed
handing resources over to the free-market by means of extensive legal reform, institution-
alizing private ownership where it previously was not, or if it resulted in giving local com-
munities freer reign to self-organize. The World Bank documents studied here suggest that
the emphasis shifted between these interpretations during this pivotal decade.
By 1993, the need for environmental impact assessments was recognized and institution-
alized by the guiding “Agriculture Sector Review” (World Bank, 1993). This report reflects
a recognition of past environmental failures, including over-exploitation. The report called
for “environmentally friendly technologies and management practices” (World Bank, 1993),
and discussed policies aimed at reducing unsustainable pressure on natural resources. At
the same time, both the importance of common resource management and a set of economic
solutions appears to have become fully established, as reflected in fishery reports at that
time. The core principles of this approach are familiar: the need for proactive management
of fisheries resources to avoid over-use, and the importance of secure property rights to
ensure secure management regimes.
2.3 Commons at the World Bank
The first mention of the commons in World Bank fishery documents is in WBR 1980,
a document largely aimed at discussing its implications. The commons, as such, is not
mentioned again in project reports until documents in 1992, 1994, and 1996, addressed
internationally, discussing fisheries management with view toward access rights. With the
exception of the 1980 report, all fishery documents prior to 1992 are nation- or project-
specific. The document titles give a sense of their concern over the tragedy. The 1994
document is “World fisheries: avoiding a natural resource disaster”, suggesting that bad
management was recognized as rampant. In 1996, “Managing transboundary stocks of small
pelagic fish: problems and options” identifies fish populations where national property laws
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are absent as particularly problematic (a view shared by current marine economists). These
documents suggest that by the mid-1990s, the importance of the open-access problem and
the economic perspective on it and solution to it had emerged.
Starting in 1994, these ideas began to be incorporated into country projects. WBS
Mauritania 1994 highlights four approaches to fishery management: licenses, quotas, taxes,
and territorial use rights. The potential for management through traditional methods or
through technology and time restrictions as described in Panama reports two decades earlier
is entirely ignored.
Figure 2.3 shows some simple word analyses, which I will not dwell upon. Although
it is impossible to draw conclusions from them, the trends described in the figure caption
corroborate this shifting view of the commons.
The core of commons fishery problem is over-fishing, and the solutions proposed for over-
fishing evolved during this time period. Early documents expressed concern over decreases
in “catch per vessel” as the number of vessels fishing increased, focusing on the revenue-
needs of the fishers. However, reports written before and shortly after Hardin’s article
consistently expressed uncertainty about whether these decreases represented ecological
over-fishing (WBS Korea 1966, WBP China 1967, WBS Senegal 1970), that is, a drawing-
down of the resource as opposed to a wider division amongst harvesters. Some reports
offered rationales for why over-fishing was impossible (e.g., WBP Panama 1971), and
conservation is only mentioned as a strategy for management twice before 1992 (WBS
Iceland 1956, WBP Panama 1971). Where over-fishing became a problem, the first solution
was often an expansion of fishing area (WBS Senegal 1970, WBP Panama 1971). However,
placing limits on the level of fishing effort was soon considered, through limiting the capacity
of fishers to bring fish to market (e.g., WBP Panama 1971), or by limiting the amount of
time they spent on the waters (e.g., WBA Panama 1983).
A similar story unfolds with global tuna stock.7 Several World Bank reports catalog the
7The documents that include tuna stock development are WBP China 1963, WBP China 1967, WBS
Korea 1966, WBP Ghana 1969, WBA Maldives 1979, WBP Maldives 1983, WBP Maldives 1992, WBS
Mauritania 1971, WBS Mauritania 1994, WBP Panama 1971, WBP Panama 1975, WBA Panama 1983,
WBS Senegal 1970 and WBP Somalia 1984.
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Figure 2.3: Word frequencies by year, relative to total document word counts for all World Bank fishing
documents through 2001. Top: Any mention of fishery management in project documents was brief until
1992. Middle: Discussion of access rights started growing in 1967, peaked around 1978, and diminished
until strong rise in 1992. This rise and fall suggests an active debate around commons issues, preceding
the synthesis in the 1990s, in line with the narrative in section 3. Bottom: Based on word occurrences,
there seems to have been a decreasing interest in over-fishing from 1956 to 1980; followed by sporadic panic,
suggesting that the problem was ignored through the 1980s, but not resolved.
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growth of an international open-access problem, but with little awareness of it at the time.
Evidence of over-fishing is consistently ignored: “The fear that declining catch rates during
1962 to mid-1965 indicated depletion of the resource was allayed by the sharp rise in catch
rates from mid-1965 to 1966” (WBP China 1967). The rise was temporary. Through the
1960s, there was no awareness of the open-access problem as such:
It seems evident that the additional vessels introduced by Taiwan have had no
influence on levels of catch and there is no reason to believe that the addition of
a further 20 vessels would affect the abundance of stocks distributed over such
a wide area. Japan has now ceased increasing its deep-sea tuna fleet and the
foreseeable participation of other nations in the Indian Ocean tuna fishery is
unlikely to have any significant impact on the stocks. (WBP China 1967)
However, a decade later, some international fishing regions had restricted fishing to brief
seasons to try to maintain tuna stocks (WBP Panama 1975). Of the regions that mention
tuna in their reports, tuna stocks in China, Ghana, South Korea, Mauritania, and Panama
have since collapsed (according to the catch-based criteria used by Worm et al. (2006)).
Catch per unit effort shows temporary increases, followed by collapse for China, as well as
a general downward trend globally (see figure 2.4).
Evidence of project attempts to preempt over-fishing start in the late 1970s. The World
Bank began to encourage the monitoring of fish populations under intense exploitation
(WBP India 1977, WBP India 1978, WBA Philippines 1979). Simultaneously, however,
some reports in the late 1970s offer rationales for why over-fishing should not be a concern
(WBA Maldives 1979, WBA Philippines 1979). By 1992, monitoring was considered a
necessary element of fisheries management; for example, one report advised that “careful
monitoring of landings [i.e., catches] is desirable even though tuna stocks do not appear to
be under pressure.” (WBP Maldives 1992).
Two external milestones make a useful comparison. The northeast Atlantic cod fisheries,
one of the most important European fisheries, peaked around 1968, followed by lower catches
and a total collapse in 1992. World catches across all wild fish leveled off between 1968 and
1980. Starting in 1981, world catch rose again until 1986, and has since remained level.
This helps explain concern for over-fishing in the 1970s, which lessened in the 1980s.
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Figure 2.4: Top: Catch per unit effort (CPUE) for tuna within the exclusive economic zone of China
between 1952 and 1980. Catch data is from Sea Around Us (2007) and effort data is from the Western &
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), translating all effort metrics into a single “effective fishing
days” estimate. The red lines denote the years of the two China fishery projects, WBP China 1963 and
WBP China 1967. While catch rates increased temporarily after each project, a collapse occurred within a
few years. Bottom: Extrapolated CPUE for tuna globally, using WCPFC hook data as a proxy for global
effort. These estimates do not include the 2.42% additional yearly increase in effective effort suggested by
Watson et al. (2012), which would exacerbate the downward trend.
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Concerns around access restrictions also shifted. Between the 1960s and mid-1970s the
term “access” is almost never used in World Bank reports with respect to a management
regime. The sole exception is a positive observation in WBP China 1967 that the global
tuna stock “constitute a truly international resource accessible to all fishing countries.” As
the World Bank increased its focus on supporting private enterprise in agriculture during
the late 1970s and 1980s, project reports expressed positive interest in access for fisheries,
focusing on increasing the benefits to fishers of market access, through the building of roads
and other infrastructure. The potential for unsustainable usage is absent from discussions
of providing this kind of access.
Quotas were finally proposed as a management strategy in WBA Panama 1983, in
fairly exploratory terms. Modern quotas are licenses which allow a ship to catch a certain
tonnage of fish over the course of a season. In the last decade, ITQs (individual transferable
quotas) have grown to be considered a fundamental component of management in many
developed regions (Heal and Schlenker, 2008). In the World Bank corpus, quotas were first
mention in WBP China 1963, expressed in the sense of a communist-style production quota.
They were not mentioned in the 1980 report that tried to bring the problem of commons
management to light. However, by WBR 1992, transferable catch quotas were considered a
natural solution to the commons tragedy. In 1994, a sector report in Mauritania provides
an extensive discussion of the implementation difficulties and complexities of quotas, which
is further expanded in a 2001 Argentina report.
2.4 Equity in the World Bank commons
WBR 1980 describes the years leading up to the Berg Report, at a time when studies of
the commons had identified a number of failings in Hardin’s original theory. This study is
inspired by Southeast Asian observations (its author, Donald Emmerson, is an Asia-Pacific
scholar), but addresses fishing world-wide. WBR 1980 is largely a critique of the appli-
cability of the theory of open-access resources to fisheries and its solutions to the tragedy
of the commons: “[the open-access argument] is not sensitive enough to the contexts in
which fishing occurs, to the different patterns of human behavior and motivation that, in
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different cultures, influence the fishing act and its consequences.” This sentiment echoes
Ostrom (2010) emphasis on socio-ecological contexts as well as the concern for local com-
munity needs and expertise prominent during McNamara’s tenure. While the concerns
expressed by actors in this history echo issues codified by later authors, there are significant
differences. The motivating concern in WBR 1980 is the poverty of fisherman.
A brief overview of fisheries management theory helps contextualize this report. Since
the 1930s, “maximum sustainable yield” (MSY) has been a primary concern of fisheries
management– the idea is to ensure that fish stocks are maintained at a level of maximum
production of new fish to catch. Too high of a stock would leave little room for new fish;
too low of a stock would lack an optimal number of reproductive age fish.8
Starting in the 1950s, fishery economists began to advocate for management to optimize
economic efficiency. Gordon (1954) characterized the goal of “maximum economic yield”
(MEY), which seeks to optimize fisheries at a lower level of exploitation than for MSY but
at a higher profit. MEY differs from MSY both due to an integrated accounting of the
cost of exploitation, and due to discounting potential future benefits from the fishery in a
market that provides alternative investment opportunities. Scott (1955) added to Gordon’s
work by arguing that sole ownership of fishery resources was the most efficient institution
for achieving MEY. According to WBR 1980, this movement was interpreted differently by
many developing countries. They recognized a choice between MEY and MSY: governments
could choose to maximize economic benefit, using their fisheries as drivers for development,
or to maximize yield and thereby the number of poor fisheries who could be supported by
a region’s fishery. Many socialist countries made an explicit policy choice for the latter.
During the 1970s, the debate around fisheries shifted to focus on whose ends should
be served by the restrictions involved in fishery management: whose property should the
oceans become (Royce, 1988)? Economists in the developed world claimed that common
property regimes, by at best supporting MSY, led to greater poverty. Sole ownership, on
8In general, open-access yield is much lower than MSY. The level of fishing effort which produces MSY
is optimal under zero discounting of future profits, while effort in an open-access fishery corresponds to an
infinite level of discounting: there is no incentive in an open-access commons to preserve current stock for
future yields (Conrad and Clark, 1987, chap. 2). Fishers will increase their exploitation and additional
fishers will join the fishery until the marginal fisher earns zero profit.
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the other hand, created the incentives for MEY and led to accelerated growth. WBR 1980
argues that this narrative ignores issues of wealth distribution. Economics saw the poten-
tial economic benefits as “dissipated” in a common property regime, while other groups
saw these benefits as “shared” (WBR 1980). Developed countries argued for conservation
and exclusion, while developing countries argued for distribution. These policies often inte-
grated well with preexisting cultural norms to share benefits, in opposition to the “rational
agent” assumptions typically made by in the economic analysis of open-access resources
(e.g. Gordon, 1954).
Simultaneously, there was a growing recognition that the core of the fishery problem was
industrial fishing. Clark (1973) notes “The most spectacular and threatening developments
of today... can by no means be attributed to impoverished local fishermen. On the contrary
it is the large, high-powered ships and the factory fleets of the wealthiest nations that
are now the real danger.”9 Royce (1988) argued that open access should be preserved for
non-commercial and subsistence use, and identified commercial exploitation as the cause of
management problems. For these commercial entities, however, the management blueprint
follows economic theory: “the rights should be owned, be transferable, and be divisable, so
that sale or purchase of them would let a fishing business become efficient.”
A decade after WBR 1980, WBR 1992 presents a different economic understanding of
commons issues. In this report, the scope of policies for addressing commons problems
consists of the range from “governmental restrictions on use of the resource to emergence of
private collectives to allocate use rights.” While government is not considered a necessary
actor, access rights are. A lack of property rights is considered synonymous with a lack of
restrictions.
WBR 1992 includes a short section on equity concerns that can arise from access-rights
management schemes. These paragraphs read as highly skeptical of equity issues, while
noting that restrictions “could change the proportion of small to large scale fishermen”,
9For example, this became a key issue in WBP Yemen 1980: “With unclear objectives left open to
local interpretation by weak management, the corporation did initially focus heavily on its own non-project
commercial catching and marketing activities which threatened to come into conflict with the interests of
the small-scale fishermen.” (WBA Yemen 1992)
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and that “the resulting distribution of income from fishing could be highly skewed”. In
light of this, WBR 1992 recommends that “policy-makers who use fishery management as a
development strategy may need to be sensitive to the occasional need to sacrifice economic
efficiency in order to assure survival of economically disadvantaged groups, at least in the
short run.” The assumption is that once rights are firmly established, markets will efficiently
ensure collective benefits.10 This perspective could not be more at odds with WBR 1980.
During the 1970s, fishery management mainly aimed to either ensure high benefits to
stakeholders or to ensure high yields. WBR 1992 reinterprets the aims of management
as correcting a market externality. It argues that “fishery management may be a highly
effective strategy to increase the contribution of the fishery sector to the net economic
output of society, including the fishery sector itself.” The World Bank had absorbed a keen
awareness of commons problems, and concentrated on resolving them while disregarding
the equity concerns that arose from its economic solutions.
The economic solution to the commons seems to have co-evolved with the drive for a free-
market approach to fisheries. WBA Maldives/Yemen 1994 reviews a series of fishery projects
in the Maldives and Yemen, aimed at supporting small-scale fishermen. In Yemen, the
fisheries were explicitly opened to the free-market through the World Bank’s intervention,
replacing a state-run agency. In the Maldives, WBA Maldives/Yemen 1994 advises caution
in doing the same only because “the pool of private entrepreneurs may be too small to
quickly replace the State Trading Organization.” These observations seem to be made
without consideration that one likely consequence of increased free-market demand without
governance of the commons is a tragedy of over-fishing. The report provides evidence that
a state of over-fishing is being approached, but advises “investigation” and “monitoring”,
rather than management.
10The section argues that any disenfranchised groups could be retrained or simply supported financially
using of the new profits.
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2.5 Panama’s fishery projects
In the 1970s, equity was a primary concern, and by 1992, free-markets were the solution.
Did this transition reflect a failure of previous management? The World Bank’s early fishery
development work in Panama offers additional insight into the years between 1971 and 1983,
with three project reports and two audits. Projects in 1971 and 1975 aimed at expand-
ing the shrimp fishery, with assurances that over-fishing was impossible but that careful
management was nonetheless required. In fact, early documents mention a surprisingly
proactive management style of the shrimp fishery, with existing government institutions
and interventions aimed at ensuring MSY. In response to decreasing catch per vessel, the
government placed a cap on allowable ships in 1968. By the time of the first fishery project,
in 1971, the shrimp fishery was already believed to be fully exploited; the project aimed to
replace old ships with new ships to stop catches from decreasing as ships aged and retired
(WBP Panama 1971). At the same time, the loan included a provision to educate ship
captains to increase the effectiveness of their exploitation, ignoring the increase in total
exploitation that would result from this effort.11
Old ships did not retire as expected, but the project ships were nonetheless added to
the fleet, depressing the catch per vessel. By 1977, catch had decreased so far that the
government prohibited any fishing for two breeding months each year.
An audit of the first fishery project, WBA Panama 1979, critically argues that even if
the old ships retired, the technologically-improved, newer ships would ensure an effective in-
crease in pressure on the stock, without benefit since the fishery was already fully exploited.
There were also significant problems with the enforcement of new standards, for example,
to limit ship horsepower. Another audit, WBA Panama 1983, has long comments about the
pervasive problem of over-fishing, which it claimed has plagued the fishing projects from
their beginning but was given insufficient attention. By 1983, a fishery collapse had not yet
occurred, but was expected.
The Panama government, however, may have held a different perspective. WBA Panama
1979 also includes a letter from National Bank of Panama (BNP), which adamantly denies
11WBP Panama 1975 has ecology section, but it only concerns fish odors.
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that the World Bank project contributed to over-fishing. The letter notes that the limit on
ships was only increased slightly to accommodate project ships (the project contributed 26
ships, one ship retired, and before the project there were 23 fewer ships than government-
imposed limit). There are two issues here. First, the BNP considered the natural limit to be
the one placed by the government, rather than one based on catch per vessel. This is partly
a question of whether fishing effort should be based on economic concerns or social decisions.
Second, for the BNP, an increase in vessels without a corresponding increase in catch did
not imply a failure– perhaps because they recognized the direct benefits to captains of the
new ships. The World Bank specifically avoided employment programs organized through
local institutions (Kapur et al., 1997), but WBA Panama 1983 notes pressure from the BNP
to make funding under the second project available to small-operation captains.
This short account suggests that in 1971 and 1975, the World Bank supported the man-
agement approaches taken by institutions in Panama, which aimed at equitably supporting
the fishing community. Investment in new ships and education was intended to ease the
burden on poor fishers, even if it could not raise their profits. By 1979, the World Bank
had shifted its perspective, and in 1983 measured the success of all past fisheries projects
by the single metric of economic returns.
2.6 Conclusion
The history told by Ostrom and others of the development of the concept of the commons
appears to be the story that the current antithesis tells about itself. However, there was a
previous antithesis, with a different story. That group, which was active within the World
Bank during 1970s, focused on equity concerns, and the problems involved in the transfer
of ownership entailed by the privatization of the commons.
Before 1992, the economic solution to commons tragedies was unclear, but not for a
lack of management expertise. Common property theory was well understood, as well as
the disruptive role of industrial fishers within traditional commons. Rather than identi-
fying effective traditional practices, the early commons movement focused on the effects
of economic intrusion. Traditional management formed a set of de facto owners, and the
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transition to a property-oriented approach to development and management often meant
disenfranchising these fishers.
Effective commons management hinges on the nature of over-fishing. If over-fishing is
defined in comparison to an optimal profit or to the behavior of a sole proprietor, then many
effective traditional management schemes fail. However, for many developing countries, the
potential for sharing wealth was considered more important. Governments actively engaged
with fishing communities in many regions, encouraging fair distribution and protecting
groups from industrial fishing pressures, at the expense of some potential economic growth.
The problem of over-fishing appeared prominently with the peaking of the European
cod fishery, in the same year that Hardin published The Tragedy of the Commons. During
the 1970s years, the World Bank supported governments playing a role in management,
and maintained a nuanced position on the utility of property rights and free-markets in
fisheries. Issues of access and usage restrictions were discussed in fishery reports, but the
emphasis was on supporting communities. With the Berg Report in 1981, privatization
became the norm. Free-market pressures increased and over-fishing occurred, but these
problems remained masked until the early 1990s as modern ships harvested ever wider
regions.
During the 1980s and 1990s, as traditional management schemes collapsed under the
new market demands, fishery economists developed new methods of management. A greater
role for property rights– through quotas, for example– was proposed as a solution to over-
fishing, though markets were also part of the problem. It would be another decade before
management of the market and more context-specific approaches were recognized as nec-
essary elements of fisheries policy, in light of an ever greater number of fishery collapses
around the world.
37






















































































































































Figure 3.1: Reproduced from Kirby (1884, p. 68).
This work was developed in 2011, with thanks to Drs. Jenna Lawrence
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and Jeffrey Sachs.
Fine-scale, local interconnections are often the source of the larger spatial structures
and dynamics that affect commons management. The class of models explored below in
the context of marine ecology provide a mechanism for making that connection. While the
implications of this model are more limited in their applicability than the model presented
in the next chapter, its insights inform the model-building process.
Cross-scale emergence is a common feature in marine ecosystems. Emergence in an
ecosystem describes the process by which “properties of the ecosystem at large spatial scales
result from feedback interactions between components occurring at smaller scales” (van de
Koppel et al., 2005). Classic examples include fish schooling (Hemelrijk and Hildenbrandt,
2012), synchronized spawning in coral reefs (Harrison et al., 1984), and the collapse of
open-access fisheries. In each of these cases, micro-behaviors of individual agents produce
dynamics that are usefully described at a macro-scale.
Emergence is a very general process, which can be produced by an unlimited range of
mechanisms. This chapter considers one class of those mechanisms, called self-organized
criticality. Self-organized criticality itself encompasses a broad range of behaviors and can
be explored through qualitatively different models. However, it provides a level of specificity
needed to identify useful insights into several forms of emergence in marine ecosystems.
3.1 Self-organized criticality
In the past two decades, the concept of self-organized criticality (SOC) has generated
considerable interest, in fields ranging from physics to finance. The implications of self-
organization and critical states have the potential to revolutionize our models of many
natural and social systems and reshape our intuition. This paper reviews the fairly limited
treatment that SOC has been given in marine ecology within the deeper literatures on com-
plex systems and fractals in marine environments. It also identifies some under-explored
potential that SOC has for informing research on conservation in marine ecosystems.
Self-organized criticality is a kind of emergent behavior found in a wide range of complex,
spatial, and historical systems. These systems exhibit a critical state between chaos and
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order, within which small perturbations can escalate to any size. Bak (1990) argues that
the large temporal fluctuations, and the spatial self-similarity [exhibited by many
systems] are two sides of the same coin: “self-organized criticality”. The idea
is that the systems operate persistently way out of equilibrium at or near a
threshold of instability. The systems evolve automatically to this critical state
without any fine-tuning of external fields; hence the criticality is self-organized.
Although the underlying mechanisms and structures that cause SOC are still unclear,
most SOC systems exhibit a collection of interrelated characteristics. First, like all natural
systems, these systems rely on structures in space or networks of connections, so their
dynamics cannot be fully described with analytical expressions. Furthermore, the full state
of the system is able to “build up” in time, historically and heterogeneously (Pascual and
Guichard, 2005). As it builds, driven by some force, the system approaches a critical limit,
beyond which it becomes locally and globally unstable. Instability leads to local collapses,
which can avalanche by further destabilizing nearby regions. The distribution of the sizes
of avalanches follows a power law, implying that there is no normal size of avalanches. As a
result of this ongoing build-and-collapse dynamic, the SOC system maintains an emergent
critical state. If the system is spatial, the critical state is characterized by fractal-shaped
patches of order and disorder (Bak, 1990). Thus, the system exhibits heterogeneous, scale-
independent features both in time and space.
The classic sand pile example, developed by Bak (1990), remains among the most in-
tuitive, and a brief overview is informative.1 In this computational model, grains of sand
fall on a plane, forming a pile. Sometimes, a grain of sand falls on an unstable area of
the pile’s slope, causing an avalanche. A graph of the number of avalanches versus their
size, measured in sand grains, conforms to a power law: for every doubling of avalanche
size, the number of avalanches decreases by a consistent factor (see figure 3.2, a). This is a
self-similar relationship, suggesting that the avalanches have no natural scale and very little
predictability. The continuous build-up of instability and avalanching process naturally or-
ganizes the pile into a critical state, where the next sand grain could produce an avalanche
1For other accessible examples, see Bak (1996) and Buchanan (2001).
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CHAPTER 3. MARINE SELF-ORGANIZED CRITICALITY
of any size. Furthermore, graphs of the destabilized regions from an avalanche have fractal
properties, implying that there is no natural size to these spatial structures (see figure 3.2,
b).
a) b)
Figure 3.2: Example power law relationship and fractal clusters, using the NetLogo Sandpile model (Weintrop
et al., 2011, Wilensky, 1999). The power law in (a) applies to the sizes of avalanche from a single grain drop.
An example region affected by an avalanche is shown in (b). The size and boundary of the avalanche region
in (b) is not readily apparent from the distribution of unstable regions, shown in the lightest shade of blue.
Models of self-organized criticality have been proposed for earthquakes, forest fires, mar-
ket fluctuations, human conflicts, and many other systems (see table 3.1). Many researchers
studying the intersection of ecology and SOC appear to focus on identifying SOC features
and extrapolating the implications of self-organizing forces. In particular, the power law
is often taken to be the arbiter of SOC: where it is absent, SOC is shown to not apply,
and where it acts, its characterization is often taken to imply a full SOC dynamic. If SOC
is common, it has important implications for the role of history and local events, and the
nature and predictability of catastrophic changes. As a tool for researchers, its main ad-
vantages include its departure from conventional (analytic and continuous) models, and the
general applicability of its results.
Ecosystems are perfect candidates for SOC, because of their spatial complexity and
nonlinearity, and their intense evolutionary forces and competitive limits. Jørgensen et al.
(1998) suggests that “ecosystems strive towards moving as much as possible from ther-
modynamic equilibrium,” placing them in the out-of-equilibrium domain of self-organized
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criticality. Studies have identified SOC features in insect populations (Lockwood and Lock-
wood, 1997), pelican populations (Milne and others, 1997), forest canopies (Kizaki and
Katori, 1999), river systems (Sapozhnikov and Foufoula-Georgiou, 1999), and many other
areas.
Despite this work, there appear to be plenty of opportunities to integrate the insights
from self-organized criticality more deeply into ecological studies. Theoretical work has
focused on simplified ecosystem SOC modeling, while many empirical studies seem satisfied
to identify power laws. In particular, the implications of scale-independence in ecosystems;
the community-wide relationships suggested by SOC; and the use of SOC metrics to gauge
ecosystem health warrant additional research, as described below.
3.2 Extinction in the marine fossil record
Self-organized criticality has long been suggested as an underlying cause of extinction in the
fossil record. Evolution exhibits the “punctuated equilibria” characteristic of self-organized
systems (Gould and Eldredge, 1977). This property of punctuated equilibria may also
be scale-independent, applying both to ecological (micro-evolution) and geological (macro-
evolutionary) timescales (Carson, 1975).
Bak and Sneppen (1993) proposed a simple self-organizing model of coevolution, in which
incremental evolutionary mutations organize the biosphere into a critical state of trophic
relationships, which then “collapse” into a cascade of extinctions and macro-evolutionary
changes. In particular, the size of extinction events is predicted to follow a power law re-
lationship, which suggests that species evolve into such a tightly knit complex for which
one extinction can start a chain of extinctions that can grow to any size. As an impli-
cation, very large extinction events may result from this same dynamic, rather than an
external catastrophe or qualitatively different process, if extinction events follow a power
law distribution.
This work set off a long empirical debate. Solé et al. (1997) found a strong power
law in family extinction records. However, other authors have suggested that this is an
artifact of the statistical methods used (Kirchner and Weil, 1998, Alroy, 2008). Further
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analysis showed that two distinct power law relationships may better explain the fossil
record (Newman and Eble, 1999). Eble (1999) found no support for SOC in the timing of
species origination for marine species, but did find evidence for SOC among land species.
Plotnick and Sepkoski Jr (2001) have attempted to move beyond this debate by applying
some elements of SOC while discarding the rest. They propose a generalization of SOC
properties called multifractal self-similarity:2
We also believe that the underlying assumptions of SOC are incompatible with
our understanding of the processes controlling macro-evolutionary patterns. Sta-
tistical analyses of the data sets are compatible, however, with the presence of
multifractal self-similarity in both records, consistent with a hierarchical and
multiplicative generating process.
It appears that some kind of deeper emergent structure underlies extinction– that it
is not a simple matter of exogenous catastrophic events– but the nature of this structure
remains unclear.
3.3 Scale-independence
Scale, applied to ecology, refers to both the spatiotemporal extent and resolution used in an
analysis (Wiens, 1989). Unlike some contexts and models studied for self-organized criti-
cality, marine environments have strong scale-dependence. Aronson (1992) emphasizes that
“variables such as abundance and diversity often behave unpredictably at one level of reso-
lution but produce predictable patterns at another”. For example, fish species distribution
in the Great Barrier Reef is fairly random at the scale of a single patch or atoll reef, but
show predictable patterns at the scale of reef systems. Phytoplankton distribution shows
a complicated set of patterns, dominated by local turbulence at the scale of kilometers,
ecosystem effects on a wider scale, and oceanic flows on a still wider scale (Wiens, 1989).
Although some authors have argued for scale-dependence in opposition to the simplic-
ity of SOC, ecological scales are neither surprising nor in opposition to the existence of
2Multifractals are distributions of a variable that show some spatiotemporal self-similarity. They have
also been proposed for spatial patterns of species abundance (Harte et al., 1999)
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scale-independent properties. Organisms work in very scale-dependent ways, because they
have a natural scale, and have evolved to exploit dynamics at particular scales. On a fine
enough scale, they can be considered a substrate for other organisms; at another scale, all
but the autotrophs act as predators; and on a yet wider scale, most organisms are prey.
This cycle repeats itself in a self-similar way at all scales. Azam et al. (1983) argues that the
marine food web spans seven orders of magnitude, from cyanobacteria and other bacteria
(the smallest of which are .2 µm) feeding nanoplanktonic flagellates, which feed microzoo-
plankton (such as ciliates), which feed a hierarchy of zooplankton topped by the ocean’s
macrofauna.3
The biosphere as a whole can be scale-independent precisely because of this succession
of scale-dependences. At any scale, species have filled all appropriate niches, often con-
figuring themselves vis a vis other species into common arrangements (such as the preda-
tor/prey dynamic, symbiotic relationships, and competition). The self-organized criticality
of these relationships is evident in temporal studies of species (even though scale-dependence
dominates spatial studies). The population dynamics of brittlestar beds show self-similar
predator-prey dynamics on the scale of days, decades, and eons (Aronson, 1992). Tempo-
ral self-similarities have also been identified in the effects of predators on gastropods and
marine algae (refs in Aronson, 1992).
Spatial self-similarity is also present in a wide range of marine ecosystems. Studying
the branching patterns in gorgonian corals, Sánchez et al. (2004) finds the fingerprints of
a self-organized, self-similar critical state, which helps maintain the colony shape. Similar
fractal properties are present in spatial patterns of the diverse and competitive ecosystems
in intertidal sediment (Seuront and Spilmont, 2002). Fractals have been identified in a
wide range of elements in the marine world: in the structures of coral reefs, marine snow,
mussel beds, intertidal benthic communities, invertebrate and vertebrate behavior, species
diversity, zooplankton, and phytoplankton (Seuront, 2009).
Simultaneously, the scale-independent process of evolution seems to abhor simplicity:
every level of the biosphere is (fractally) filled with niches for other species. This is evident
3The much larger phytoplankton compete with bacteria and support the conventional zooplankton
trophic pyramid directly.
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in the “patchiness” of marine ecosystems: the distribution of species in the marine biosphere
is spatially heterogeneous at all scales (Downing, 1991). This patchiness is both a result
of the critical self-organization of marine ecosystems, and beneficial to those ecosystems by
providing living environments for species on all trophic levels (Seuront, 2009, pp. 31-32).
Power laws and scale-independence can also be usefully described as applying locally.
Just as there are limits on all SOC systems (for example, sand pile avalanches cannot exceed
the size of the sand pile), scale-invariant properties can be confined to a collection of scales
without losing their validity.
3.4 Relationships in marine ecology
One contribution self-organized criticality models have that is missing from the ecological
literature is the new relationships that it formally defines. Ecologists model ecosystems
largely as collections of species and nutrients, and the relationships between them. Direct
relationships between species generally fall into the classes of symbiosis, competition, and
predation. Where nutrients are involved, species are commonly identified as producers,
decomposers, or consumers. Most of these roles and relationships are trophic; less frequently,
relationships describe how species support or undermine other life functions.
These relationships reflect an “organism bias” that remains prevalent in models of
ecosystem interaction in marine ecology. In essence, this view is that a species plays the
roles of its individual organisms (see figure 3.3). This is exemplified in the trophic map or
food web, and chemical nutrient flow diagrams. The relationships described in these models
are those observed at the organism level. The organism bias is a reflection of the implicit
organism scaling problem above: the most natural scale for studying a species is the scale
of its individual organisms. However, this need not be the only scale on which a species
acts, as shown by the emergent effects of local changes in critical systems.
SOC in particular provides a suite of new relationships, based on species-wide and
community-wide effects. These include:
Self-Organization Support when one species provides material or behavioral support for
another’s self-organization. For example, coralline algae supports coral recruitment
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Figure 3.3: Diagram of the organism bias. Organisms have a collection of functions, which can thought
of as instantaneous relationships between two organisms when they interact. The organism bias prescribes
enduring relationships between two species based on the individual relationships found between their repre-
sentative organisms.
(Harrington et al., 2004), which is necessary for coral to self-organize into fractal
forms.
Critical Value Support when the actions of one species affect the magnitude of the crit-
ical value about which another species is organizing. Salt-marsh vegetation organizes
into a critical state which improves plant growth, but if the relevant critical value is
too low, vegetation collapse leads to pervasive erosion (van de Koppel et al., 2005).
Collapse Facilitation when one species plays a role in the collapse dynamic of another
species. The effect of predation by fish and crabs on brittlestar beds supports its
natural population collapse dynamic, which help its ecosystem maintain its critical
population states (Aronson, 1992).
Critical Competition when the competition between species produces critical state spa-
tiotemporal patterns. One result of competition between diatoms of several species is
the creation of self-organized, fractal patch patterns in intertidal soils (Seuront and
Spilmont, 2002).
In general, these are not relationships between individual organisms, and cannot be
observed at the individual level; they appear only between species, with respect to their
environments. With the exception of colonial animals, it is not the organisms themselves
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that are self-organized, but their collective community or the ecosystem in which they are
contained.
3.5 Contributions to conservation
Self-organized criticality has important implications for conservation and resilience. Com-
plexity is omnipresent in ecosystems, making them unpredictable through nonlinearity,
feedback, and chaos (Scheffer et al., 2001). Our capacity to predict the effects of human
interference on marine ecosystems underlies much of the work of marine conservation ecol-
ogy. Conservation is also greatly concerned with resilience, because it both is a natural
consequence of health and biodiversity, and counteracts the conditions that result in catas-
trophic shifts. However, SOC simultaneously undermines predictive capacity and supports
resilience. If SOC is prevalent in marine ecosystems, it may suggest the need to reconsider
complex uncertainty as a friend to conservation.
Healthy ecosystems are characterized by a high level of self-organization, suggesting that
SOC metrics might be useful in measuring the overall health of an ecosystem. van der Heide
et al. (2010) argue that the self-organized, spatial patterns of intertidal seagrasses are reli-
able indicators of the multiple stressors acting on them. Kolasa (2006) investigates the use
of SOC power spectrum exponents as measures of self-organization and ecological integra-
tion. Lower exponents correspond to both ecosystem stability and species richness. Metrics
of self-organization are significant because they reflect both ecosystem-wide dynamics, and
signatures of local processes (Solé et al., 1999).
Further buttressing this association, decreases in ecosystem complexity often correspond
to decreases in environmental health. The overgrowth of macroalgae, a species that under-
mines the ability of coral reefs to self-organize, is a robust indicator of overall reef health
(Bahartan et al., 2010). Lohrer et al. (2004) find that a decrease in the complexity of marine
fractal structures through thin sediment deposits causes a decrease in ecosystem biomass
and diversity. The dangerous effects of invasive species can also be understood in this light:
these species have not evolved to fill critical state niches, so their propagation decreases
ecosystem complexity (Bax et al., 2003).
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Beyond reflecting ecosystem health, changes in the frequency relationships that char-
acterize SOC systems can directly interfere with their functioning. Lohrer et al. (2004)
notes,
Most likely, species evolve to cope with minor disturbances that occur relatively
often, particularly when those disturbances occur at frequencies greater than
the generation time of the species, as this would be adaptive. However, with
increasing disturbance intensity, the response of the community may shift from
negligible to catastrophic, with an intermediate domain consisting of sub-lethal
effects and/or mortalities of selected individuals and taxa.
A model of SOC behavior in ecosystems is developed in appendix C, as almost a direct
discretization of a simple analytical fisheries model. It can produce two stable regimes,
characterized by either high or low stock, or a chaotic region between the two, depending on
the parameter choices. The chaotic regime is characterized by “boom and bust” dynamics,
where the threshold for global fragility is below the point of population saturation. This
model can help explain highly variable stocks among exploited species, since it is exactly
this middle region where fisheries management might aim.
Self-organization is also an important factor in marine reserve design. Reserve design
is greatly impacted by scaling effects of organisms (Wiens, 1989), which SOC informs. In
addition, sites for marine reserves are currently selected under the assumption that physical
features determine the distribution of species. However, new models suggest that large-
scale and meta-population patterns are self-organized, challenging that assumption and the
reserve boundaries based on it (Guichard et al., 2004).
Based on these results, self-organized criticality has four major implications for marine
conservation ecology. The research on SOC systems provides a framework for studying a
class of emergence in marine ecosystems, and developing models that can describe multiple
scales. Critical states point to the need for a new way of understanding and managing
sustainability and catastrophic events, by working with and through complex uncertainty.
Finally, self-organization is in no small way the very process of ecological restoration, and
can be used as a metric for gauging the health of ecosystems. Each of these offers opportu-
nities for future work.
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Management of the Distributed
Fishery Commons
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Figure 4.1: Reproduced from Kirby (1884, p. 15).
This work was developed in 2012, with thanks to Dr. Laurence Tubiana.
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This chapter develops the central conceptual model of this dissertation. It is informed
by both the broader understanding of the commons in the first chapter and of the process
of emergence studied in the second. Future chapters provide an empirical foundation for
aspects of the model, culminating into a computational model in the last chapter.
Fishery collapse is a global concern, affecting world food supply and economic prospects
for fishing communities, and spilling across borders and across species. A growing set of
policies are available to address these problems, including catch quotas, marine reserves,
and community management. However, a variety of systemic problems continue to hamper
their deployment and effectiveness, including those stemming from the open-access nature
of some fisheries.
Wild fish stocks are common pool resources (CPRs), with high subtractability of use
(rivalry) and high difficulty of excluding users (Ostrom and Ostrom, 1977). They are also
plagued with many characteristics considered unfavorable to community management, often
including entrenched stakeholders, mistrust of science, high variability and uncertainties in
stock sizes, complex migration patterns, orientations toward short-term gains, questions
of sovereignty, counterproductive subsides, incentives to misreport catches, and ambiguous
spatial boundaries. Despite all these issues, some regions have had long histories of success
(Pinho et al., 2012). This paper considers commons that share these characteristics and
asks how further success might be possible.
While some commons are “well-mixed”, such as CO2 in the atmosphere or a small
pasture, in many commons the distance between users is a key parameter. For example,
fish stocks, timber, groundwater, water and air quality, and other ecosystem services are
exploited and impacted heterogeneously across space. Users and stakeholders also vary
across the system’s area. Modeling and thinking about these resources in a non-distributed
and non-spatial way can significantly distort our understanding of the system and the choices
within it (Durrett and Levin, 1994, Smith and Wilen, 2003).
I argue that understanding the successes and failures of fishery commons demands a
cross-scale perspective. Most CPR research focuses on the local level, where cooperative
management has the greatest potential. Contemporary CPR theory ignores many influ-
encing factors from the outside world, or considers them “as ‘given’ or as a ‘black box’ ”,
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independent of the activities of the local environment (Steins et al., 2000). This perspective
has limitations, particularly for fisheries where much of the crucial ecological activity takes
place on a wider scale.
To support this investigation, this paper develops the concept of the “distributed com-
mons” in the context of fisheries management. A distributed commons differs from the
traditional commons model in that the boundaries of the system are imprecise and resource
users are affected most by impacts located nearby. This conception brings to the fore the
role of perspective and scale (including cross-scale aspects) in understanding the political
economies around management. I sketch several consequences of this new model of the
commons applied to fisheries management, along with the model’s implications for the po-
litical economy surrounding local stakeholders, governing institutions, and their cross-scale
interactions.
In the first section, the role and consequences of cross-scale issues are explored. Second, a
general theory of distributed commons is developed, and certain consequences are explored.
Finally, some consequences of this model are enumerated for fisheries management. In
chapter 7, the intuitions from these theoretical models are developed into an agent-based
model, to explore three dynamic situations.
4.1 A need for cross-scale management
Scale, applied to social-ecological systems, refers to the spaciotemporal, quantitative, and
analytical extent and resolution used in a perspective or analysis (Wiens, 1989, Gibson et
al., 2000).1 Scale has long been a central issue in ecology as explored in the last chapter.
The dynamics, predictability, concerns, and opportunities differ depending on the scale of
observation.
Traditional CPR research focuses on the local scale for several reasons. Management at
1The term ’scale’ is used in this paper mainly in reference to the spatial dimension, although temporal
scales and institutional scales are also relevant. Importantly, discussions of “different scales” and “cross-
scales” always refer to differences in the extent and resolution of a perspective or analysis within the same
dimension. Thus, the distinction drawn by Cash et al. (2006) is not used and ’scale’ and ’level’ are used as
synonyms in this paper.
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the local scale provides the greatest potential for communication and cooperation, stake-
holder engagement, application of local knowledge, and agile adaptation (Ostrom et al.,
1999). One branch of CPR research responds to the failures of management orchestrated
by centralized institutions, which in many cases has resulted in unsustainable exploitation
and undermined long-standing traditions of stewardship. A focus on the local scale also
affirms the local perspective, in which the concerns of users and their relationships are
paramount.
There is also an implicit claim that local analyses are applicable to larger scales and
remote contexts. First, it is argued that higher level features have little bearing on the
institutions and outcomes at a local level (Elster, 1989, Furubotn and Richter, 1991). Fur-
ther, Keohane and Ostrom (1995) argue that important facts of commons management
are scale-invariant, so conclusions from local CPR studies can inform problems of global
governance.
This paper makes a case that scales do matter, and that it is a combination of cross-
boundary issues and the relationships between the local and the global contexts that de-
termine the scope of many commons issues. Cross-boundary issues arise when dynamics
outside of a system affect those within it, such as when the sustainability of a region is
undermined by fish harvests or pollution in neighboring regions. The emphasis on a local
perspective is inappropriate for commons rife with cross-boundary issues. Schlager et al.
(1994) argues that cross-boundary migration aggravates many CPR problems:
(1) users are more likely to attribute flow declines to the behavior of users
elsewhere in the system; (2) the users in any one location cannot control the
flow even if they act collectively; (3) because no one group can control the flow
and capture the benefits of collective action, users in any one location are less
likely to provide benefits for users elsewhere in the system by restraining their
own appropriation activities; and (4) coordinating activities with users in other
locations raises transaction costs.
The complexity of stock dynamics makes it very difficult to determine the effects fishers
have on each other. As a result, the rules adopted by fishers often do not address the appro-
priation externalities at the heart of CPR problems, because the source of these problems
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extends beyond local fishing grounds. Leaving cross-boundary issues outside the scope of
study undermines our ability to address the root of many CPR problems.2
Agents naturally act at many scales. Norberg et al. (2008) identifies the operational
level, at which fishers make day-to-day decisions, as both smaller-scale and more pertinent
than the collective choice (“local”) level. Fishers regularly operate at more than one level,
making operational decisions, helping debate collective choice rules, and providing input for
regional rules. The multiple spatial and temporal scales upon which fishers act also affect
the outcomes of management (Smith and Wilen, 2004). The cross-scale literature focuses
on the relationship between fishing communities and the government or the market, but
intermediate levels (such as middlemen) can also play crucial roles (Crona et al., 2010).
Those different levels can cause “cross-scale” issues.
Cross-scale issues are pervasive in complex social-ecological systems. Cash et al. (2006)
identifies three common kinds of “scale challenges” in institutional responses to scales: “(1)
the failure to recognize important scale and level interactions altogether, (2) the persistence
of mismatches between levels and scales in human-environment systems, and (3) the failure
to recognize heterogeneity in the way that scales are perceived and valued by different
actors, even at the same level.” In natural systems and their management, scale challenges
come from both “top-down” and “bottom-up” mechanisms. Emergent patterns drive the
dynamics of higher levels,3 while intervention into regional dynamics is impossible without
warping the functioning of lower levels.
The cross-scale impacts that government-scale policy has on the local scale are the best
studied. Local fishing communities are affected by a wide range of outside factors, including
regional environmental health, management policies, and market demands. In particular,
national HDI, quota regimes, and the existence of protected areas have been identified as
2Fishers are confronted with a wide variety of difficulties, including pervasive uncertainly (Schlager,
1994). I will not discuss issues, except as they pertain to scale and boundary issues. For example, a portion
of fish stock variability is a consequence of fish movements, which is relevant to this exploration, while
another part reflects underlying ecological dynamics, which is not.
3Emergence in an ecosystem describes the process by which “properties of the ecosystem at large spatial
scales result from feedback interactions between components occurring at smaller scales” (van de Koppel et
al., 2005).
54
CHAPTER 4. MANAGEMENT OF THE DISTRIBUTED FISHERY COMMONS
significant influences on the success of local management (Gutiérrez et al., 2011). Higher
level institutions can strengthen local ones, through state legitimization, enabling legis-
lation, cultural revitalization, capacity building, and institution building (Berkes, 2002).
However, centralization and higher level management also frequently undermine local in-
stitutions. Co-management, defined as an institutional arrangement between government
and communities, addresses this need for collaborative rules at different scales, and will be
discussed in the last section.
4.2 The distributed commons
A distributed commons is a kind of non-excludable, rivalrous resource, with localized im-
pacts from resource users. The distinction between this and the traditional commons is
most relevant when considering scale issues. At a sufficiently local scale, a distributed
commons– for example, a fishing area– is simply a commons with an ambiguous boundary,
cross-boundary effects, and an open community of users. As with any commons, anyone
in the community can access it for individual benefits, with the potentials for aggregate
externalities, on one hand, and collective or autocratic management, on another. However,
classic commons theory presumes that both the scope of the resource and the community
with the potential to access it are clearly and completely defined, and relatively homoge-
neous (Young, 1995).
These assumptions are modified for distributed commons. System boundaries are im-
precise because there are no clear border lines, because the system is open with flows passing
in and out, and because of uncertainty in the underlying state and dynamics. There is also
no clear boundary defining a scope of the commons relevant to a given stakeholder, and
different stakeholders may have very different experiences of the resources available and
community using them.
Questions of storage, mobility, and property are at the heart of distributed commons,
and new insights are available on these issues under this conceptual framework. Schlager et
al. (1994) explore the distributed aspects of commons through their the attributes of mo-
bility and storage. They categorize all commons based on the presence or absence of these
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Figure 4.2: The distributed commons makes explicit the separate affects of scale and resolution. The
governing institutions of a region operate across a widely distributed exploitation process, while an individual
user observes other users spread out at distances from it. While the prior resolution of a government is
aggregate, due to its concern for aggregate measures like taxes and law, it can cultivate a localized resolution.
The user’s perspective is inherently on a local scale, but by recognizing the regional scope of its problems,
it can better address them.
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attributes, but some distinctions they draw seem unsatisfactory. For example, fisheries are
classified as having “mobile [resource] units” and “without storage”, while groundwater
basins have “stationary units” and “storage”. Both of these contexts have varying degrees
of both “mobile units” and “storage”, and in very similar ways. Groundwater is far from
stationary, although it seeps more slowly than fish swim. Furthermore, while water quanti-
ties are easier to measure and treat as stored, the spatial heterogeneity of geology imposes
considerable uncertainty in many regions (Beckett and Webster, 1971).
For Schlager et al. (1994), storage must be specific to a given resource user, with their
prototypical example being the well. However, even with groundwater, water left in a well
can be extracted by other users over time (Pfeiffer and Lin, 2012). Conversely, although fish
are highly mobile, the probability of fish varies over space, and is higher in regions where
they are underexploited. Unexploited regions can become sources of population recruitment.
The storage capacity of fish is isomorphic to that of groundwater: in both cases, resource
units that are left unharvested diffuse and a portion of them are likely to be available later.
Property rights and “assignment problems”, central questions and the direction for
solutions for classic commons, become difficult to establish in full. One’s capacity to lay
claim to a parcel of the greater commons is easier than to ensure that activities beyond
that parcel do not impact it. Because of uncertainty, “fishers are more likely to use time,
location, and gear restrictions, as opposed to quotas” (Schlager, 1994). Location restrictions
may be the most common rule used in community managed fisheries. Boundary rules, which
attempt to restrict access to only local fishers, are a natural response to the spatiotemporal
variation of distributed fisheries, but applying them to this context is difficult.
Sources and sinks are also important elements in distributed commons. Resource users
can be thought of as sinks located at particular points. For renewable resources4, production
occurs across a region, but often with localized “hot spots”. For example, marine reserves
can act as sources of fish in neighboring fisheries, greatly increasing their sustainability
(Gell and Roberts, 2003). For groundwater, recharge wells are gaining popularity as a
management method, offsetting the growth of sinks by building more sources. A commons
is overexploited when the sinks in a given region exceed the sources, and the degree of
4Note that all CPRs with the potential for sustainability are renewable resources.
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exploitation can vary across space.
The distributed commons has several conceptual advantages. It can help build an un-
derstanding of ecological issues, management issues, and the complexity between them.
Strathmann et al. (2002) shows that many coastal species have very localized recruitment,
suggesting that fish cannot be considered a single aggregate stock. This is supported by
genetic and mating studies and has important implications for resilience (Strathmann et al.,
2002, Norberg et al., 2008). The spatial distribution of degraded ecosystem regions can have
important consequences for the capacity of the ecosystem as a whole to recover from shocks
(Hughes et al., 2005). Moreover, patterns of degradation are important determinants of
whether SES systems experience regime shifts, reflecting the large-scale consequences that
small-scale activities can have (Elmhirst et al., 2009).
While CPR theory typically applies unitary conceptions of the system’s state and the
resource-using community, these abstractions are often problematic (Carlsson and Berkes,
2005). In contrast, the distributed commons model starts from a disaggregated view of
the resource and its users, and thereby helps situate management options. For example,
the necessary scope of management depends on the properties of the underlying resource.
Management policies need to apply to larger or smaller regions based on the characteristics
of the resource system that determine the degree of cross-boundary effects that users ex-
perience. Management of tuna requires international conventions since tuna are so mobile,
while forest management may require only small buffer zones.
Empirical CPR studies find that heterogeneity in preferences and capabilities typically
undermines cooperative governance (Johnson and Libecap, 1982). When heterogeneity in
preferences is combined with a recognition of heterogeneity in membership– that not all
users need to be in partnerships with all other users– new cooperative potential can be
identified.
Distributed commons also make explicit the actors in the two-level games that charac-
terize governance of global commons (Putnam 1988, Evans et al. 1993). Two-level games
involve the relationship between domestic constituents and international negotiations. The
users of traditional commons under the regimes constructed through international relations
remain nationals or institutions of one state or another, these commons on an international
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scale are also examples of a classic two-level game (Young, 1995). An equivalent dynamic
occurs between regions in a single country, where the preferences of users of a distributed
commons are necessary determinants of the national policy regimes that arise.
4.3 A model of the distributed commons
Diagram 2-a of figure 4.3 is a visual representation of a concrete model of a distributed com-
mons. In contrast to a classic commons, where it is exactly the capacity for multiple users
to simultaneously use a resource that is its defining feature and the source of its problems,
the distributed commons is conceptually segmented into parcels under exploitation by at
most one user or a single agent that represents a cooperative community. These parcels
may fluidly shift in size and physical location, but it is not their simultaneous use that
causes problems. Instead, the tragedy of the commons results from the compounded drain
of many localized sinks. The compounding effects come from the cross-boundary movement
of critical elements between the parcels. These elements may be the actual resource (e.g.,
fish and other mobile stocks), a necessary input (e.g., water for agriculture), or ecosystem
services which rely on a wider domain (e.g., bee pollination services). The resulting tragedy
may only apply to a region, or may be felt across the entire distributed commons.
For many real commons, this makes natural sense. The space that a boat physically
occupies is inherently excludable– two boats cannot occupy the same space.5 For ground-
water use, each well occupies a distinct column, and property rights typically keep some
distance between them, but too many wells across a region cause overuse.
The diagrams in figure 4.3 explore some basic classes of management strategies avail-
able for commons. The boxed figures refer to classical commons, where three potential
institutional approaches are as follows.
Unmanaged commons (1-a) An unmanaged commons, with multiple users exploiting it
simultaneously.
Managed commons (1-b) The exploitation of all users of the resource is limited through
5Also, boats speeds cannot exceed 3× 108 m/s.
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Extraction flows Cross-boundary flows
ClosedManagedUnmanaged
Legend:
Figure 4.3: Classes of governance options for classical and distributed commons. The boxed schemas (1-a
through 1-c) denote classic commons. These diagrams are meant to introduce a visual language of symbols
used in the remaining diagrams, where the same approaches are applied in distributed fashion. The remaining
diagrams show a general model for the distributed commons (2-a) and management options for it (2-b through
2-e). See the text for descriptions.
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rules, such as quotas. The managed commons requires active monitoring and com-
munication.
Exclusion/property (1-c) The tragedy of the commons is resolved by enforcing property
rights, excluding all but a single agent or self-managing community of users.
In distributed commons (2-a), rather than imagining multiple users of one area, each area
is exploited by at most user. With strong cross-boundary flows and without communication,
the tragedy of the commons is almost inescapable. For distributed commons, the same
abstract approaches yield more management options, due to the greater complexity of the
model.
Managed distributed commons (2-b) All users within a region are managed, through
limiting extraction, monitoring, and communication.
Closed regions of distributed commons (2-c) Some regions can be closed, providing
sources to offset sinks elsewhere. This is equivalent to having protected areas for
ecosystems or recharge wells for groundwater.
Gated distributed commons (2-d) The flow of materials between parcels is monitored
and impeded, or equivalently, the material sizes of each parcel are managed. Manage-
ment of the material sizes, which is mainly appropriate where the flowing material is
not the same as the resource being extracted, can involve continuously changing the
spatial boundaries.
Fenced distributed commons (2-e) The flow of materials between parcels can be shut
off, or equivalently, their material contents can be fixed, so that each parcel or distinct
regions acts like classic (non-distributed) commons with a single user.
An example of managing the material sizes of regions as a “gated distributed commons”
is as follows. If each user in the commons harvests the resource to the same level, none
are benefited by diffusive inflows from their neighbors, since they lose the same amount (in
expectation) to their neighbors. However, by harvesting more, a user could create a gradient
under which they would benefit from additional diffusion. If this amount of diffusion could
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be modeled or measured, it can be exactly removed from the material size of such a user’s
region and added to their neighbors. This removes the incentive to over-extract in order to
implicitly harvest from one’s neighbors.
The diagram shows the distributed commons modeled on along a line, appropriate for
a coast or a river, but a grid or network would better represent spatial regions. A network
could also be used to represent more complicated interacting resource systems.
4.4 Cones of Depression
Useful resolutions of a distributed common could have a vast range, from small-scale fishing
locales to large-scale fishing regions across the global commons (e.g., Berkes et al., 2006).
The extent of cross-boundary effects is a key factor in choosing a resolution for representing
a distributed resource. Cross-boundary effects arising from a random walk of fish or the
diffusion dynamics of groundwater can be modeled using the diffusion equation:
∂u
∂t
− α∇2u = g(u, x, t)− f(u, x, t)
for a resource distribution in space and time, u(~x, t), where α is related to the rate of
diffusion, g(u, x, t) is the rate of resource growth (e.g., g(u, x, t) = ru(1 − uK ) for logistic
growth), and f(u, x, t) is the rate of resource extraction (e.g., f(u, x, t) = −cδ(x) for a point
extractor). Examples of the consequences of a set of extraction regimes are shown in figure
4.4.6
The magnitude of impacts over space decays roughly according to a spatial exponential
decay rate constant: D in e−|x|/D, where D is related to α, the diffusion constant.7 Point
extraction produces an exponentially decreasing impact, with a length scale D, described
in the hydrological literature as a “cone of depression”. In other words, the mobility of
resources sets the natural length scale for describing impacts across distributed resource.
This result will be used in the next section to explore a spatial game on the commons.
6For g(u, x, t) = ru(1− u
K
), analytical solutions have only been discovered in the special case of traveling
waves (Kaliappan, 1984).
7This is clearest when considering the steady-state ( ∂u
∂t
= 0) and g(u, x, t) − f(u, x, t) = u(x). Then
u(x) = Ae−x/
√
α1{x > 0} for the boundary condition that u(0) = A.
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Methods used to study groundwater levels provide a simplified approach for some of the
interaction scenarios that are possible. Wells have well-known compounding effects, where
the cones of depression for individual wells sum in areas affected by multiple wells. We can
use this approach of compounding cones to understand different exploitation scenarios and
the sustainable yields that can be achieved under them. Figure 4.4 combines stock level
graphs with yield graphs for the central stakeholder under four scenarios.
The most important consequences of the investigations in figure 4.4 are the changes in
maximum yield, extreme yield, and potential for depletion. In diagram B, it is shown that
a single user on a distributed commons can expect greater sustainable yields, as well as
greater yields under exhaustive exploitation, in the presence of inward resource flows from
either side. Diagram C shows the case of a local user in a region with broad depletion, which
in fisheries might be produced by external industrial fishing. In this case, little additional
exploitation potential is available. Diagram D shows the cone of depletion that occurs
between users. As their use increases, the cross-border benefits from the depleted region
between them diminishes.
The exact levels of stock and catch corresponding to the scenarios in 4.4 depend on the
growth model and parameters. See appendix D for examples.
4.5 Optimal harvesting under diffusion
Optimization under spatial diffusion has recieved considerable attention recently. Typi-
cally, these discussions identify optimal control for social planners Brown and Roughgarden
(1997), Costello and Polasky (2008), Brock and Xepapadeas (2008), and in some cases com-
pare these outcomes to behavior under open-access (Conrad, 1999). As here, a key question
is how to study the effect of marine protection within such a context (Conrad and Smith,
2012). The result here is most similar to Brock and Xepapadeas (2010), who compare
cite-specific private optimization to social optimization under diffusion. While the spatial
context used in Brock and Xepapadeas (2010) is more sophisticated, only the myopic be-
havior is considered. We are interested in agents optimizing under a diffusive environment
with other agents.
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Figure 4.4: Examples of distributed commons exploitation at maximum sustainable yield, and the associated
yield graphs. For each diagram, the box on the left shows resource levels across space, as they would be
in a sustainable steady-state. To the right is the surplus available to a point resource user across levels of
the resource, with decreasing levels down. The peak of this right graph is the maximum sustainable yield
(MSY), shown left. (A) shows conventional uniform exploitation, with MSY at a stock size of half the
carrying capacity (under a logistic-style growth model). Only the stock in the center are is available, and
no stock flows in from outside of the commons. (B) adds the benefits of diffusion, showing exploitation at
a single point sink: the total MSY is greater, since stocks are flowing in from neighboring regions; the MSY
stock may be higher or lower depending on characteristics of the resource. (C) shows a point sink under
conditions where the total stock is already uniformly exploited: now both the maximum yield and the stock
at that yield are much lower. (D) shows the effect of multiple point sinks, with an intermediate region of
depleted stocks. In the extreme, the region between the two point sinks would be devoid of resources.
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Consider two neighboring regions, with diffusion rate γ between them, as shown in figure
4.5. The stock levels are X a Y , growth rates are F (X) and F (Y ), and harvesting levels
are A and B.
Ẋ = F (X)−A+ γ(Y −X)





Figure 4.5: Two simple distributed commons with two agents. (A) Extraction occurs from two regions with
diffusion between them. (B) The same case as (A), with enforced separation between the two regions using
a marine protected area.
The optimal steady-state extraction is determined by the Hamiltonian with discount
rate r:
H = e−rtp(A+B) + λ1 (F (X)−A+ γ(Y −X)) + λ2 (F (Y )−B + γ(X − Y ))
The result is that the optimal level of A and B are where F ′(X∗) = r and F ′(Y ∗) = r,
identical to the result without diffusion.
Now consider two agents, with agent A extracting from region X and agent B extracting
from region Y. We wish to find the level of harvest for these symmetric agents that represents
a Nash equilibrium. Let the right agent’s extraction as assumed, producing a steady-state
stock level Y ∗. Now the Hamiltonian for agent A is,
H = e−rtpA+ λ (F (X)−A+ γ(Y ∗ −X))
The optimal level is F (X∗) = r + γ, and by symmetry, F (Y ∗) = r + γ and this is a
Nash equilibrium. This higher slope is at a lower level of stock, and a correspondingly lower
sustainable harvest, than the economically optimal level, and it is driven by the perceived
losses to the other agent. It also produces an range between sole ownership and open-access:
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(sole ownership) X1 > X
∗ > X∞ (open-access)
When γ = 0, each agent has sole ownership of their stock. As γ → ∞, the Nash
equilibrium converges to the open-access level, equivalent to infinite discounting.
Finally, if a protected area is positioned between the two, it decreases the effective
diffusion between then, thereby allowing the agents to achieve higher Nash equilibria.
4.6 The distributed prisoners dilemma
The analysis above only applies to simple diffusion, but often there are additional fishery-
wide effects of decreasing stocks. As an example of the potential consequences resulting
from these interactions, we consider a prisoner’s dilemma situation (Rapoport, 1965), with
two fishery users.
The general payout matrix for any prisoner’s dilemma game is
Coop Expl
Coop M, M H, T








The game is played once with known payoffs. If both users cooperate by harvesting
sustainably (Coop), they get modest returns (M). If one tries sustainable harvesting while
the other excessively exploits the resource (Expl), the returns to the cooperative harvester
are very low (T ) while those to the exploiter are high (H). If both exploit to their full
potential, they get equal low returns (L). For this model to produce a dominant strategy
that results in L,L– that is, for this to represent a true prisoner’s dilemma– the payouts
must be such that H > M > L > T .
We define the fishery prisoners dilemma to have a payout for each user of the form
vi = ci − 1{ci + c−i > S}
(




where 1{·} is the indicator function (1 if · is true, else 0), ci is the catch that user i aims
for, S is the stock, and P is a penalty for causing a fishery collapse. For our analysis, let
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S = 100, ci be either at a cooperative level, set to 40, or an exploitive level, at 80, and let
P = 20. The resulting payouts under this function are,
Coop Expl
Coop 40, 40 50, 10 (*)








where (*) denotes a fishery collapse. This model satisfies the prisoner’s dilemma criteria
and rational agents will both select high levels of exploitation, causing lower total and
individual payouts as well as fishery collapse. This payout function produces intuitive
results for a wide range of parameter values. Figure 4.6 shows the consequences of varying































Figure 4.6: (A) shows the mechanics of the fishery prisoners dilemma payouts, varying the level of ex-
ploitation (ci) against a constant exploitation by user −i. Up to S − c−i, increases in exploitation lead to
corresponding increases in value. After a level of S−c−i, increases in exploitation are still beneficial, but the
limited stock is shared. Also after this point, a penalty, P , drives down both payoffs. (B) shows a similar
payout graph, if both players choose the same action.
Next consider if there is a distance d between the two, causing their compounding effects
to decrease. We modify the payout equation by adding an exponentially decreasing portion
of the impact of the other user, as a function of d, the distance normalized by D:
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As d increases, eventually choosing fishing sustainably under the assumption that the
other user is exploiting will no longer result in the penalty of a fishery collapse. At this point,
the exploitive strategy will no longer be dominant (since it is dominated by cooperation
in the case where the other user is exploitive). At a further distance, cooperation will no
longer be socially optimal, since the cross-user impacts will be smaller and the ecosystem
use will be sustainable even when both users are exploitive. These regions are diagrammed
in figure 4.7.
Figure 4.7: Regions for the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game, based on the distance between users, d, and
the “cooperative” level of exploitation, cCoop. Each region is characterized by the relationships between the
payouts for each pair of actions (CC = cooperative/cooperative, CE = cooperative/exploitive, and so on).
At large enough values of d, even exploitive levels of use are sustainable, so cooperation is no longer socially
optimal. For values of interest, producing a prisoner’s dilemma for d = 0, as d increases, a new region
appears where exploitation is only weakly dominant.
Above, c−i can be treated as the combined catch of all other resource users in a simple
extension of the model. In either case, recognition of the distance between users here exposes
some new opportunities to avoid the tragedy of the commons.
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4.7 Fishery governance for a distributed commons
Local fishing communities bear huge costs from fishery collapse. While many commu-
nities historically developed commons management practices to maintain their resources
sustainably, a combination of government policies, market changes, industrial entrants, and
environmental cross-border effects have undermined these regimes. This section investigates
some of the ways that the distributed commons perspective illuminates responses that local
fishing communities have to these difficult issues. How can local communities encourage
overarching regulatory regimes that then support their ability to self-organize sustainable
fisheries?
Addressing this question requires understanding the perspective of both governments
and users within local communities. An example of conflict between these perspectives
revolves around “outsiders”, entities whose cross-border effects impact the commons. One
source of outsiders is the international commercial fishing industry which over the last cen-
tury has had an increasing impact on coastal fisheries in Africa (Alder and Sumaila, 2004).
The government and local communities may have very different perceptions on the nature
of outsiders and their consequences. For example, some agents that are “outsiders” for
the fishery may actually be sanctioned by the government, such as international industrial
fishers invited to develop fishery resources. Other outsiders may be national institutions,
such as the agricultural or industrial sectors, producing impacts on the fishery.
The remainder of this discussion applies a focus on a particular stakeholder. For a fishing
community that desires sustainable management (and understands the institutional needs
by virtue of historical traditions, learning about other successes, or outside facilitation),
that desire can be said to have a “nucleus”– a core group with the capacity to deliberate on
their situation. The scale on which the nucleus operates defines the local scale. At that local
scale and in the region of the central stakeholder, an array of other users coexist, cooperate,
and compete. Other members of the distributed commons are at various distances from
that nucleus: some use a fishing region which only partially overlaps; others have closer
affiliations with outside nuclei.
In the interests of maximizing well-being or tax revenue, the government’s first priority
for a renewable resource is to maximizing the total sustainable or economic yield under
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some discount rate. Depending on the characteristics of the fish species, this requires a
combination of gear restrictions (to protect vital life stages or supporting species), ITQs (or
other restrictions on total catch), and marine reserves (to protect vital habitats). Often,
however, only a portion of the necessary practices are implemented, reflecting the politi-
cal economy around entrenched stakeholders and poor communication between fishers and
management groups.
The management concerns from the perspective of the nucleus are different from the
government’s. These include a reliable livelihood, the elimination of outside drains, and
support for self-management. Scientific information could also inform these goals, but the
current distrust that many fishers have for the scientific community obstructs this avenue.
Two questions are critical for the nucleus. The first is what changes in the conditions of
access and usage would best support a better fishing regime. A wide range of institutional
regimes coexist within the vast distributed commons that is global marine and coastal fish-
eries. These include catch restriction regimes (such as quotas and gear restrictions), spatial
restriction regimes (such as MPAs, use rights, and exclusive economic zones), community
management regimes (which variously focus on decision-making and conflict-resolving prac-
tices), and co-management regimes (which apply combinations of the three other types).
Cooperative community institutions may themselves impose catch restrictions and spatial
restrictions, or be embedded into a larger region where such restrictions exist. In addi-
tion, these regimes may include governance architectures and boundary institutions that
specify the roles of stakeholders, scientists, economists, special interest groups (including
environmental NGOs), the national bureaucracy and international community.
The research on commons suggests the best options that an overarching governance
body has for encouraging community self-organization: for example, it can close the com-
mons (through a quota system), or enforce boundaries on the commons. A more inclusive
approach asks how government can support effective local institutions. Several answers are
available in the literature:
• Pinkerton (1989) notes that governments can support local institutions through data
gathering, protection from environmental damage, and enforcement.
• Gutiérrez et al. (2011) identifies empirically the management characteristics that lead
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to effective co-management of fisheries, including leadership, quotas, cohesion, and
protected areas.
• Gibson (2000) shows that the capacity for, and laws supporting, local property rights
and rule-making plays an important role in conservation.
• Ostrom (2009) identifies the size of the resource system, its productivity, its pre-
dictability, the mobility of its units, the number of users, leadership, norms and social
capital, knowledge, importance of the resource, and the ability to create rules as
important factors determining the capacity of users to self-organize.
• The insight that social inequality results in poorer ecosystem management (Klooster,
2000, Holland et al., 2009) may also be explored through this lens.
For classic commons, these many factors determine whether the expected benefits of man-
aging the commons exceed the perceived costs. For a distributed commons, that result can
differ in space, and the factors determine the potential scope of such management regimes.
Communities need to identify zones with leadership, equality, good communication, and
the whole host of factors which support community management. Within the regional
institutions, they need rights, legitimacy, and support from groups with a wider scope of
information. Wilson (1982) notes that “gear conflicts or other forms of physical interference
[arise] because fishermen often find it advantageous to fish very close to one another.” This
fact helps the establishment of local management regimes: the repeated encounters in prime
fishing spots are conducive to cooperation (Schlager, 1994).
The second issue confronting the nucleus concerns methods for encouraging these changes.
I will not address tactical options, which might include campaigning, lobbying, or mobi-
lization of scientific support. Zürn (1993) argues for the importance of domestic actions in
regime formation (cited in Young, 1995). The consequences of this cross-level power relation
is studied in the literature on two-level games (Putnam, 1988).
In addition, the spatially heterogeneous nature of the commons provides an powerful
incentive to devolve power to local authorities. Local users not only have greater knowledge
of the environmental dynamics around them, but have a capacity to recognize the local
social dynamics as well. Similarly, regional authorities are better equipped to recognize
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regional level issues. This suggests a potential not only for a mutually beneficial information
exchange, but for local users to extract rent (or better, drive power shifts) from their
knowledge.
Berkes (2002) notes that“the balance of evidence from the commons literature of the
past few decades is that neither purely local-level management nor purely higher level man-
agement works well by itself.” Co-management, the institutionalized cooperation between
regional and local governance, is a solution for handling cross-scale issues (Berkes, 2006).
Co-management has the potential to mitigate the weaknesses of the management techniques
used by different levels of institutions (Pomeroy and Berkes, 1997).
The distributed commons provides a natural perspective for a co-management regime,
for both the government and local communities– but with different resolutions. For users
within local communities, the agents of the distributed common are individual fishers. For
the government, the agents are communities and commercial fishers. Many users can be
encapsulated behind a single market, a single revenue stream, and aggregate metrics of
well-being. At either resolution, cross-boundary and cross-scale issues continue to motivate
a non-unitary vision of the commons.
By applying a model of distributed commons at local, regional, and international levels,
the diverse needs and issues of fisheries management become clearer. The relevant users, re-
sources, preferences, and impacts are all non-unitary and vary over space. Recognizing these
variations can help identify places with greater potential for sustainable governance, and
produce the cross-border effects which will support other regions in becoming sustainable
as well.
4.8 Conclusions
The distributed commons model offers a new perspective on the commons and the potential
for managing them. Many commons are not well-mixed, unitary resources. First, the
community of resource users differs over space, opening the possibility of finding zones of
cooperation. Second, the mixing process itself operates on a distance-scale and a time-scale
that is observable to those resource users. As a result, cross-boundary flows become a
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central source of conflict, and the tragedy of the commons is often mediated through them.
This chapter constructs a conceptual model of the distributed commons that remains
general enough to describe a wide range of systems, but concrete enough to provide new
insights. The insights fall into three main categories. First, the model explicitly captures a
broader range of management options than the traditional commons model, where protected
areas and cross-boundary flows can become a target for management. Second, the impacts
of resource users upon each other decrease over space in an exponential fashion. The
actual resources experienced by users are partly a consequence of diffusion from neighboring
regions. As a result, isolated users will experience a greater extraction potential than users
of a non-spatial resource; but when two users are nearby, they will cause a zone of depletion
in the region between them. Third, incorporating this exponential decay into a classical
prisoner’s dilemma model of the commons opens up new opportunities. Most importantly,
at intermediate distances, unsustainable harvesting is no longer a strictly dominant strategy.
These insights have implications for local commons management. The cross-boundary
flows that produce a tragedy of the commons in the distributed commons demand co-
management at both the local and regional levels. Local managers can seek zones of coop-
eration and leadership, and ensure support from the regional management institutions that
protect, inform, and legitimize their ability to cooperate.
Chapter 7 will extend the results here through a concrete, computational model of the
distributed commons. The implications of cross-boundary flows and distributed agents in
commons tragedies have an enormous potential to change the ways that we perceive, study,
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Chapter 5
Inferring Spatial Fisheries
This work was developed in 2012 in collaboration with Kimberly Lai, and
with thanks to Dr. Upmanu Lall.
This chapter provides an empirical method for constructing a spatial perspective on fish-
eries using the most widely available fisheries data, catch records. The logistic model studied
here takes a central role in the next chapter. It also includes concretely one of the funda-
mental claims of the Distributed Commons model: that communities at different spatial
locations can affect each other through the spatial medium of fish.
The spatial dynamics of fish stocks are a growing concern in fisheries management. Fish
resources often display a “patchiness”, resulting from complex spatial arrangements. As
spatial management becomes more complex, planners need to know what environments fish
rely on during different stages of their lives. Estimates of stock abundance that do not
account for spatial heterogeneity may result in over-estimation and error (Anderson and
Seijo, 2011, ch. 10).
However, spatial information about fish stocks is difficult to collect. Individual fish may
have widely varying spatial habits, and standard tagging methods are expensive and time-
consuming. This study provides a method of estimating the “spatial reliance” of fish stocks,
understood as the connection between stock recruitment and individual regions, using fish
catch and spatial plankton information.
We analyze the spatial reliance of anchoveta Engraulis ringens near Peru. Anchoveta are
75




















































































































































Figure 5.1: Reproduced from Kirby (1884, p. 44).
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the most heavily exploited fish in the world, but have widely chaotic dynamics driven partly
by ENSO cycle (Iwamoto et al., 2010). They consume primarily zooplankton (Espinoza and
Bertrand, 2008), so this study can take advantage of a long historical dataset of plankton
measurements performed by the Instituto del Mar del Peru.
5.1 Literature review
An extensive body of work on plankton and anchoveta dynamics was collected in the books
The Peruvian Anchoveta and Its Upwelling Ecosystem: Three Decades of Change and The
Peruvian Upwelling Ecosystem: Dynamics and Interactions (Pauly, 1989). Multiple ap-
proaches were used for estimating anchoveta stock.1 The first approach involved collecting
information on each step of catch-landing-processing to estimate under-reporting (Castillo
and Mendo, 1987). Other studies took a more standard stock-assessment approach with
spawning, stock, and egg production data (Pauly and Soriano, 1987), growth models (Palo-
mares and Muck, 1987) and length-weight catch composition (Tsukayama and Palomares,
1987). The papers collected in these volumes also studied plankton seasonal variation (Car-
rasco and Lozano, 1987), the physical dynamics of the region (Brainard and McLain, 1987,
Bakun, 1987), and bioeconomic modeling (Aguero, 1987).
Spatially, anchoveta occurs mainly within 80 km of the shore. The effects of El Niño on
anchoveta are well known (e.g., Cushing, 1981), with their range limited by warmer and less
saline El Niño currents (Iwamoto et al., 2010). Bertrand et al. (2004) find that the spatial
distribution of anchoveta changes with stock sizes, with both geographic range and density
decreasing when the abundance is low.
Scientific understanding of plankton-fish dynamics has evolved over time. Originally,
ecological modeling focused on modeling the physical system, including hydrodynamics
such as temperature and nutrients (Denman, 1976, Weber et al., 1986). It was found that
such hydrophysical features were relevant only on a macro scale (dozens of kilometers or
more) and on a micro scale (100 meters or less); distribution on an intermediate scale is un-
correlated to hydrodynamics. To model these distributions, researchers looked for patterns
1Each relevant chapter is given a separate reference in this paragraph.
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based on predator-prey distribution and developed phytoplankton-zooplankton interaction
models (Scheffer, 1991, Malchow, 1994). Several papers introduced local chaos based on
seasonal oscillation of parameters (Doveri et al., 1993, Scheffer et al., 1997), multiple in-
teracting plankton species (Ascioti et al., 1993), or diffusion of nutrient gradients (Pascual,
1993). Another branch of ecological modeling took off in the late 1990s: instead of trying
to model physical relations, papers applied statistical approaches (Punt and Hilborn, 1997,
Chen et al., 2003). Other studies have incorporated logistic growth models (Pyo and Lee,
2003).
More recently, focus has shifted to spatial and hierarchical Bayesian techniques. Smith et
al. (2009) develop a general model of spatial ecology and develop a method for identifying
the parameters of their model from observed data. Our approach here uses a lumped
model, but relaxes assumptions on the relationship between effort and catch, using a fitted
distribution.
Bayesian approaches have re-integrated physical assumptions to develop multilevel pri-
ors. For example, Hiruki-Raring developed predictors such as krill density, sea ice, and seal
dive characteristics in her paper on fur seal foraging and pup growth related to sea ice and
prey abundance (Hiruki-Raring et al., 2012). When it is not possible to calculate the joint
posterior distribution, Markov chain Monte Carlo simulations are used (Mäntyniemi, 2001).
Our analysis builds on the statistical and Bayesian approaches. We apply a hidden
Markov framework, informed by a logistic growth model. Combining this model with a
Kriging estimate plankton concentrations throughout our region, we develop an estimate of
the spatial reliance of anchoveta.
5.2 Data
This analysis draws on two key data sets. Plankton data comes from NOAA’s World Ocean
Plankton Database and was collected by Instituto del Mar del Peru (IMARPE). IMARPE
was created in 1964 and started its plankton collection project the same year with the goal of
better understanding the impacts of ENSO on the marine resources. The IMARPE casts use
a Hensen net (300 m) to collect zooplankton and a 75 m surface tow net for phytoplankton.
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The survey spanned the Peruvian coast and all seasons between 1972 and 2005. It includes
16,099 geolocated casts for each of phytoplankton and zooplankton (ml/m3).
(a) Location of plankton samples from
IMARPE, 1972-2005. (b) Distribution of Plankton casts by month, 1990-2000.
Figure 5.2: Plankton casts in space and time.
The second data set comes from the International Research Institute (IRI) Eastern
Pacific Pelagic Fisheries project and was collected by the Fishmeal Exporters Organization
(FEO). It contains weekly anchoveta landings in tons in three ports (Paita, Chimbote, and
Pisco, Peru) as well as total anchoveta landings for Peru for the years 1993 - 1999.
In the analysis, the entire collection of plankton data is used to produce a Kriging var-
iogram, defined in the next section. In the second phase of this analysis, where plankton
concentrations are related to fish recruitment, the plankton data is divided into two seg-
ments. The 6,012 plankton casts taken before 1990 are used to construct a backdrop of
plankton concentrations, while the 7,926 casts between 1990 and 2000 provide the variation
for identifying plankton’s effects on fish populations. See supplemental section E.1.1 for a
discussion of the selection of these data.
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4.1 Cleaning the plankton data:
The phytoplankton and zooplankton data cover a wide range of values.  The boxplot below 
shows only the values above 0, on a log scale (59 phytoplankton and 89 zooplankton zero 
values are excluded from the boxplot, but included in the analyzed data).  We removed four 
data values recorded for Feb. 29 of non-leap years and the zooplankton outlier (a value of 
855 ml/m3, compared to the next highest value at 66 ml/m3).
To handle the long tailed distribution of values, the plankton data is analyzed in ranks.
(a) Anchoveta FEO ports from Google Earth.
(b) Weekly catch data to the Pisco, Chimbote, and
Paita ports, and total catch for Peru.
Figure 5.3: Weekly catch records for three ports in Chile.
5.3 Methodology
5.3.1 Cleaning the plankton data
The phytoplankton and zooplankton data span a wide range of values. The boxplot in figure
5.4 shows only the values above 0, on a log scale (59 phytoplankton and 89 zooplankton
zero values are excluded from the boxplot, but included in the analyzed data). We removed
four data values recorded for Feb. 29 of non-leap years and the zooplankton outlier (a value
of 855 ml/m3, compared to the next highest value at 66 ml/m3).
To handle the long tailed distribution of values, the plankton data is analyzed in ranks.
That is, throughout the values used to analyze plankton concentrations are the ordered rank
of each value, with the rankings determined separately for phytoplankton and zooplankton.
5.3.2 Gridding the plankton data
Kriging is a method of using estimates of the spatial covariance of sampled data to con-
struct gridded estimates of the values throughout a region. The sampled data is first used
to estimate the semivariance between points at different spatial distances, displayed in a
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Figure 5.4: Measured phytoplankton and zooplankton concentrations. Samples with concentration measure-
ments of zero are not shown. The large number of outliers suggests very long tails. The high zooplankton
concentration outlier is dropped for the analysis.

















(a) Phytoplankton bubble plot

















(b) Zooplankton bubble plot
Figure 5.5: Phytoplankton and zooplankton observed densities. Each bubble shows a single cast, with the
size proportional to the concentration level. The data points are aligned along axes of latitude and longitude,
although the axes are not equally scaled.
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variogram. The semivariance increases as distance between sampled points increases, reach-
ing a maximum value where covariance between points decays to zero. An analytical model
is fit to the variogram, consisting of a smooth increase in semivariance, starting from a
lower value called the nugget and reaching a higher value called the sill, at which point
it is constant. In the analysis below, a spherical model is used for this smooth increase
(Pebesma, 2004).
We use Kriging to fill in the spatial data holes for phytoplankton and zooplankton. We
treat the plankton variation is isotropic, and since Peru is near the equator that degrees of
longitude and latitude are nearly equivalent. The assumption that latitude and longitude
degrees can be treated as equivalent appears justified (see supplemental section E.1.2),
however there is a clear difference between variation along the shore and away from the
shore that is not accounted for. Separate variograms were estimated for phytoplankton and
zooplankton, as ranks, and each month in the data set. The data is divided by month to
minimize the amount of temporal evolution across the region. A spherical model was fit
to each month’s variogram (see figure 5.6), and the median values for the nugget and sill
parameters across all months were used to construct a single variogram model to be applied
to all time.
















Monthly Variogram Model Values
(a) Sill parameters for the variogram models






Monthly Variogram Model Values
(b) Range parameters for the variogram
models
Figure 5.6: Boxplots of the parameters for the variogram models. Each point represents a month between
1972 and 1990. The range parameters are in units of degrees.
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Figure 5.7 shows the variogram monthly semivariance data points, with our model in
blue, the mean semivariances in red and a locfit line in green.
(a) Phytoplankton variogram model verification (b) Zooplankton variogram model verification
Figure 5.7: Phytoplankton and zooplankton variogram model verification. Each point (black) represents the
semivariance within a span of distances, estimated for a given month. The blue line is the variogram model
used in the analysis, applying median values for each parameter. Green shows the locfit (local regression) of
the data points, suggesting that a longer decorrelation distance may be appropriate. Red points show the
semivariance for the entire dataset, which is higher due to loss of temporal correlation.
The resulting Kriging graphs provide good spatial coverage and temporal variability.
Two sample weeks for phytoplankton and zooplankton are shown in figure 5.8.
5.3.3 Modeling fish stocks with a hidden Markov model
Next a hidden Markov model and expectation-maximization are used to estimate anchoveta
stocks based on port landings. Hidden Markov models (HMMs) assume a dependency
between an observed time-series and the time-series of a hidden state of the system variable
(Leroux, 1992). In this case, the state of the system is the stock, and the observed time-series
is the port landings.
In the model shown in figure 5.9, the observed catch (Ct) is informed both by a hidden
stock variable (St) and by information denoting which of the ports are active (Pi,t). Pi,t
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(a) Week 1: Phytoplankton krige (b) Week 151: Phytoplankton krige
(c) Week 1: Zooplankton krige (d) Week 151: Zooplankton krige
Figure 5.8: Kriging estimates for gridded phytoplankton and zooplankton, for various weeks.
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Figure 5.9: Hidden Markov Model for modeling fish stocks.
for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} is 1 if the port i reported a catch greater than 0 in period t; P4,t is 1 if the
country-wide total catch minus the sum of the available ports is greater than 0, representing
the remaining undisaggregated ports. The time periods when Pi,t is 0 are marked in red in
figure 5.3.
We assume that growth follows a logistic model,





− Ct + εt
= αSt + βS
2
t − Ct + εt
for some unknown parameters, S0, α, and β.
The model is estimated by relating catch to the “effective stock”, the stock available
to those ports that are open in a given week. We also assume that the catch in each time
period is drawn from a probability distribution characterized by the ratio of catch to stock





where γi is the fractional influence of each port, with the constraint that
∑4
i=1 γi =
1. Therefore, we assume that there exists a probability distribution function f such that
P (Ct|S̄t) ∼ f(CtS̄t ). The assumption is that the ratio of catch to effective stock is a static
distribution to be estimated. This assumption is valid if the effort did not significantly
change over the time period and if there are no density-dependent effects in anchoveta
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schooling behavior.
The aim of the estimation-maximization procedure is to simultaneously estimate this
function f, using a kernel density, and determine the model parameter estimates, S0, α,
β, and {γ1, . . . , γ4}. The resulting values are those which produce a maximum likelihood











The specific steps are enumerated in supplemental section E.1.4.
The predicted stock is shown in figure 5.10.
  
This assumption is valid if the effort did not significantly change over the time period and if 
there are no density-dependent effects in anchoveta schooling behavior.
 
The aim of the estimation-maximization procedure is to simultaneously estimate this 
function f and determine the model parameter estimates which produce a maximum 
likelihood under it:
 
The specific steps are enumerated in supplemental material section B.
 
The predicted stock is shown below.
From the total stock, we can also estimate the stock growth (Gt 
= St+1 - St + Ct), which we will correlate with plankton across 
Figure 5.10: Predicted total stock aggregated across the Chilean coast.
From the total stock, we can also estimate the stock growth (Gt = St+1 - St + Ct), as
shown in figure 5.11. Plankton is not used in this model, but we now correlate the stock
growth with plankton across space in the next section.
5.3.4 Average correlations
Anchoveta eat zooplankton, so we expect to see a correlation between anchoveta growth
and average levels of plankton. That correlation could be delayed, based on the maturation
and spawning time of the anchoveta. The average plankton concentrations over time give
an indication of their variability (see figure 5.12).
We correlate the predicted anchoveta stock growth against measured average plankton
concentrations, delayed from 0 to 200 weeks (see figure 5.14). Autocorrelation in the plank-
ton is corrected for (see appendix E.1.3). Delayed weeks correspond to earlier life stages
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Figure 5.11: Change in predicted stock across the Chilean coast. A long-term decline in recruitment (red)
extends over the period despite varying catch (black).
Figure 5.12: Average phytoplankton (red) and zooplankton (green) concentrations over time, from observa-
tions, showing their wide variability.
87
CHAPTER 5. INFERRING SPATIAL FISHERIES
and the preceding generation. Growth occurs when fish are recruited to the fishery, at 5-6
months of age. Correlations at a delay greater than 5-6 months describe the previous gener-
ation, which was spawned 1 - 3 years before this (Iwamoto et al., 2010). Figure 5.13 shows
the time-line preceding recruitment. We also include some leading weeks, as a falsification
test.
20 - 2672 - 78176 - 182
5-6 m1 year2 years
0
maturity recruitmentmaximum age earliest spawning
Figure 5.13: Time-line for delayed weeks in subsequent figures. The top row describes life events: the
maximum and earliest birth times for the previous generation, and the time of spawning and recruitment.
The middle row shows the durations of each stage, and the bottom row shows weeks before 0 (the week of
recruitment).























(a) Correlation between growth and phytoplankton























(b) Correlation between growth and zooplankton
Figure 5.14: Correlation between anchoveta growth and phytoplankton and zooplankton concentrations,
with 95% confidence intervals. Each location along the x-axis is a delay between the concentrations and the
growth, implying that high phytoplankton is disadvantageous to growth 150 weeks before recruitment, but
zooplankton correlates positively (but unsignificantly) with growth at 50 weeks before recruitment.
Phytoplankton abundance in the preceding two to four years correlates negatively with
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anchoveta stock growth. Weeks with high phytoplankton might support competing species,
making it difficult for young anchoveta to grow. Zooplankton abundance correlates posi-
tively with anchoveta growth, with 95% statistical significance in the 45 to 85 weeks preced-
ing recruitment. This reflects the reliance of anchoveta on zooplankton, particularly during
the spawning period of the generation preceding the recruited generation.
5.3.5 Spatial correlation
Finally, we perform the delayed correlation between plankton and stock growth for each grid
cell. We display a measure of the combined correlation, ρphyto+ρzoo−ρphytoρzoo, where ρphyto
is the absolute value of the correlation between phytoplankton and stock growth and ρzoo is
the absolute value of the correlation between zooplankton and stock growth. This describes
when either phytoplankton or zooplankton are correlated with stock growth. Where the
95% limits for the correlation of phytoplankton or zooplankton include 0, accounting for
autocorrelation, that phytoplankton or zooplankton correlation is set to 0. This gives an
indication of what regions anchoveta, and their food chain, draw upon for various stages of
their lives.
Qualitatively, the following results are suggested by figure 5.15:
• The region of significant correlations expands across the period of delays, to its largest
extents when the delays are small.
• In the period 2-3 years before recruitment, only scattered regions show significance,
possibly clustered near the three ports.
• Around 1.5-2 years before recruitment, a zone of significance emerges off the southern
coast of Peru.
• Around 0.5-1 year before recruitment, the spatial dependence becomes smoother over
the whole of Peru.
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Correlation at  -156 weeks
seq(from = y.range[1], to = y.range[2], by = dpc)
Correlation at  -130 weeks
























Correlation at  -104 weeks
























Correlation at  -78 weeks
































































































Figure 5.15: Spatial maps of the correlation between stocks and plankton, across time. The correlation values
are the average of the correlation between growth and delayed stocks for phytoplankton and zooplankton.
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5.4 Conclusions
It was found that stock growth correlates positively with the abundance of zooplankton
in the period from 45 to 85 weeks prior to recruitment (95% statistical significance). The
correlation varies considerably in space.
The varying correlations in space and time suggest that anchoveta stocks continue to
shift over their lifespan, at odds with traditional “static” adult population models (e.g.,
Anderson and Seijo, 2011, ch. 10). These techniques provide a basis for using targeted
catch restrictions to support specific cohorts, depending on the spatial dependence during
that period. Additionally, the state of plankton can be used to inform the future growth of
the anchoveta stock.
These results suggest a need for further research to better understand the dynamics
of the plankton-anchoveta relationship. The Kriging approach helps interpolated sampled
plankton across the region, allowing correlations with predicted stocks in space and time.
Further improvements to the Kriging results could be accomplished by adding predictors to
the variograms in our Kriging model, such as latitude, distance from shore, and the merid-
ional Atmospheric Circulation Index, which has been associated elsewhere with increases in
Anchoveta population (Kliashtorin, 2001). Closer study of the correlations between phyto-
plankton and zooplankton could also help to shed light on the reasons for the time-lagged
negative correlation between phytoplankton and anchoveta.
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Chapter 6





















































































































































Figure 6.1: Reproduced from Kirby (1884, p. 229).
This work was developed between 2012 and 2015 in collaboration with
Geoffrey Heal.
This chapter analyses the central outcome of marine spatial planning, the marine pro-
tected area. Significantly, the full expression of its effects requires a spatial and cross-
boundary perspective, as developed in previous chapters. The results produced here further
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inform calibration of the computational, spatial model of the Distributed Commons.
Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) are regions within which human activity is restricted
in order to preserve ecosystems or historical and cultural features. MPAs, and particularly
their strictest form, the no-take reserve, can be very powerful tools for conservation. Within
many MPA boundaries, fish biomass, density, average size, and species richness increase
dramatically (Lester et al., 2009). MPAs also have the potential to benefit adjacent fish-
eries. These effects have been studied as “benefits over boundaries”, in which increased fish
biomass diffuses into exploited areas (Gell and Roberts, 2003), and as “savings accounts”,
able to buffer fluctuations and support resilience (Grafton et al., 2010).
Theoretical models (Polacheck, 1990, Holland and Brazee, 1996, Tuck and Possingham,
2000, Pezzey et al., 2000, Sanchirico and Wilen, 2001a, Neubert, 2003) and computational
models (Walters et al., 1999) have explored the potential for MPAs to benefit exploited
fisheries, but previous empirical studies have focused only on specific regions and species
(e.g., Sluka et al., 1997, Murawski et al., 2000, Roberts et al., 2001, McClanahan, 2010).
This study is the first global analysis of the benefits of MPAs for harvested fish stocks. We
exploit temporal and spatial variation in protected areas as predictors of stock surplus, as
new areas are designated as MPAs within the management boundaries of exploited stocks.
The designation of new MPAs amounts to a natural experiment whose consequences we
study.
The first section describes our dataset, which combines global databases of MPAs, stock
assessments, catch time-series, and sea surface temperatures. In the second section, we
perform a set of treatment-and-control analyses, by comparing stock assessments in regions
that had a concentrated growth of protected areas to those which did not. The third
section constructs a flexible model with stock-specific parameters, based on the logistic
growth equation. We treat MPAs as mechanisms for enhancing the growth rate parameter
of a stock, and explore a number of model formulations. The fourth section studies a
regression tree of the stock-specific MPA effects, as a way of identifying which stock and
region characteristics drive positive results. The fifth section estimates the economic benefits
of MPAs, and compares these to country-specific costs for maintaining the protection. The
sixth section develops a model that accounts for non-linearity in the effects of MPAs and
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All Marine No Take
Available: 4259 2489 1493
Non-zero: 4255 2489 381
Median (km2) 8 4.4 .7
Mean (km2): 1166 1171 203
Total (km2): 5.0e6 2.9e6 3.0e5
% of Ocean: 1.4% 0.81% 0.08%
Figure 6.2: Left: Summary statistics for the MPA Global database. All entries are include in the left
column, while only entries that distinguish marine area from coastal area, and no-take area are included in
the middle and right columns. The “% of Ocean” row shows the portion of the full ocean area included
in the MPAs. However, the denominator for calculating this value in the “All” column is inaccurate, since
the total protected area sometimes includes non-marine area. Right: Map of MPAs in the MPA Global
database. Red dots denote MPAs with only total protected area information available; green dots denote
MPAs with non-zero marine areas (corresponding to the “Marine” column on left); and blue dots denote
MPAs with non-zero no take areas (corresponding to the “No Take” column). Blue circles around blue dots
show the relative sizes of the no take MPAs (but are not to-scale with the geography).
stock-size dependent effects.
6.1 Data
As described below, our main results rely on the MPA Global database (Wood, 2007)
and the RAM Legacy Stock Assessment database (Ricard et al., 2011). Economic results
additionally use data from Sea Around Us (Sea Around Us, 2007), and our localization
result applies maps from the AquaMaps project (Kaschner et al., 2007).
The MPA Global database includes 4383 MPAs, along with their designation date, loca-
tion, IUCN category, and area (often specifying the marine portion and no-take portion).1
Figures 6.2 and 6.3 summarize this data.
We use stock assessments from the RAM Legacy Stock Assessment Database. The
RAM database contains 336 assessments, with an average of 5 time-series variables across
1MPA regions can include segments of land, such as islands and shoreline. The marine area of an MPA
excludes this area.
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Figure 6.3: Top: Total MPAs and total MPA area (on a log scale) designated by year. More than 50 new
MPAs have been designated yearly since 1970, and over 1000 km2 of ocean has been protected yearly since
1956. Bottom: MPAs and total MPA area by region. Regions designations are from the Sea Around Us
project, which divides some countries into smaller regions (for example, Japan is divided into two coasts).
Countries have taken very different approaches to designating protected areas, and the regions with the
greatest number of MPAs do not always have the greatest area protected. For example, while Sweden has
the second most protected areas, it is ranked 27th by total area protected.
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46 years per assessment. The assessments vary considerably in the variables they include,
but of these, 285 assessments contain yearly values which can be interpreted in terms of
metric tons (MT) for both the stock and yearly catch, for an average of 36 years. These
are the assessments that will be analyzed below. The assessments are biased toward de-
veloped countries, with 42% from the U.S. another 40% from other OECD countries. Half
of the remaining are from international organizations, and the remaining half from poorer
countries. Unassessed fisheries may differ significantly from assessed ones (Costello et al.,
2012), and we do not attempt to resolve this uncertainty.
Throughout this paper, we will study the effects of MPAs on the yearly surplus or
recruitment (which we treat as equivalent), defined as the change in stock level from one
year to the next, plus the catch in that year:
Rit = Sit − Si,t−1 + Ci,t−1
Catch includes discards where the data is available. This measure reflects the total produc-
tivity of the stock, whether it is appropriated by fishers or not.
We approximate bounding regions for these assessments, using FAO and country man-
agement region shapefiles (see appendix F.1). Of the assessment regions in the RAM
database, 274 had additional MPAs designated within them during the years when stocks
were assessed. Figure 6.4 shows the spatial distribution of these assessments.























Figure 6.4: Left: Geocoded assessment regions from the RAM database. Right: Heat map of number of
assessments used in the analysis.
We combine MPAs within assessment regions to generate a consistent measure of pro-
tection which we use across most of the analyses below. This is the portion of an assessed
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where MPAit is the total protected area in assessment region i and year t. Assessment
region i encompasses an area Areai. The sum on the right includes an individual MPA j if
its centroid is within the assessment region and it was designated before year t.
In addition, catches, landed values, and shelf areas by country and distinct sub-country
marine regions were collected from the Sea Around Us Project (Sea Around Us, 2007).
Temperature provides a key control. Environmental variability, through temperatures
and indices based on them (such as ENSO, NAO, and AMO) have been shown to strongly
predict recruitment (Keyl and Wolff, 2008). Changes in sea surface temperatures (SSTs)
can have effects throughout the food web, although the effects can vary by species and
region. Along the west coast of South America, warm temperatures can signal a shutting-
off of nutrient-rich cold water upwelling due to El Niño conditions, resulting in decreased
productivity and increased mortality for many stocks. In other stocks, such as scallops
in the same area, warmer temperatures increase growth rates (UCAR, 1994). Long-term
temperature changes are also shifting stock ranges producing more complicated impacts
(Cheung et al., 2013).
We calculate the average SST anomaly for each region and year, using the Extended
Reconstructed SST dataset from NOAA (Smith et al., 2008). Estimates that account for
SSTs include temperature anomalies from the two years preceding the measured stock
growth, further capturing some cohort effects.
Of the fish assessed in the RAM database, 121 species have fish distribution maps
available in the AquaMaps database (Kaschner et al., 2007). These maps are show in
appendix figure B.1. Fish distributions offer a way to refine the effective protection available
to each species.
SSTs are averaged over assessment regions and fish population distributions are summed
over circular regions representing each MPAs. Since both SSTs and AquaMaps data are
provided on a grid, we generate values across regions in an analogous manner. The average
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For fish distributions within an MPA, the effective protection provided by an MPA covering









If the region is too small to encompass any grid centers, the closest grid point is used
(TA = T (x, y) and DA = |A|D(x, y)).
6.2 Treatment and control analysis
We first divide assessments into “treated” and “control” assessments. This is similar
to BACI (Before-after-control-impact) approaches which compare changes in reserves to
changes in similar control regions.
Treated regions are those which had a period of very little change in their MPA portion,
followed by a short period in which proportionally large areas were protected, followed by
another stable period. Control regions are those for which, over the entire timeseries, the
protected portion never increased beyond a threshold. Formally, a region is categorized as
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Figure 6.5: Evolution in time of stock surpluses, for “treated” stocks (left) and “control” stocks (right).
The histogram below each graph shows the number of assessments available for each year. All stocks are
normalized to a pre-treatment average of 1, with control regions applying their matched treatment period
(green line). The red line shows the average stock surplus in each year. In the left graph, the blue shows
estimate and confidence average surplus and post-treatment trend.




The values for t0, t1, t2, and t3 are determined on per-region basis, selected for the ranges
that produce the longest baseline and treatment periods, by maximizing (t1 − t0)(t3 − t2).
We use µ = 0.15 % and ν = 0.5 %, which produces 102 treated regions and 132 control
regions.2 Treatment regions are matched to control regions as described in appendix F.2,
using a combination of stock dynamics and location. We assume that the creation of reserves
in the treated areas does not also affect effort in the control areas. Normalized time-series
of the surplus of these two collections show a strong effect (see figure 6.5).
A difference-in-difference regression supports this result. The model is as follows:
Rit
Baselinei
= β0 + β1Tit + β2Pit + β3TitPit
Rit = Sit − Si,t−1 + Ci,t−1 is the surplus for stock i in year t. For each observation, Tit is 1
if the stock is treated and 0 otherwise, and Pit is 1 if the time is after t2 and 0 otherwise.
Control stocks use the same year for t2 as their matched treated stock.
2These values are somewhat arbitrary, and chosen to maximize the number of treated and control regions
while still providing separation between them.
99
CHAPTER 6. GLOBAL BENEFITS OF MARINE PROTECTION
No Temp. With Temp.
Treated (β1) 0.14 0.15
(0.13) (0.13)
Post (β2) 0.53 0.52
(0.38) (0.37)





Adj. R2 0.01 0.01
Num. obs. 5558 5558
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 6.1: Two difference-in-difference regression models of the effect of MPA designation. The left and
right models are identical, except for additional temperature controls in the right model.
The values are normalized as in figure 6.5, by dividing by the average surplus over the
pre-treatment period (from t0 to t1), with time periods for control stocks again taken from
their matched treated stocks. This result is shown in table 6.1.
Treated stocks are slightly better off prior to treatment, and all stocks improve later in
their assessments. However, treated stocks show an 30% improvement in surplus, relative
to matched control regions. None of these coefficients are significant under robust standard
errors clustered at the assessment level, but provide suggestive relationships. The next
section uses a more flexible, biologically-motivated model to capture endogenous growth.
6.3 Logistic results
We use the logistic growth model to estimate the growth of each fish stock over time, given
stock and harvest levels. While logistic growth models are unnaturally simplistic, they
are appropriate in situations when age class and ecosystem information is missing. The
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Gompertz model is also reasonable in these context, and an analogous analysis is done for











We hypothesize that the effect of MPAs is a function of the portion of the total assessed
region that is protected. In the main model specification (reported below), the protected
portion produces additional surplus through changes to the logistic growth rate, r. The ratio
r
K is assumed to remain constant. This assumption suggests that increases in r are balanced
by proportional increases in K, and is supported by the data.3 An increase in r represents
more productivity for a given stock level, as a consequence of supporting environmental and
ecosystem services.
Protected areas provide an immediate benefit to fishers by providing a greater yearly
surplus production. If the new growth rate is expressed as a factor increase over the old
value, r1 = ar0, then the new maximum sustainable yield by the square of the increase:










By combining the stock assessment time series with the area protection history, the
marginal benefit of protecting an additional portion of stock’s range can be estimated di-
rectly. We use a linear model, estimated by least squares regression with robust standard










i,t−1 + δi + εit
Logistic growth is represented here through coefficients estimated on Si,t−1 and S
2
i,t−1,
and estimated independently for each stock. The marginal change in growth rate, β, is
3Models that include a term MPAit
Areai
S2it find that the corresponding coefficient is not significantly different
from zero.
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the parameter of interest, and MPAi,t−1 is the area protected within the stock assessment
region, Areai. The two previous years’ average temperature anomalies are included (Ti,t−1
and Ti,t−2) as controls on the growth rate.
4 δi is a stock fixed effect. εit is a normally
distributed error term. In addition, we include time as stock-specific trends (θit) and year
fixed-effects (φt) in some formulations.
The results are shown in table 6.2, for total protected areas, and for marine-only portions
of protected areas, where the data is available.
The numerical values of these results are difficult to interpret, since each stock has a
distinct baseline growth rate. The distribution of growth rates is shown in figure 6.6. For the
histogram, we estimate growth rates after accounting for the global MPA effect, constraining
them to be positive. The median growth rate is 0.34. According to the fifth column model
(including trends and year fixed effects), increasing the protected area portion by 10% would
increase this median growth rate by 50% and the MSY by 125%. The distribution of these
percentage increase in growth rate per percent increase in protected area is also shown in
the lower-right graph of figure 6.6.
MPAs often include non-marine regions, such as islands and shoreline, and the marine-
only regressions only include the portion of each MPA that is specified as marine. Results
for marine-only MPAs tend to be less significant but numerically greater. This is ex-
pected, since these regressions include only the 60% of the globally designated protected
area which specify the marine portion of their area (see figure 6.2). The observations are
at the assessment-year level, so the number of observations does not change between the
total and marine-only MPA data, even though less MPA area and fewer MPAs are counted
in the marine-only results. These results suggest that marine protection is more beneficial
to fish stocks than protection of their adjoining land.
We also consider models that allow for changes in K, a relative change in r, phasing in
of the effects of a time horizon (appendix F.12), and inclusion of only IUCN categorized
protected areas (appendix F.5).
The spatial distribution of positive and negative estimated benefits from MPAs is dis-
played in figure 6.7.
4This modification allows growth rates to vary systematically, in line with Carson et al. (2009).
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No Temp. Timeless Stock Trends Year FE Trends-Year
Data: MPA variables represent Total MPA areas
β 0.7872 0.9369∗ 1.7077∗∗∗ 1.0124∗∗ 1.6860∗∗∗
(0.7530) (0.5179) (0.3685) (0.4486) (0.3731)
R2 0.5280 0.6042 0.6375 0.6076 0.6398
Adj. R2 0.4844 0.5391 0.5636 0.5402 0.5635
Data: MPA variables represent Marine-only MPA areas
β 1.1983 2.1367 10.4473 2.9363 10.2263
(1.9896) (4.5583) (6.7117) (4.4884) (6.6549)
R2 0.5277 0.6040 0.6366 0.6076 0.6390
Adj. R2 0.4841 0.5389 0.5625 0.5401 0.5625
Temperatures no yes yes yes yes
Stock trends no no yes no yes
Year FE no no no yes yes
Num. obs. 10093 10093 10093 10093 10093
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Table 6.2: The estimated marginal change to the growth rate for protecting a portion of an assessment. To
capture this entire benefit, 100% of the region would need to be protected, a value which is outside of the
range of our data. The first column has no temperature or time regressor, while all other columns include
temperature controls. The second column includes temperatures, but not time. The middle third includes
assessment-specific trends. The fourth column has a fixed effect for each year. The fifth column includes
both year fixed effects and stock trends.
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Figure 6.6: Upper-left: A histogram of the protected portion of each assessed area. The middle 50% have
protected portions between .3% to 2.8%. Upper-right: A histogram of the growth rates, before accounting
for protected areas, according to the fourth column (time FE) model and for growth rates estimated as
non-negative. Lower-left: Percentage of the observed total growth attributable to protected areas in 2006.
Lower-right: Relationship between marginal increases in protected areas and increases in growth rates.
Figure 6.7: Regions with positive and negative estimated effects from MPAs. Blue regions have most assessed
stocks showing positive benefits; in red regions most assessed stocks showing negative benefits.
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Stock assessments for exploited fisheries estimate only the portion of the fish population
available to fishers. As such, this estimate only describes the benefit of protected areas to
exploited populations, either due to cross-boundary recruitment or fish movement. Most
assessed regions have a small fraction of their area protected (the median protected portion
is 1.4%; see figure 6.6), but the impact on the fish population outside of this region is
detectable.
6.3.1 Simulation experiments
These estimates rely on variation in the MPA area over time. In general, the timing of
protection designation is endogenous to the greater socio-ecological fisheries system. More-
over, some past analyses of the impacts of management suffer from identification problems
that conflate the role of catch restrictions with other forms of management (Bromley, 2009,
Nowlis and Van Benthem, 2012). This sections considers the potential for the measured
effect of MPAs reported here to represent other forms of management.
First, we argue that much of the variation in our independent variable is exogenous.
The exact year of designation is difficult for members of the system to predict, given the
multiple scales at which decisions need to be made and the often delicate discussions between
stakeholders that can take many years. The protected areas that we study are also rarely
designed to support exploited fisheries productivity, since evidence of this process has only
emerged in the last decade.
Forms of fishery management that operate through catch restrictions (e.g., ITQs, season
restrictions, and horsepower limits) are captured by changes in the observed catch. Gear
restrictions which can allow catch to be more selective, however, are not accounted for and
could explain some of the benefits here attributed to MPAs if these restrictions were imple-
mented simultaneously. There is also an error-in-variables problem, since the measure used
of protected area may not correspond to the amount of area that is effectively protected, and
this will downward bias our results. A great number of additional factors are missing from
this model: environmental forcings, species interaction, and other anthropogenic effects.
However, these are unlikely to correlate either strongly or positively with MPA designation.
To investigate the potential for this estimate to falsely identify other changes in man-
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agement, we perform a series of experiments. Each experiment simulates a stock under
growth and harvesting model. Initially, each stock is fished at an unsustainable level, for
20 years. In year 20, optimal catch management is implemented: first, all fishing is closed
to allow the stock to recover; once the stock is within 10% of MSY, the sustainable harest
level is applied.
For each experiment, we estimate four statistical models that include effects from MPAs.
The true effect of the MPA under these simulations is 0, while estimates other than 0 are a
reflection of conflating management effects with MPA effects. The estimated models either
have a step increase of 1% in MPA coverage starting in year 20, with and without time
trends (Step, Time Trend and Step, No Time), or a linear increase in MPA coverage
starting in year 20 (Increasing, Time Trend and Increasing, No Time).
The six experiments are describe below:
Logistic (no error): A logistic growth function is used, with to confirm that the estimate
on the MPA change is zero.
Logistic (10% error): As above, but with 10% model error on the simulation.
Age-structured (no error): An age-structured model from Branch (2009).
Age-structured (10% error): As above, with 10% model error.
Age + Gear (no error): As above, but including also a gear restruction which ensures
that no fish under 4 years of age, which do not yet have high fecundity, are caught.
Age + Gear (10% error): As above, with 10% model error.
The range of the MPA coefficient under simulations with model error is estimated from
1000 Monte Carlo runs. The results are shown in figure 6.8, and show insignificant and
negative effects for all MPA coefficients. This supports the claim that the MPA estimate is
not picking up other management, even if it is correlated with the implementation of other
management practices.
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Estimated Model: Step, No Time Step, Time Trend Increasing, No Time Increasing, Time Trend
Figure 6.8: Estimates of MPA effect for null models. For each simulation described in the text, and under
each model, the estimated effect of MPAs in a model with no effect from MPAs is 0 or negative.
6.4 Regression tree analysis
To determine what factors most influence the effectiveness of MPAs, we estimate the MPA
effect for each assessment individually, and build a regression tree against a wide variety of
assessment characteristics, shown in table 6.3. These include both region and fish features.
The assessment-specific values for β use the multiple years available for each assessment,
with a linear time trend.5
Regression trees identify the natural divisions that associate input and output param-
eters (Breiman et al., 1984). Each decision branch of the tree is a division in the data or
a subset of the data, and is characterized by an average coefficient estimate and a num-
ber of observations. Branches are chosen sequentially, based on whichever parameter and










t−1 + δ + θt+ εt
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split produces the greatest reduction in the sum of squared residuals. The highest-level
node, representing the average β coefficient across all data when estimated independently,
is negative.







































Figure 6.9: A regression tree to explain stock-specific estimates of the benefits of MPAs, according to the
logistic model. Each box shows the mean value of the β coefficient for all assessments matching the given
constraints, and the number of such assessments. The variables are defined in table 6.3.
The first branch of the regression tree is determined by the potential size of the stock,
which also relates to the size of the assessment region. Large stocks (left branch) typically
are not benefited by protected areas unless the protected areas are large and the stock
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Parameter Description Notes
Region.Size Assessed region size in km2
MPA.Size Protected area size in km2
MPA.Portion Portion of assessed region protected
Latitude, Longitude Latitude and Longitude of the assessment region centroid
Productivity Productivity as the maximum recorded catch, divided by the region size
Logistic.r Logistic growth rate (r) estimated
Logistic.K Logistic carrying capacity (K) estimated
Country The country, or multinational
REC.AGE.yr, Age of recruits and recruited biomass in yr, as used for estimating stocks
Age.for.total.biomass (by individuals, N = 210; by biomass, N = 182)
MSY.MT Maximum sustainable yield in MT (N = 193)
F.AGE.yr.yr Age for computing mortality in yr (N = 157)
Habitat.Habitat Habitat pelagic; demersal; diadromous; wholly freshwater (N = 142)
SSB.SEX.sex Sex of spawners for estimating stocks (N = 129)
SSB.AGE.yr Minimum age of spawners in yr (N = 128)
M.1dT, M.1dyr Natural mortality per year (N = 126)
A50.yr Age at 50% maturity in yr (N = 122)
Table 6.3: The variables used to in the regression tree construction to predict effect sizes, as estimated by
the logistic equation.
is very productive. For smaller stocks with large MPA areas, all branches show positive
effects from MPAs, with the largest effects from large MPAs within even larger assessment
regions. High latitude stocks also show large benefits from MPAs, probably driven successful
management in Alaska and the North Sea.
A few missing parameters are notable. In particular, the country is not a top-level
predictor, although latitude may be a proxy for it. Age only shows up on the lower left
branch (age for estimating biomass), suggesting that both long- and short-lived species
benefit. Finally, habitat type is not a top-level predictor.
6.5 Economic analysis
One of the clearest impacts of successful fisheries management is on fisher income, and
MPAs may be an effective method for boosting incomes (Worm et al., 2009). In principle,
this expected surplus can be compared to the cost of protecting an area, to determine if the
benefits of protection outweigh the costs.
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In the following, we treat the estimated point values from the model including trends and
year fixed effects in section 6.3 as valid across all countries. This is a poor approximation,
and the following results should be taken as only suggestive of actual country benefits.
To translate our estimate of effects into economic benefits, we use the Sea Around Us









where S̄k is the steady-state stock for species k, pk is the landing price per MT for that
species, and EEZ is the exclusive economic zone area for the given country. The steady-
state stock is unavailable for most species, so we use recorded catch as a lower bound on
the stock and produce a conservative estimate of these benefits.
Balmford et al. (2004) uses a survey of the costs of 83 globally representative marine
reserves to estimate an empirical model of the reserve maintenance. They include both a
simple model, based only on the reserve size, with an R2 of 0.79, as well as a model that
includes more predictors and achieves an R2 of 0.90. Both models show economies of scale,
where larger MPAs cost less per unit area than smaller ones.
This relationship describes the added value of marine protection in terms of potential
landings. This is not equivalent to fisher incomes, since we have no information on effort
or fisher costs. It is furthermore an underestimate of the value of these landings to society
as a whole.
To estimate the threshold at which benefits exceed costs, we apply the simple model




= 5.02− 0.8 log10(MPA)
where MPA is measured in km2 and cost is measured in year 2000 U.S. dollars. The landed
value of catch from Sea Around Us, pkC̄k is also in year 2000 dollars, and the average of
catch is taken over the years 1997 - 2006.
We combine these to produce a profit function, and find its root, which is the point
at which estimated economic benefits exceed estimated costs. Of 234 countries and large
marine regions, 71 have enough area protected to have a net economic benefit, 141 currently
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have a net loss, and 22 generate too little rent for any amount of protected area to generate
surplus sufficient for an economic gain. The mean portion of a country’s EEZ that needs to
be protected to generate an economic surplus is 8.5%, while the current protected region,
averaged by country as a portion of EEZs, is 2%. A table of these countries and their key
parameters is listed in appendix F.11.
This estimate assumes that a single MPA is created for each country. However, most
countries have a large number of small MPAs. Balmford et al. provide an refinement of the
expression above that accounts for distance to a populated area (DP ) and purchasing power





= 5.62− 0.72 log10(MPA)− 0.002DP − 0.3PPP
where DP is measured in km.
As an example, compare Alaska and Australia, two large and productive regions (see
table 6.4). Both have a large share of their EEZs under protection, and because of the
high value of their marine products, this amount is far greater than the breakeven portion
for which potential benefits exceed costs. Since the average landed value in Australia is
40% of the landed value in Alaska, the breakeven point for Australia is correspondingly
larger, although it is still less than .1% of its total EEZ. The economic benefit in Australia
is estimated to be less than Alaska’s, despite the larger protected area. In addition, the
much larger number of MPAs in Australia (356 compared to 42) causes its total estimated
cost of maintaining them to be higher. With both effects, Alaska is estimated to gain three
times its costs, while Australia’s MPAs cost three times their benefit. All of these effects,
however, are much smaller than the economic benefit to Australia of just the tourism of
one protected region, the Great Barrier Reef Marine park, estimated at $5.7 billion in 2012
(Deloitte Access Economics, 2013).
Country EEZ (km2) Landed Val. ($m) Breakeven Current Cost ($m) Benefit ($m)
Alaska (USA) 3 770 021 1398 0.000 26 0.059 39 26 94
Australia 6 362 934 544 0.000 97 0.082 19 160 51
Table 6.4: Estimated cost and benefit components for Australia and Alaska.
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2e−5 4e−5 8e−5 1.6e−4 3e−4 7e−4 1.4e−3 3e−3 6e−3 1.3e−2 0.02 0.05 0.1 0.22 0.47 1
(a) Portion of a country’s EEZ required for benefits to exceed costs: green countries require less than .1%;
yellow countries require less than 1%; and orange countries require less than 10%.
0.001 0.0025 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.1 0.25 0.63 1.58 3.98 10 25 63 158 398 1000
(b) Current status of total MPA area, relative to the breakeven point: green denotes countries which have
more than the necessary share of protection; orange and red for those below that threshold.
0.1 0.14 0.18 0.25 0.34 0.46 0.63 0.86 1.17 1.58 2.15 2.93 3.98 5.41 7.36 10
(c) Current status of MPA approximated costs and benefits: green denotes countries for which economic
benefits exceed costs; orange and red for those below that threshold.
Figure 6.10
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Globally, the estimated costs of all MPAs, under Balmford’s assumptions, is 1.45 billion USD per year.
Using the assumptions above, the additional landed value attributable to MPAs is 2.18 billion USD per year.
This estimate is conservative, since catch is used as a lower bound on the stock. The rela-
tionship between catch and stock is widely variable (see appendix F.11.1), but the average
ratio in our dataset since 2000 is 0.18. Using this to estimate stocks globally, the added
value is 12 billion USD per year. This suggests that out of a total landed value within EEZs
of 51 billion USD in 2005, existing MPAs may be responsible for approximately 23% of catch
(see table 6.5).
Regoin Costs ($m) Cons. Value ($m) Scaled Value ($m) Landed ($m)
North America 434 1118 (13%) 6212 (75%) 8258 (16%)
South America 64 60 (1%) 335 (7%) 4261 (8%)
Europe 503 466 (6%) 2589 (38%) 6713 (13%)
Africa 41 99 (3%) 554 (18%) 2989 (5%)
Asia 174 281 (1%) 1563 (6%) 24071 (46%)
Oceania 226 143 (3%) 799 (17%) 4485 (8%)
Open Ocean 6 12 (2%) 66 (12%) 516 (1%)
Total 1451 2181 (4%) 12121 (23%) 51297 (100%)
Table 6.5: Regional costs and added value for nationally designated MPAs. Costs are estimated using the
three-term expression from Balmford et al. (2004). Conservative (Cons.) values use catch as a proxy for
stock; Scaled values are conservative values scaled by the estimated stock-to-catch ratio. Percents for each
are the percent of the total landed value (Landed). Percents for the landed value are as a fraction of the
total global landed value from national EEZs.
6.6 Nonlinearity in responses
To explore the effects of non-linearity in the strength of the response, we add quadratic
terms and terms that allows the effect to vary with stock-size. The derivation of this model
is described in multiple steps.





, we find that the marginal benefit of MPAs de-
creases with total protected area (see appendix F.10), but the decrease is slight (< 2 %) for
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Timeless Stock Trends Year FE Trends and Year
# MPA St −0.0007 −0.0027∗∗ −0.0006 −0.0028∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0010) (0.0004) (0.0010)
Sum MPA2 / Area2St 16.6424
∗∗∗ 18.5588∗∗∗ 16.6583∗∗∗ 18.1516∗∗∗
(3.6807) (3.2159) (3.7054) (3.2042)
R2 0.6072 0.6422 0.6099 0.6448
Adj. R2 0.5425 0.5691 0.5428 0.5695
Num. obs. 10093 10093 10093 10093
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 6.6: Estimate of the nonlinear effects of individual MPA areas, represented as coefficients on the
number and sum of squared areas. Additional MPAs have a negative effect, unless they have a large enough
area. This break-even point is 1.2% for the Trends and Year model.
most of the observations.
However, the benefit is increasing in the size of individual MPAs. Let the effect of an
























are significantly colinear (see appendix F.10.1), but that
the sum of square areas provides a closer fit to data, so we drop the linear term.
Fitting the model with these changes shows that the largest MPAs produce the largest
benefits, as also supported by the regression tree. Small MPAs do not produce a clear
benefit. In fact, MPAs less than 1.25% of an assessed area are estimated as having a
negative effect, although the significance of that result is low. This is at odds with Halpern
(2003), who suggests that relative impacts are independent of reserve size.6
We further add a relative stock-size effect. Whereas the previous coefficients of interest
above are interacted with current stock size to estimate growth rates, we now add cor-
6Halpern (2003) studies the effects of protection on fish density and biomass and other benefits within
reserves and finds these benefits are constant per unit area. The assumptions of this paper differ from those
of Halpern both in that we consider a separate form for the impact, and study that impact for populations
adjacent to reserves.
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responding coefficients that are not interacted with the stock size, but are scaled by the
observed mean stock. These terms boost the stock surplus above its previous predicted
growth rate when the stock is low, and depress it when it is high.
This forms our final specification:
Rit =
(

















S̄i + θit+ φt + δi + εit
where MPNit is the number of MPAs in assessment region i in year t and S̄i is the average
stock level over the entire assessment period.
While the carrying capacity, Ki, might be a more natural choices to use in place of S̄i
to scale relative effects, this specification better incorporates directly observed values. In
addition, S̄i and the estimate of Ki =
γi
κi
are closely correlated (95% CI 0.943 to 0.964).
The coefficients from this model are cleanly estimated, but their impacts are more
difficult to interpret. For both the number of MPAs and their squared sizes, the coefficients
on the current stock level are of similar magnitude to the coefficients on the average stock,
but of opposite signs. When the stock is at its mean level, the combined coefficient on
MPA number is negative, implying that more small MPAs depress growth. At the same
time, the coefficient on squared area is positive, so that a large enough protected area will
counterbalance this effect.
The benefits of MPAs, according to this model, are also stock-size dependent. Depressed
stocks receive a larger benefit, even producing surplus increase for all MPA sizes when stocks
fall below 76% of the historical biomass. One consequence of this stock-dependency is that
there exist qualitatively different dynamics in different regions of the MPA state space, as
shown in figure 6.11.
As before, the coefficients for marine-only areas are less precisely estimated. As ex-
pected, the marginal effect of a squared-MPA-portion at the average stock size (St = S̄) is
greater for marine areas than for total areas (20 compared to 16). In the discussion that
follows, we will use the coefficients estimated for MPA total area.
Two parameters provide a clearer interpretation of this model’s results, which we call
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Timeless Stock Trends Year FE Trends and Year
# MPA St −0.0024∗ −0.0039∗∗∗ −0.0025∗ −0.0040∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0008)
Sum MPA2 / Area2St −33.0278∗∗ −35.8660∗∗∗ −34.5726∗∗ −37.5532∗∗∗
(10.9829) (7.9614) (11.7827) (9.1776)
# MPA S̄ 0.0016∗∗ 0.0031∗∗ 0.0016∗∗ 0.0030∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0006) (0.0010)
Sum MPA2 / Area2S̄ 48.5862∗∗∗ 52.6993∗∗∗ 50.0724∗∗∗ 54.0134∗∗∗
(7.4335) (7.9802) (8.1518) (9.1374)
R2 0.6101 0.6450 0.6130 0.6475
Adj. R2 0.5458 0.5724 0.5463 0.5727
Num. obs. 10093 10093 10093 10093
# Marine St −0.0419∗∗∗ −0.0521∗∗∗ −0.0391∗∗∗ −0.0492∗∗∗
(0.0089) (0.0113) (0.0095) (0.0133)
Sum Marine2 / Area2St −29.1042∗∗∗ −21.3140∗∗ −30.2583∗∗∗ −22.9769∗
(8.0467) (7.8458) (8.8440) (9.2439)
# Marine S̄ 0.0045 −0.0133 0.0056 −0.0153
(0.0066) (0.0307) (0.0068) (0.0319)
Sum Marine2 / Area2S̄ 43.1634∗∗∗ 42.2305∗∗∗ 43.7379∗∗∗ 43.1593∗∗∗
(7.5955) (8.2189) (7.9078) (8.9348)
R2 0.6560 0.6697 0.6635 0.6772
Adj. R2 0.5663 0.5626 0.5655 0.5618
Num. obs. 2917 2917 2917 2917
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 6.7: Results from the nonlinear, stock-dependent model. For both the number of MPAs and the sum
of squared areas, values interacted with the current stock and with the mean stock size are of opposite signs,
driving a counter-balancing stock-dependent effect.
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Mean Stock 0.76 Mean 1.44 Mean
Always Positive Always Negative
Growth Rate Effects for 1 Additional MPA
Figure 6.11: Parameter regions for the stock-dependent effects of a single MPA. Stocks at the mean stock
level (blue) experience a small decrease in growth rates up to a protected area portion of .8%. However,
stocks less than 76% of their mean biomass always experience additional growth, and stocks greater than
144% of the mean biomass always experience depressed growth.
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the surplus parameter and the stability parameter. First, we define,












A is the stock-independent effect of MPAs (the coefficients for S̄i), as a function of
MPA distribution, and B is the stock-dependent effect (the coefficients for Si,t−1. The
value A + B is the surplus parameter, and estimates the steady-state growth boost from
protection for any given combination of MPAs, when Si,t = S̄i. The value 2A + B is a
summary statistic that captures the added stability provided to the region by its protected
areas. The derivation of this “stability” parameter will be described in section 6.6.3. Figure





















e MPA Area Input
Total Area
Marine-Only
(Number coeffs / 10)
Figure 6.12: Coefficients and combined parameters from the model with both year fixed-effects and stock-
specific trends. The combined parameters represent the surplus boosting and stabilizing effects of protection.
While the effects of the number of MPAs are insignificantly estimated, the size of MPAs shows a positive
value for both of these effects. Bars shown for marine-only number of MPAs are divided by 10 for clarity.
Error bars show 95% confidence intervals.
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For another perspective on these effects, we consider the surplus as a fraction of the
mean stock size, A + B S
S̄
. Figure 6.13 shows this effect across stock sizes (as a fraction of
the mean stock size) and the portion protected. For a single MPA, the benefit is largest for
large protected areas and small stocks. Beyond a single MPA, the distribution of MPA sizes
has a large effect. For equally sized MPAs, as the number of MPAs increases, the contours
smooth, until they are only a function of stock size. For “extreme” sized MPAs, where all
but one MPA covers zero area, the threshold for a positive benefit at the mean stock size
slowly extends toward a larger area protected as the number of MPAs increase.7 In both
cases, the size of the effect for small protected area portions increases with the number of
MPAs.
6.6.1 MSY changes
Another way to study this change is to consider the growth curve, normalized by the carrying
capacity. Let z = sK and the mean stock be denoted z̄. Then, dropping controls and the
minimum viable population intercept (ζ1,Ti,t−1Si,t−1, ζ2,iTi,t−2Si,t−1, θit, φt, and δi) and













Three example growth curves are shown in figure 6.14. Large amounts of protection
(> 2%) produce large increases in the growth rate across a large span of the growth curve.
A greater number of small MPAs can produce as large of an increase in growth, when
stock-sizes are low, but depresses growth for large stock sizes.8
A useful statistic for comparing these adjusted growth curves is the maximum sustain-











7In theory, the effect of MPAs with zero size should be zero. However, very spall protected areas can
produce large effects, and are often placed in highly productive regions. We treat this effect as an empirical
approximation, accounting for non-linearities that allow very small MPAs to produce non-zero effects.
8We have developed an online tool to graphically apply these estimated effects to any parameter values:
http://existencia.org/mpa/
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Figure 6.13: The surplus boost (additional stock surplus) as a fraction of the mean stock size. The x-axis
represents total area protected; the y-axis is the stock size as a fraction of the mean stock size. The plots
are divided into two groups. Along the top row, the MPAs are assumed to be identically sized, so that each
MPA has a relative size of p/N . Along the bottom, every MPA except one has a size of 0, and one has a
size of p.
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Effects of MPA designation on growth


























1 MPA, 1% Protected
1 MPA, 3% Protected
20 MPAs, 1% Protected
Figure 6.14: The baseline (zero protection) growth curve, normalized by the carrying capacity, for the
baseline growth rate r = 0.5. A single MPA protecting 1% of the assessed area makes very little difference,
while one protecting 3% of the area produces a large effect. Similarly, 20 MPAs results in large decreases in
the growth rate for large stocks, but boosts growth rates for small stocks as much as protecting 3% of the
region.
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Substituting this expression into the growth expression above gives a relative measure
of the MSY growth. This is shown across a range of values for the “Trends and Year” model
in figure 6.15. The ratio of the MSY growth under existing protection, compared to MSY
growth with zero protected areas, is also shown. For low total amounts of protected area,
the driving factor is the number of MPAs, with MSYs increasing when more than 60 MPAs
were designated. MSYs also increase for a single MPA when the size is greater than 0.7%,




> 0.0006, reachable when at least 2.4% of an area is
protected.
Figure 6.15: Ratios of MSY growth (as a fraction of the carrying capacity, K) accounting for protection,
divided by the MSY that would be achieved if there were no protection, under the estimated model “Trends
and Year” model. Dots show observations (which also extend outside of graph range), using partial trans-
parency to show the number of years occupied by each assessment. The majority of the data are represent
fewer than 50 MPAs and 1e-3 for the sum of squared area, however the entire range of impacts is represented
in the data (with less density for large numbers of MPAs representing both high and low squared areas).
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6.6.2 Localization of effects
The effects from MPAs are naturally local, with the influence generally expected to extend
less than 10 km to 100 km from a reserve boundary (Palumbi, 2004). It is commonly claimed
that protected areas only benefit fish that spend time within them. We explore to what
extent MPAs produce localized effects.
First, as a counterpoint we aggregate the effects of MPAs at a country-wide level, using
country-wide stock surplus, as described in appendix F.3. Pooled to this level, the effects
of MPAs appear to be negative: the growth of MPAs has coincided with a decrease in the
growth capacity of stocks. This result is not surprising, given the long-term degradation of
fishery ecosystems that have occurred over this period.
We can also better limit the MPAs within assessment regions. Assessment regions tend
to represent the convex hull around fish populations, describing only a rough approximation
to the spatial population distribution. The AquaMaps database (Kaschner et al., 2007)
provides a finer resolution approximation to the location of fish populations. We estimate
the non-linear, stock-dependent model including both the MPAs interacted with the fish
distributions and the “remaining” MPA areas and counts. The results are shown in figure
6.16. Additional details on this analysis is described in appendix F.7.
The estimates for the effect of the number of MPAs within the overlapping area are
similar to the non-linear model estimated without AquaMaps intersections. The effect of
those outside the regions cannot be estimated. The magnitudes for the effect for overlapping
MPA sizes are a factor of 100 times greater, and the signs are reversed. The value of the
growth coefficient (A+ B), however, is similar but 100 times greater. The key result from
this analysis, however, is that the estimated effect for remaining MPA sizes is very closely
estimated to be zero. MPAs that do not intersect with a species have no effect on them.
6.6.3 Stabilization effect
Relative to their effects at the mean stock size, MPAs further increase growth when the
stock is low, and depress growth when it is large. This results in a stabilization of the stock.
This result is the converse of evidence that exploitation increases variability in fish stocks
(Anderson et al., 2008).
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e MPA Area Input
Total Area
Overlapping Area
(Area coeffs / 100)
Remaining Area
Figure 6.16: A comparison between the original model (left) and an interaction with the FishMaps distri-
butions (right).
To identify this analytically, we complete a simple Gordon-Schaefer bioeconomic model
by adding effort-based catch to the expression above (Gulland, 1983):
St+1 =St + rSt(1− St/K) +BSt +AS̄ − ESt + ε′∆
zt+1 =zt + rzt(1− zt) +Bzt +Az̄ − Ezt + ε∆








; E is a measure of both
fishing effort and catchability, so that catch Ct = ESt; and ε∆ is a normally-distributed
error term. The top line is in terms of stocks (St), while the bottom uses normalized units,
zt = St/K. The effort expression allows the bioeconomic system to have a stable point at
some point (which will, by virtue of its stability, be z̄).
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The level of effort, E, to maintain the stock at z̄ is,
E = r(1− z̄) +A+B
We define ε2 as the total variance across several periods,
E(zt − z̄)2 = ε2
Finally, to study the amount of variability as produced by this process, we assume
stationarity of the variance:
E(zt+1(zt + ε)− z̄)2 = ε2
From this, we can derive an expression for the long-run variance as a function of the
other parameters. It is,
ε2 =
4ε2∆
4− (2− r + ρ− 2A−B)2
These expressions are only defined where 0 < r − ρ + 2A + B < 2, and ε2 decreases as
2A+B increases. Therefore, 2A+B is a summary statistic the determines the effect that
MPAs have on stability.
6.7 Conclusions
We show that, on average, MPAs have clear benefits for fisheries. They drive increases in
stock surpluses through growth rates. The effects are local, but captured by assessment
regions. Large MPAs are have the largest effects, and since they also have the smallest per-
area costs, provide the best opportunity for profits to exceed costs. Finally, MPAs provide
a stabilization effect which even small MPAs support. Our results correspond roughly
to comparable case studies of the effects of marine protection on catch per unit effort in
adjacent fisheries (see figure 6.18).
9Maximum economic yield (MEY) is identified by treating the fishery as a production mechanism which
is a function of stock size: R = f(S), as with MSY. MEY is the level of yield at which the f ′(S) = ρ, the
economic discount rate. If ρ corresponds to the externally available interest rate, then this is the highest
level of “investment” in S which provides a return at least as large as ρ.
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2 α + β + r − ρ
ε /
 ε Δ
Long−term standard deviation vs. yearly deviation







2 α + β + r − ρ
ε /
 ε 0
Long−term standard deviation vs. no−protection deviation (r − ρ = .3)
Figure 6.17: The addition of protected areas decreases the variability of stocks. The top panel shows the
total variability of a bioeconomic model of a stock, shown as its total standard deviation, relative to its
yearly variation. As the protected area terms, 2A+B, increase, this variability decreases, toward having no
added variability. The bottom panel sets r − ρ, the growth rate minus the discount rate, at .3 and displays
the variability of the stock with protected areas, relative to the same stock without protections. In this case,
the variability can shrink to half of its unprotected value.
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Linear Model Case Studies
Case Study Comparison
Figure 6.18: Comparison between the linear model and case studies described in appendix F.6. Dots and
line ranges show the estimated changes in catch-per-unit-effort (CPUE) that result from designation of
neighboring marine reserves. The linear model is shown with 95% confidence intervals. The spread between
case study results is very large, but appears roughly comparable to the model results.
There are a number of caveats to the results presented here. We are estimating an av-
erage effect across widely varying, complex, social-ecological systems. We apply a reduced-
form, ex post approach, which black-boxes a wide range of relevant dynamics and uncertain-
ties. For example, while shifts in effort from marine protection are relevant to management,
we look only at the ecological production outcomes. While a better understanding of the
global averages can inform outcomes, individual estimates can vary greatly. The logistic
model used here is also very simple. It does not include age cohorts or ecosystem interac-
tions, and environmental impacts are limited to the linear effects of temperature. Analyses
that incorporate more detailed contextual information, such as vessel-level effort data, gear
types, and concurrent management practices, can provide better internal validity (e.g.,
Smith et al., 2006).
It is likely that less than a third of MPAs are effectively managed and protected (Kelle-
her, 1996, Pauly et al., 2002). This suggests that our results are conservative since well-
protected MPAs are expected to have greater benefits. However, the RAM database is also
biased toward developed countries, due to the dearth of scientific assessments in developing
countries. The true global average benefit, and potential average benefit for MPAs may be
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outside of the confidence intervals of our estimate.
This analysis provides a new entry point for exploring a wide variety of topics, including
the institutional features that support effective MPAs (Charles and Wilson, 2009) and the
role of fish mobility (Hilborn et al., 2004) and growth rates (Roberts et al., 2001) on MPA
effectiveness. It also informs discussions of trade-offs between the costs and benefits of
protection (e.g., Smith and Wilen, 2003). Economic models suggest that marine reserves
increase fishing costs and decrease optimal catches (Hannesson, 1998). While our dataset
does not include fishing costs, and our results show increases in optimal catch levels, these
are estimated mostly for low levels of fishing.
Our results corroborate evidence from Guidetti and Claudet (2010) that catch-per-unit-
effort (CPUE) within MPAs can be twice that of surrounding areas. This suggests that
MPAs can be amongst the most effective forms of fishery management, and future work
needs to explore the conditions that affect the distribution of benefits.
Our work supports the hypothesis that protecting large portions of the ocean can greatly
benefit both fish and fishers. We find that the greatest benefit from MPAs comes from the
largest MPAs, in expectation. It is not possible to place strong confidence in this result,
however, since most of the regions we evaluate only have small protected portions, and
evidence from the Great Barrier Reef reserve does not support this hypothesis (Fletcher et
al.).
We find that for most countries, marine protection easily generates more than it costs.
However, this cost comparison is most favorable where MPAs are large and have small
per-area costs due to economies of scale.
Finally, this analysis does not address the effect of ITQs or other catch restrictions,
since these are implicitly incorporated into our dependent variable. Our results suggest
that MPAs provide an benefit that is independent of the effects of ITQs to manage optimal
stock and catch levels. Because of this, MPAs and ITQs can work together to support more
productive marine resources.
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Chapter 7
A Distributed Fishery Model
Generated for member@columbia.edu (Columbia University) on 2012-08-28 02:35 GMT  /  http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b3361272
Public Domain, Google-digitized  /  http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Figure 7.1: Reproduced from Kirby (1884, p. 65).
This work was developed between 2013 and 2015. The analysis of lar-
129
CHAPTER 7. A DISTRIBUTED FISHERY MODEL
val drift is an extension of work from a collaboration with Kimberly Lai,
Denyse Dookie, and Nandini Ramesh.
The distributed commons model developed in chapter 4 is conceptual and analytic, and
a qualitative connection with policy was explored. The previous chapters of this empirical
section have provided a more quantitative perspective on spatial features in fisheries, which
can inform and help calibrate a computational model of the distributed commons. The model
presented below is simple but sophisticated enough to investigate complex interactions and
questions of management.
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part consists of three estimates of
the rate of diffusion for marine resources. Diffusion is a key parameter for the distributed
commons, and can be used as a summary statistic for the distance scale of spatial impacts
in the distributed commons. The second part of the chapter describes a computational
model of the distributed fishery commons, and then performs three experiments using it.
The three computational experiments are aimed at studying overfishing in the dis-
tributed commons and solutions to it. The first experiment considers the capacity of
individual fisheries to overfish, and the role that their mobility plays. This investigates,
in effect, how open-access plays out across space. The second experiment considers the
capacity of the entire fishery to become over-exploited through the process of free entry.
This is another feature of open-access, which can here be understood as access across the
boundaries of the fishery system. The third experiment studies a possible resolution to the
fishery commons problem through local management, and the issues of equity that result
in that attempt.
The distributed commons model emphasizes the movement of both resources and re-
source users, in contrast to most spatial fishery models (e.g., Sanchirico and Wilen, 1999,
Pezzey et al., 2000, Sanchirico and Wilen, 2001b). Much of spatial fisheries research focuses
on source-sink theory, using networks of patches rather than continuous space. Models that
are fully spatial often assume a static distributions of fish resources. For example, Anderson
and Seijo (2011) studies the interplay between exploitation patterns and economic incen-
tives against spatially heterogeneous resources. In contrast to these approaches, the model
presented here studies the endogenous emergence of resource patterns. The approach is
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most similar to Smith et al. (2009), which use a diffusive growth model and relate these
dynamics to economic patterns. Here, the fishing resources are initially uniform, but the
role of diffusion and the spatial patterns of extraction shape the fishery. It is then through
these emergent resource patterns that different users impact each other.
7.1 Estimating diffusion
The fish ecology model used below is a reaction-diffusion system,
∂z
∂t
= A∇2z + g(z)
where z = S/K is the stock of a fishery resource as a fraction of its carrying capacity, as
it varies in space and time. A is a vector of diffusion coefficients, and g(z) is a logistic or
another growth equation.
The key parameter of the distributed commons model is the rate of diffusion. Diffusion
determines the extent of spatial and cross-boundary interaction. For very high rates of
diffusion, a region can act like a well-mixed common pool resource. For very low rates,
spatial effects are insignificant, since every location acts independently. It is between these
two extremes that the distributed commons model is useful.
In both the model below and the estimates here, diffusion is treated as a discrete process.






can be expressed in discrete space and time as
z(t+ ∆t, x)− z(t, x)
∆t
= α
z(t, x−∆x)− 2z(t, x) + z(t, x+ ∆x)
∆x2
z(t+ ∆t, x)− z(t, x) = α∆t
∆x2
(z(t, x−∆x)− 2z(t, x) + z(t, x+ ∆x))
We define γ = α ∆t
∆x2
as the discrete form of α, which increases with the length of time
steps and as the modeled resolution of space increases.
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7.1.1 Diffusion from the plankton analysis
The first estimate of diffusion is for plankton, much of which is spawn of larger species
and which is a important component of ocean food webs. In chapter 5, the spatial effects
studied are mediated by plankton, and the characteristic length scale is estimated in Kriging
variograms. Combined with an estimate of how quickly plankton changes in time, the
diffusion rate for plankton can be estimated.
Consider a diffusive model between two regions, A and B, with stock densities at time t
of zAt and zBt, respectively. The recursive relationship between A and B as time evolves is,
zA,t+1 = βzAt + γ(zBt − zAt) + εAt
zB,t+1 = βzBt + γ(zAt − zBt) + εBt
This represents simple diffusion, with a decay term (β) which is necessary so that the entire
system has a defined variance. The error terms, εAt and εBt, represent exogenous changes
in the densities of plankton (for example, due to nutrient influxes or consumption by higher
trophic levels), and are correlated in space.
We can calculate the variance and covariance of the stock densities in the two regions
using these relationships. The covariance is,
C ≡ EzAtzBt = E (βzAt + γ(zBt − zAt) + εAt) (βzBt + γ(zAt − zBt) + εBt)
= (β2 − 2γβ + 2γ2)C + (2γβ − 2γ2)V + S
Where V = Ez2At = Ez2Bt, the variance of the values in region A and B over time; C =
EzAtzBt, the covariance of these values; and S = EεAtεBt, the covariance in the spatial
errors.
Similarly, the variance is,
V ≡ Ez2At = E (βzAt + γ(zBt − zAt) + εAt)
2
= (β2 − 2γβ + 2γ2)V + (2γβ − 2γ2)C + E
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Where E = Eε2At = Eε2Bt, the variance of the errors in A and B.







where ζ = 2(γβ − γ2) and ψ = 1− β2 + 2γβ − 2γ2.








(Ez2At + Ez2Bt)− EzAtzBt
= V − C
=
(ψ − ζ)E + (ζ − ψ)S
ψ2 − ζ2
To estimate β and E, I use an autoregressive relationship among plankton concentrations
measured 1 month apart in the same location:
zAt = µ+ βzA,t−1 + ηAt
Note that the estimated ηAt = εAt + γεB,t−1, so the mean squared-error of this regression,
F ≡= Eη2At = E + γ2E (assuming EεAtεB,t−1 = 0). Similarly the covariance of the errors
from this regression, G ≡ EηAtηBt = S + γ2S (assuming Eεtεt−1 = 0). To calculate the
covariance of the errors across space, we computer another variogram, the result of which,
γ̂η = F
2 −G2.
Some estimated values are shown in table G.1, and the estimates across the range of the
variogram are shown in the comparison figure 7.7.
7.1.2 Diffusion from the protected area analysis
The second estimate of diffusion is for protected stocks neighboring exploited stocks. In
chapter 6, the effects of marine protected areas are mediated by diffusion of fish out of the
protected region. One interpretation of the additional surplus that is found in that chapter
to scale with both the protection area portion and the size of the exploited stock is as
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follows. Larger MPAs allow the stock density of the protected area to reach higher levels
than it would if the fish were constantly diffusing out of the region. Furthermore, larger
exploited stocks result in larger neighboring protected stocks. This then produces more fish
which diffuse into the exploited area in the case where the stock is depleted below MSY, as
shown in figure 7.2
protectedfished
Figure 7.2: Conceptual relationship between protected and exploited stock levels under diffusion. The area
below the solid curve is the fish density across space. An additional portion of density under the dashed line
occurs when the fished area has a larger stock, resulting in also a larger stock in the protected area.
Consider a simple two pool model, with exploited and protected regions in equilibrium.
Stocks in both regions increase under logistic growth. Stock in the exploited region is
held in balance due to catch and diffusion with the neighboring protected region. Growth




























where E is the catch effort per unit time, q is a catchability coefficient, S1 is the size of the
exploited stock, S2 is the size of the protected stock, and γ is the diffusion per unit time, in
terms of a fraction of the total carrying capacity (K = K1 +K2). This represents a chunk
of water is exchanged between the two regions, with a fish density SK , as above.
If γ = 0, this simplifies to the single pool result. We define the degenerate steady-state
catch from this case as C0,
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For γ > 0, an analytical solution exists, but the expression itself provides little insight.1
Instead, it is evaluated across a range of parameter values in figure 7.3. The analytical coef-
ficient that corresponds to β in the empirical logistic analysis in chapter 6 is approximately
constant for small protected areas.
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gamma = 0.1, qE = 0.1
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gamma = 0.1, qE = 0.2
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gamma = 0.05, qE = 0.1
gamma = 0.1, qE = 0.1
gamma = 0.2, qE = 0.1
gamma = 0.05, qE = 0.2
gamma = 0.1, qE = 0.2
gamma = 0.2, qE = 0.2
Figure 7.3: Results of diffusion, as a function of portion protected, for different values of qE and γ. The
protected portion in the model is K2
K1+K2
. Left: Additional stock available to the fished region by virtue of
protected area diffusion. This is S1(p)−S1(0), where the different results from diffusion. Right: The value
corresponding to β in the empirical analysis in chapter 6. This is S1(p)−S1(0)
pS1(p)
, the additional catch available,
as a fraction of the MPA portion and stock.
1 It is,
S1 = X +
−3γpr + k2(p2 − p) + 3γ2
(9p2r2 − 9pr2)X −
2k
3r
where p = K2
K1+K2
, k = γ







(4γp4 − 4γp3)r3 + (−k2p5 + 2k2p4 + (−k2 − 12γ2)p3 + 12γ2p2)r2+
(2γk2p4 + (−4γk2 − 18γ2k)p3 + (2γk2 + 18γ2k + 12γ3)p2 − 12γ3p)r + 4γk3p4+





γk(9pr − 9p2r) + k3(2p3 − 4p2 + 2p) + γ2k(9p− 9) + 27γ3
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This model and the linear empirical model both give estimates of the additional surplus,
βpSt = qES1(γ)− C0
where S1(γ) results from the analytical diffusion expression.
For each assessed stock from chapter 6, I use the estimated value for the logistic r and K
parameters, approximate qE as CtSt , and then find the value of γ that explains the predicted
increase in surplus under the globally estimated value for β. This γ represents diffusion over
the entire year, and so is divided by 12 for comparison to the estimates from the previous
and subsequent sections. The diffusion distance is taken as the square-root of the MPA
area, representing the approximate distance that fish need to travel to be counted amongst
the exploited stock. The comparison with the other estimates is shown in figure 7.7.
7.1.3 Diffusion from the larval floating
The third estimate of diffusion uses ocean currents in spawning regions. Fish spawn and
floating eggs have little ability to move independently of ocean currents. The ocean currents
that spawn are subject to for economically significant species is a concern for cross-boundary
fisheries conflict. This section studies the regions and periods of spawning for 25 top fish
groups.
Most marine species float for a period during their early development, as floating eggs
and planktonic larva. The FishBase database contains the duration and characteristics of
this period for some species (Froese and Pauly, 2014). Durations for species in the top
economically important fish groups with floating data in FishBase are shown in table 7.1
and figure 7.4. The median floating duration from figure 7.4 is 45.5 days, and the mean is
61.5 days.
To estimate the total distance traveled during this dispersal period, we look at the
spawning regions for each species. The maps in figure 7.5 highlight the EEZs of countries
which are identified as having spawning activity in each month, for the 52 species for which
Froese and Pauly (2014) contains spawning location data.
The distance traversed by floating spawn is determined by the velocity of the ocean
current. We use the NCEP Global Ocean Data Assimilation System (GODAS) at a depth
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Species Larvae Duration Egg Duration Egg Floating Float Bounds
Clupea harengus 160 NA fixed 160
Decapterus pinnulatus NA 0.38 buoyant [0.38, ∞)
Decapterus polyaspis NA 1.50 buoyant [1.5, ∞)
Engraulis encrasicolus 37 2.00 buoyant 39
Engraulis japonicus 47 1.50 buoyant 48.5
Engraulis ringens 74 NA buoyant [74, ∞)
Gadus morhua 100 25.00 buoyant 125
Katsuwonus pelamis 20 1.10 buoyant 21.1
Mallotus villosus 150 NA fixed 150
Nemipterus virgatus NA 1.00 buoyant [1, ∞)
Sardina pilchardus 40 NA buoyant [40, ∞)
Sardinella neohowii NA 1.00 buoyant [1, ∞)
Sardinops caeruleus 43 2.50 buoyant 45.5
Scomber japonicus 17 2.06 buoyant 19.06
Scomberomorus cavalla 12 NA unknown [12, ∞)
Scomberomorus maculatus 9 1.00 unknown [9, 10]
Scomber scombrus 40 6.00 buoyant 46
Theragra chalcogramma 108 NA buoyant [108, ∞)
Thunnus albacares 25 1.40 buoyant 26.4
Trichiurus lepturus NA 6.00 buoyant [6, ∞)
Table 7.1: Available information in the FishBase database on larvae dynamics and fish egg development
for top fish groups. The Float Bounds column represents a summary of the other columns, not a true
representation of the bounds of possible range of floating durations, since the other columns only give
approximate means.
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Histogram of Floating Duration





















Figure 7.4: Histogram of the total floating time, using the larvae duration, plus egg duration in the cases
where the egg is floating and the data is available. Species without larvae duration information are excluded,
since this is typically the larger share of the floating duration.
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Figure 7.5: Masking maps highlighting areas of active spawning in each month of the year. Highlighted
areas show all EEZs mentioned in the spawning tables available in Froese and Pauly (2014) for the studied
species. Colors represent ocean current velocities, on a log scale.
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of 5 m.2 The average current speed for spawning regions is calculated as follows.
For each of the species, the spawning data specifies which months spawning has been
reported within specified regions. We associate these regions with country EEZs, of which
54 unique countries are included.
Of the species for which we have spawning data, 43 also have population distribution
maps available in AquaMaps (Kaschner et al., 2012). Within each of these EEZs, let the
population distribution of fish for a given species be Di(x, y) = D(x, y) ∩ EEZi. Let the
corresponding current speed across space in month m be Sm(x, y). The average spawn





The results are shown in figure 7.6. The median velocity is 0.092 m/s (95% CI 0.088 -
0.102).
Larval floating operates under a simpler model than diffusion, but it can easily be made
to conform to it. Assuming that steady current of rate v flows to the right in a one-
dimensional channel, the portion of the stock at S(t, x) which exits a region of length ∆x
over a period ∆t is v∆t∆x , as long as v∆t < ∆x. As a discrete dynamic (finite volume)
equation,
z(t+ ∆t, x)− z(t, x) = v∆t
∆x
(z(t, x−∆x)− z(t, x))
If the direction of flow is equally likely to be positive or negative, the expected stock
change is,
Ez(t+ ∆t, x)− z(t, x) = v∆t
∆x
(.5(z(t, x−∆x)− z(t, x)) + .5(z(t, x+ ∆x)− z(t, x)))
which is equivalent to the diffusion equation, with γ = .5v∆t∆x . This transformation is
appropriate if the ocean flow fluctuates, and is here used for comparison purposes. This
estimate is also shown in figure 7.7.
7.1.4 Diffusion comparison
Figure 7.7 shows a comparison between the three estimated diffusion coefficients above.
The range of values is large, from over 1 for currents in spawning grounds to just 0.001 for
2GODAS data provided by the NOAA/OAR/ESRL PSD, Boulder, Colorado, USA, from their Web site
at http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/psd/
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Current speed in spawning regions and month
Figure 7.6: Ocean current speeds in spawning regions and months. Each point represents a region-month
where the given species (displayed along the horizontal axis) is spawning.
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some exploited stocks. This range reflects the capacity of species to affect their diffusion.
Current speeds are nearly an upper bound on the rate of diffusion in the ocean, but many
species will either actively swim to avoid this movement, or appear stationary at the level
of a population confined to their natural range. Plankton were traditionally thought to
simply drift, but the diffusion rates 100 times below current drift suggest much more active
management.3 This could be a combination of active swimming and depth control (Hardy,
1953) or operate more at the population level where individuals who drift outside of a
region die off. Moreover, zooplankton appear to have greater ability to control their drift
than phytoplankton, perhaps reflecting their greater mobility. Fish are the most capable
of navigating currents and avoiding random diffusion, and correspondingly have the lowest
diffusion rates.
7.2 An agent-based approach
Agent-based modeling is a useful tool for exploring the consequences of the distributed
commons model. I construct a simple model of a distributed fishery with autonomous
agents derived from a Gordon-Schaefer model. Agents represent individual fishers, while
the fish resource is treated as a continuous field on a grid evolving under spatial reaction-
diffusion.
The agent-based approach has particular strengths for informing the distributed com-
mons. First, we are interested in the consequences of fisher decision-making, which can
here be represented in the agents’ logical rules. Second, inequality is a key concern in the
commons (see chapter 2), and we can study the evolution of wealth and inequality between
fishers. Third, the ABM framework is suited for studying emergence, where modifications
to the underlying micro-scale assumptions and result in macro-scale emergent results.
The axioms of the model are as follows.
• The fishery is a one-dimensional array of cells, representing locations along a shore or
river.
3Ocean current speeds in the region studied for plankton are similar to those in spawning regions, at
about 0.11 m/s (see appendix G.1).
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Figure 7.7: Comparison between three estimates of the marine diffusion coefficient, γ, over one month. The
top line shows diffusion from the flow rate of ocean currents in fish spawning grounds. The red and green
lines show diffusion for phytoplankton and zooplankton, respectively, based on the spatial and temporal
covariance of plankton populations. The blue dots each correspond to an exploited fish stock for which the
diffusion constant could be estimated, located at the square-root of the total marine protected area of the
assessment region.
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• Each cell in the array has its own stock of fish, which grows according to a logistic
growth model: (∆Sit)1 = rS(1−
Sit
K ).
• Every time step, a portion of the stock in each cell diffuses to neighboring cells:
(∆Sit)2 = γSi−1,t + γSi+1,t − 2γSit
• Agents occupy a grid cell in each time step, and can only harvest fish in that grid cell
in that time step.
• Agents join the fishery with some wealth and pay costs according to their fishing effort
and earn profits by catching fish. They go bankrupt (and exit the system) if their
wealth reaches 0.
• All agents receive the same price per ton of fish, pay the same operating costs for the
same level of effort, and extract stock in their grid cell each time step according to
Ct = (1 − e−E∆t)St. This is the integral of the continuous equation C(t) = ES(t)
with Ṡ = −C(t) over one time step.
One element that is absent from this model is the cost of travel far from port. The
agents are assumed to be able to bank their catch immediately, and never need return to
a particular port. In contrast, the different results in the static distribution spatial model
used by Anderson and Seijo (2011) are driven by different assumptions about the cost of
travel. In a model of fishing along a shore, port location and travel time can plausibly be
ignored.
The operating costs, fish price, and diffusion rate are chosen so that a user can only
make a profit by either moving around the fishery or taking advantage of diffusion. In
particular, diffusion per time-step is 0.1 of the stock in each grid cell. The range of diffusion
values found above is between .001 and 10 over distances between 25 km to 125 km (see
figure 7.7). The value of γ = 0.1 is near the center of these estimates, and with ∆t = 1
month and ∆x = 100 km, we find α = 33 km2 / day. Now, we can understand what this
value of α implies across a range of spatial scales.
The values of α, γ, ∆t, and ∆x are related. Taking α = 33 km2 / day and γ = 0.1
as in the model, we consider two values for ∆t and the values of ∆x that correspond to
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them. If each time-step is a single day, suggesting that the ABM agents are allowed to sail
at will, the spatial scale corresponding to an γ = 0.1 is 18 km per grid cell. The coast-
line of Maine, measured at a large scale is 367 km, or 20 grid cells (U.S. Department of
Commerce and Administration, 1975). This is the number of grid cells used in two of the
three experiments below. Alternatively, if each time-step is a year, suggesting that fishers
are locked-in to regions through an institutional process, then the spatial scale for this value
of γ is 350 km. When the coastline of Maine is calculated including tidal areas, it is 5597 km,
or 16 grid cells at this scale (Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management, 2011).
This suggests that space and time assumptions used here are appropriate for either open,
deep-sea fishing, or trap-based, near-shore fishing, for species that diffuse at an intermediate
pace similar to plankton.
I explore three experiments, by changing the rules by which agents move and harvest
resources. They are,
1. Comparing the maximum occupancy of stationary and mobile fishers
2. Exploring the consequences of local and global open-access rules
3. Locally restraining fishing to maintain maximum sustainable yield (MSY)
7.3 Maximum occupancy
Mobile fishers are defined as be able to identify fish resources near them and move in
the direction of greater fishing resources in each time step. Intuitively, a population of
mobile fishers should be able to take better advantage of the resources available across a
spatially distributed fishery than stationary fishers. However, I find that for evenly-spaced
stationary users and under a range of biological and economic parameters, a greater number
of stationary fishers can be maintained on a given fishery.
For this experiment, mobile and stationary fishers are constrained to use the same level
of fishing effort. Both mobile and stationary fishers are initially placed at regular intervals
spanning the fishery. For a fishery that is 10 grid cells long, only one fisher can be sustainably
supported in both mobile and stationary cases. If more than one fisher uses the resource,
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eventually one or both of the fishers will go bankrupt. Similarly, for 20 grid cells, three
fishers can be sustainably supported in both cases. However, the asymptotically greater
growth rate of sustainable fishers is clear at 40 grid cells. In this case, more than six mobile
fishers deplete the resource, while a fishery with stationary fishers can support seven.
An example with 7 stationary fishers compared to 7 mobile fishers is shown in figure 7.8.
As expected, stationary fishers deplete their local resources more quickly than mobile fish-
ers. However, diffusion from undepleted areas continues to sustain them, like intersperced
protected regions, with the total stock near the fishery’s MSY. In contrast, seven mobile
fishers are more effective at fishing down the resource. As a result, the total stock of the
fishery dips below MSY, and one or more of the fishers eventually go bankrupt.
As with all results in this model, this effect allowing more stationary fishers to be
sustainable than mobile fishers, is driven both by the constant effort assumption and the
diffusion rate. For low diffusion rates, stationary fishers are not sustainable at all. For high
diffusion rates, stationary fishers and mobile fishers experience identical outcomes. It is
the intermediate region where the benefits of unharvested regions left by stationary fishers
become significant. See figures 7.9 and 7.10.
7.4 Open-access rules
The model can simulate an open-access commons using a spatially-adapted Vernon Smith
function (Smith, 1969). A new fisher is added to the fishery if the unoccupied grid cells
contain sufficient fish to cover the fisher’s startup costs. The profit after a time T can be
approximated as,
πT = p(1− e−ET )S0 − cT
where p is the price per ton of fish, S0 is the available stock before joining, and c is the










At each time step, if this maximum value is greater than the initial wealth of the fisher,
then a new mobile fishing agent is constructed within the fishery. This experiment is run
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Figure 7.8: Each row is a time step, for 40 grid cells across 800 time steps. Background grid colors represent
the density of fish biomass in each cell. Lines show the location of each fisher, and correspond to the colored
lines in the right graphs showing fisher wealth. The black line on the right is the total fish stock across the
fishery. Top: For stationary fishers, the grid cells occupied by the fishers are quickly depleted, but having
2-3 neighboring unfished grid cells provides sufficient diffusion to support the fishers. For this arrangement,
the aggregate fish population asymptotes near MSY. Bottom: Mobile fishers move to grid cells with high
fish biomass, which allows them to extract more biomass. The fishers’ wealth lines peak at over $1000, but
then decline as the fish stocks are no longer sufficient to support them.
147



































Fisher Agent Type: Stationary Mobile
Stationary and mobile sustainable fishing
Figure 7.9: Maximum sustainable fisher curves, versus the size of the fishery. Each row is a different diffusion
rate, labeled on the right. For very low diffusion rates, no stationary fishers are sustainable. As diffusion
rates increase, the advantages of stationary fishing increase until more stationary fishers are sustainable
than mobile ones at γ = 0.01. As diffusion rates further increase, the sustainable fisher counts for the two
strategies converge.
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Dominant fishing strategy: Stationary Identical Mobile
Dominant strategies across diffusion and size ranges
Figure 7.10: Maximum sustainable fisher regimes, versus the size of the fishery and difussion rate. Colors
denote whether more stationary fishers or mobile fishers can coexist on a fishery. For low diffusion rates, the
mobile strategy dominates, in order to take full advantage of the fishery. At intermediate rates of diffusion,
more stationary fishers can use the fishery, since they maintain unfished areas. At high rates of diffusion,
the two strategies become indistinguishable.
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both by treating all fish stocks as an aggregate for calculating startup profits, or by making
the decision based on individual grid cell statuses (see figure 7.11).
In the simulation, both rules initially operate identically, with a new fisher added every
period. The earliest fishers see the largest gains over the first 20 timesteps, with the last
fishers to join having essentially flat wealth lines as their marginal costs match their marginal
revenue.
Under the bulk open-access rule, after fishing agents begin to go bankrupt, new fishing
agents are continuously added, since the whole fishery has sufficient resources, if the new
agent could access them all. Under the local access rule, the fishery recovers before new
fishing agents are added. However, in the local open-access rule, the open-access tragedy
reoccurs after a period of recovery (between time steps 165 and 170). The third experiment
solves this tragedy.
7.5 Maximum sustainable yield (MSY) management
I now allow fishing agents to “go into preservation mode”, a state where they continue to
occupy a grid cell but no longer fish and have reduced operating costs. For example, a
fishery with seasonally enforced preservations can support greater numbers of fishers than
one without. For this experiment, I require that fishers stop harvesting if their local stock
levels fall significantly below MSY, defined as half of the carrying capacity (see figure 7.12).
The result is a fishery that in aggregate maintains stocks near MSY, but at a social cost:
while some fishing agents go into preservation due to their local conditions, others can
continue to operate. Eventually, these can take advantage of the preserving fishers by
harvesting their diffusing stocks, as happens to the cyan agent between periods 175 and
375. As a result, the stocks in the preserving agents’ grid cells never reach a high enough
level for them to return to fishing, and they eventually go bankrupt.
As a solution, I add a new rule, “tit-for-tat”. Preserving fishers continue to monitor the
region around them. If they see another fishing agent operating within their neighborhood,
they return to fishing themselves, even if their local conditions have not attained MSY.
Instead of resulting in greater collapse, this forces all of the fishing agents to synchronize
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Figure 7.11: See figure 7.8 for an explanation of the axes. The first 45 time steps are identical between the
two experiments: A new fisher is added each time step until all locations are occupied. Between time-steps
20 and 45, the agents fish down the stocks until agents begin to go bankrupt. Top: Under the bulk open-
access rule, new fishing agents are continuously added whenever there is a free location, despite the negative
slope in their wealth trajectories. Bottom: Under local open-access, the fishery recovers for about 100 time
steps, until new fishers can join the fishery without having a negative wealth slope.
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their preservations, ensuring both stable fish populations and equitable management (see
the lower part of figure 7.12). This works because the rogue fishers who would otherwise
exploit these preserving fishers are bound by the same MSY rule, they simply perceive
different local conditions. Finally, a more aggressive form of the “tit-for-tat” behavior can
be used to “starve” fishers who do not follow the MSY preservation rule, by fishing in close
proximity to them.
The “tit-for-tat” rule also operates effectively under open-access rules. Wealth potential
is calculated locally, considering only the surplus above the MSY stock (half of the carrying
capacity). While initially too many fishers join the fishery, after a few have gone bankrupt,
the remainder maintain the fishery near MSY.
7.6 Conclusion
This simple one-dimensional fishery model offers new insights into the dynamics and op-
portunities of the distributed commons. The range of fishing activity across a distributed
commons can have a large impact on the sustainability of the resource, where movement
restrictions (including protected regions) can turn an unsustainable fishery into a sustain-
able one. Spatial information also matters: there may be no remaining local availability
of resources, even while the aggregate resource appears to still be able to support more
extraction. And finally, management rules needs to be cognizant of the spatial aspects of
the fishery as well, where requiring that every fisher not overly deplete a resource can save
the resource but if poorly implemented fail to support the resource users.
The last example of local fishing management is also poignant with respect to the equal-
ity issues discussed in the chapter 2. When local fishers can reliably enforce their norms,
as is famously the case in Maine lobster fisheries, the commons tragedy can be avoided.
Where industrial fleets access the same resource under a laissez-faire regime that local
fishing communities do not experience, these norms can quicken the fishing community’s
demise.
The one-dimensional fishery provides a simple case for exploring these and many future
issues. In addition, it is possible to apply the same model to a two-dimensional fishing
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Figure 7.12: See figure 7.8 for an explanation of the axes. Top: Local MSY management allows fishers
to be taken advantage of and never return from “vacation”. This happens to the green, purple, and cyan
fishers between time-steps 230 and 400. Bottom: Local MSY/Tit-for-tat management forces fishing agents
to synchronize their vacations. When only some fishers go on vacation, as happens between time steps 310
and 320, others return from vacation and fish down the fishery until all fishing agents must go on vacation.
153
CHAPTER 7. A DISTRIBUTED FISHERY MODEL
Figure 7.13: Open-access dynamics tit-for-tat MSY fishers, for four sizes of fishery. Fisheries larger than 20
cells rarely sync completely. However, the population of each fishery stabilizes after an initial rush of fishers.
context, as shown in figure 7.14. In this case, we see similar fractal patterns to those
studied in the literature on spatiotemporal plankton-fish dynamics (e.g., Malchow et al.,
2002, Ishikawa and Takai, 2012). While the dynamics are more difficult to study, many of
the results still hold. In particular, the sum of the fishing resource and fishing activity along
each of the rows approximates the behavior of the one-dimensional fishery.
Computational modeling allows management practices, such as ITQs, MPAs, and gear
restrictions to “play out” within an approximation to the spatial medium that they are
ultimately aimed at. While many assumptions within the model are very simplistic, they
improve upon simple aggregate models and provide new insights. Most importantly, while
fishers can affect each other through their local impact, they can also produce robust man-
agement through local norms.
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The tragedy of the commons remains as vexing and intractable as when Hardin first de-
scribed it, nearly 50 years ago. However, in that time, our understanding of the func-
tioning of actual common resources and the surrounding political economies has grown
exponentially. The classic tragedy is a vast simplification, but one that continues to inform
management and research.
During the same period, techniques in spatial analysis, global data collection, and com-
puter simulations have revolutionized how we study and understand many social-ecological
systems. These new techniques and data can help us understand how local features and
interactions produce emergent consequences. Hardin described the collective consequence
of agents acting independently, but it is exactly the interdependence of agents that produces
aggregate collapse.
This thesis has aspired to shed light on the spatial dynamics of commons by focusing on
the fishery. Improvements in data, analysis, and theory have all combined to provide a more
complete and complex understanding of fisheries as social-ecological systems with emergent
dynamics. Engaging fisheries on this level can provide new opportunities for management,
conservation, and prosperity.
The investigations of this thesis are by no means comprehensive. Data limitations have
necessitated the use of very simple models of ecological dynamics which miss age cohort
effects, species interactions, and biochemical mechanisms explored elsewhere. A great many
features of fishing communities are absent as well, such as the effect of markets and supply
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chains, different types of gear, and the politics surrounding management decisions. Finally,
some of the most active topics in fisheries research, such as the effects of climate change and
ocean acidification and planning considerations for marine reserves are under-represented.
The studies presented here provide insights into specific mechanisms. The World Bank
was not the only institution shaping ideas around fishery commons and management, but it
provides a useful case study in chapter 2. Self-organized criticality, as considered in chapter
3, is one of several new models of emergence, but its implications help to inform cross-scale
action and catastrophic events more generally. Additionally, these two chapters are not the
only theories upon which the distributed commons model of chapter 4 is founded, but they
highlight its central issues.
In the second part, the two empirical studies again provide a foundation for the inte-
grative model of the last chapter. Chapter 5 is one possible approach for elucidating the
spatial features of fisheries given existing data, but it highlights the role of spatial covari-
ance relevant to the other studies here. The benefits marine protected areas provide to
exploited fisheries, studied in chapter 6, are only one of their important effects. However,
they emphasize the consequence of diffusion of fish out of MPAs, which supports the model
in chapter 7.
The computational model of distributed commons presented in the last chapter is
grounded in these empirical studies, but remains a “toy” model. Its simplicity, makes
it possible to explore possible mechanisms behind observed behavior and the consequences
of different assumptions. In this way, it resembles Hardin’s original model. It is too far
removed from reality to describe any particular species or fishery or to justify specific policy
suggestions.
However, this model and the other studies in this thesis suggest new avenues for policy
study. Fisheries are an ideal example of the need and potential for multi-level governance.
For decades, governments have struggled with overfishing and degradation of marine and
inland waters. These failures of management are partly driven by spatial and scale effects.
Small fishing communities, fish stocks and food chains, factory ships, and policy-makers all
act on different scales. The various components of fisheries policy, such as gear and catch
restrictions, protected areas, and monitoring, also act on idiosyncratic scales.
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Despite decades of experience, fish stocks continue to collapse. This is the consequence
of a complex tragedy of the commons, playing out across scales and across boundaries.
Fisheries are constantly confronted with multi-level issues: multiple stressors, from acidifi-
cation to invasive species; environmental and human variability; cross-scale issues driven by
the scale of fish ranges, environmental forcing, and foreign fleets; and failures of traditional
management. Governance of fisheries that is focused on a single scale cannot effectively
manage resources that have their dynamics driven by other scales. Fishery contexts have
many of the characteristics that make commons management difficult: ownership rights
are weak, dynamics are unpredictable, stocks are mobile and widely dispersed, and outside
pressures are strong. Many effective traditional management practices fail when confronted
with modern demands. These are many of the same problems confronted in other areas of
sustainable development, for example around climate change, water use, and biodiversity
loss.
Multi-level governance exposes possibilities for management that do not exist at any sin-
gle scale. The general approach to fisheries multi-level management is called “co-management”:
regional and national government acts on a large scale with policies explicitly designed
to support local fishing communities acting on small scales. The functions of large-scale
government include monitoring of fish stocks, setting targets and allotments, identifying
ecosystems for protection, enforcing boundaries, capacity building and legitimization, and
facilitating communication. Each of these addresses a dynamic that cannot be captured at
the local scale due to cross-boundary flows. The local management level focuses on ensur-
ing fair fishing practices, coordinate amongst stakeholders, identify community needs, and
monitor fisherman compliance and boundaries.
The experiences of fisheries multi-level management dove-tail with the consequences of
spatial fisheries explored in this dissertation. Together, their implications are applicable to
many other commons situations. In particular, five lessons come out of this work.
First, regime shifts, and tipping points and resilience, are concrete, measurable phe-
nomena. We see them regularly in fisheries, and they manifest in cross-scale ways. Regime
shifts can be very difficult to reverse, but sometimes they repair themselves far better than
we could expect when released from external pressures. Proactive management can ensure
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long-term sustainability and buttress resilience, and evidence that empirically distinguishes
effective and ineffective management continues to mount.
Second, uncertainty and unpredictability are pervasive in many ecosystems, and the
multi-scale perspective will not diminish that problem. Predictability and slow changes
are typically unobtainable, driven by inter-dependencies, feedbacks, and history. Although
these undermine predictive power, it is exactly these systemic features that we can learn
about. Models that capture these can help us understand the range of behaviors of a system
and how to respond to them. We need robust institutions that can coexist with chaos and
catastrophe and learn from systemic failure.
Third, in multi-level situations, spatial organization matters. It matters because com-
mons tragedies play out in spatial ways, fish populations are spatial entities, and spatial
management approaches work. Models that ignore spatial structures, spatial heterogeneity,
spatially-mediated resilience, neighborhood effects and teleconnected regions typically miss
important dynamics. The conditions for sustainability and stress differ across space and
cause key dynamics play out differently in different areas. Policies that do not support
spatial choices or recognize the importance of spatial arrangements can miss important op-
portunities. The ways that local areas interact with each other is important for governance,
because no problem is just local.
Fourth, boundaries within multi-level environments are not predetermined and where
they are drawn can make a huge difference in sustainability. The divisions that seem natural
at one scale can be integral components of another scale, which highlights the opportunities
to make important choices. Boundaries can carve out healthy, protected areas, which,
through cross-boundary effects, can support sustainability throughout a region. Boundaries
create institutions, and they can be formed to delineate groups with common interests and
areas with coherent dynamics. Boundaries allow groups the space to self-organize local
institutions. The construction of institutional boundaries and other government policies has
been at the heart of much harm in fishery commons, by undermining traditional regimes.
The process of boundary construction needs to be married to a deep political process that
engages both stakeholders and scientists.
Fifth, cross-boundary effects are the foundation of multi-level commons. Whether they
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are in the form of the benefits beyond boundaries of protected areas, or cross-boundary
pollution, or the impact of exploitation of resources on scales greater than that of a given
community, when a commons is situated within a large area, the larger scale dictates the
constraints of the local commons.
A wide range of empirical questions remains to be addressed, but I would like to identify
two challenges ahead that are central. First, we need to better understand how multi-level
and multi-scale perspectives can be incorporated into our quantitative models, to form
new techniques of asking multi-level research questions, and to bring those results into the
policy realm. Techniques for tying complex models to empirical research are currently being
developed which can revolutionize this relationship.
Second, inequality is a core factor and a key challenge for multi-level governance. The
history of local fisheries management is dominated by transfers of power and shifts in the
control of exploitation, either through centralization, or to the much larger players that come
with greater market forces. Early critiques of the privatization of the commons focused on
the inequality that it created. The measurement of success in fisheries–whether by maximum
yield or maximum economic benefit–is politically charged. Inequality also plays out across
space and scales, and often the distribution of benefits is more important than the mean.
The study of fisheries can do much to help us understand the nature of sustainable
development more broadly. If oceans are the blood that breaths life into the natural and
human world, than fisheries are its pulsing heart. The ongoing fisheries crisis is not only
a microcosm of the growing challenge to find new sustainable foundations for society; they
form one of its most important pillars, where humanity, ecosystems, space, and institutions
come together.
As E. O. Wilson formulated in what he calls “Wilsons Law”: “If you save the living
environment, the biodiversity that we have left, you will also automatically save the physical
environment too. But if you save only the physical environment, you will ultimately lose
both.” We need to find a place in our world for healthy relationships with our ecosystems
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APPENDIX A. ESTIMATING WILD CATCHES
Appendix A
Estimating wild catches
Many fisheries are unassessed, and the status of unassessed fisheries may be significantly
different from assessed ones (Costello et al., 2012). In addition, the dynamics of these
fisheries may be different, undermining models, such as the one by Costello et al., fit to
assessed fisheries.
I use a catch-only model (COM), estimated using Bayesian methods. The model predicts
the most likely trajectory of fish stocks to explain observed catches, as well as fishing effort
and the catchability of the fish. A key input is the year of the peak catch. This catch is
used to place bounds on the yearly stock growth, and determines the year in which fishing
effort first reached its maximum level. The model estimates for each stock a logistic growth
model, a normal error around stock growth, fishing efficiency as a distribution of catch per
unit stock, and the fraction of fishing efficiency at the beginning of the time series.
I provide a prior of stock which is uniform up to the carrying capacity until the time of
the peak catch, and then biased to be up to 50% of the carrying capacity (since this would
be MSY). The key dynamic equations for the model are:
St ∼ N
(















if t < Tpeak
Beta(α, β) if t ≥ Tpeak
A range of estimates are shown in figure A.1.
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Figure A.1: Stocks are trajectories shown with 50% and 80% confidence intervals. The dots at the bottom
of the graph represent catches, and the line at the top is the mean carrying capacity.
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Appendix B
Fish distribution maps
The AquaMaps database include generated population distribution maps, which are further
subject to expert review (Kaschner et al., 2012). The maps are based on observed rela-
tionships between species occurrence and environmental factors including bottom depth,
temperatures, salinity, primary production, sea ice concentration, and distance to land.
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APPENDIX C. AN SOC MODEL OF ECOSYSTEM DYNAMICS
Appendix C
An SOC model of ecosystem
dynamics
The following model describes a plausible mechanism for SOC dynamics between ecosystem
patches, similar to the neighboring regions studied in chapter 4. We begin with a simple
model of ecosystem growth and harvesting:
Y (t) = rS(t)αε(t)
dS
dt
= Y (t)− cS(t)
where Y (t) is the recruitment minus natural mortality represented in the α exponent (where
α < 1), as a stochastic function of stock. Stock grows with the recruitment, and decreases
with catch (cS(t)) resulting from a constant level of effort. Parameter definitions and values
are shown in table C.1.
A run of the aggregate model for these parameters is shown in figure C.1. This model
provides a baseline for the distributed model, which has the potential to exhibit SOC. The
purpose of the distributed model is to incorporate discrete, distributed dynamics over a
graph of ecosystem niches while holding true to the aggregate relationships.
The distributed model is developed on a circular graph of ecosystem niches. Initially,
each niche is connected to two neighboring niches, a feature that will influence dynamics
later. Each niche has an individual fish stock. All dynamics occur in this model at the
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Both models: Growth concavity α 0.3 Lower values produce more concavity in recruit-
ment as a function of stock, reflecting natural lim-
its.
Aggregate model: Initial stock S(0) 0.1
Aggregate model: Growth rate r 0.4
Aggregate model: Shock ε(t) uniform(0.9, 1.1) The multiplicative shock should be centered at 1.
Aggregate model: catch effort c 0.1 This portion of the stock is harvested every pe-
riod.
Distributed model: Niche count N 100
Distributed model: Baseline growth r0 0.1 Multiplied by edge count + 1 to become equiva-
lent to the r value in the aggregate model.
Distributed model: Edge growth P (e) 0.1 Chance that each niche forms a new connection
to another niche each timestep.
Table C.1: Parameters for the aggregate and distributed (SOC) models.
niche-level, so I will not label each parameter with a subscript.
The growth dynamics are a distributed version of aggregate growth. Stock growth
is divided into two terms: g[t] = Y [t] is the growth term, and d[t] = cS[t] is potential
harvesting. Harvesting only occurs when the stock reaches a point near its local carrying
capacity, making it attractive to fishers. As long as g[t] ≥ d[t], the entire extent of the
growth applies– that is, S[t+ 1] = S[t] + g[t]. Eventually, g[t] < d[t], at which point growth
stalls in the aggregate model. This is reflected in the distributed model by literally stalling
growth at this point: S[t+1] = S[t], and adding a probability of harvesting every time step.
The probability of a harvesting, P (c), is such that the expected stock follows the aggregate
curve:
S′[t+ 1] = S[t] + g[t]− d[t] = (1− P (c))S[t] =⇒ P (c) = (d[t]− g[t])/S[t]
Each time step, a small fraction of niches get random connections to other niches.
The number of edges a niche has enters into the equations to increase total ecosystem
productivity, as r = r0(E+1), where r is the growth rate for a given niche, r0 is a parameter
across all niches, and E is the number of edges for a given niche (initially 2). An example
niche network is shown in figure C.2.
Additional connection edges serve two additional purposes beyond their direct contribu-
tion to growth. They decrease the characteristic path length of the entire network, inching
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Figure C.1: Sample run of the basic ecosystem model.
it closer to the small-world network typical of real ecosystems, in a pattern similar to the
one used by Watts and Strogatz (1998). Further, by increasing connectivity, they provide
more pathways along which harvests can result in a propagation of collapses.
When a niche is either harvested, its stock is set to 0 and its connections to other
niches are removed. This lowers the productive potential of those neighboring niches, which
can destabilize them resulting in an avalanche. The resulting boom-and-bust dynamic,
characterized by low stocks punctuated with great periods of ecosystem productivity, results
naturally in the modified model (see figure C.3).
High ecosystem productivity appears once the niche network is highly integrated. How-
ever, there is a critical point of integration which causes global instability, and system-wide
cascades can occur. This suggests that there are three dynamics within an SOC-Ecosystem
system, as driven by r(E) and c (see figure C.4).
Disconnected Regime: The critical SOC integration is below the point where a stock
can be highly productive. High productivity regimes cannot occur.
Boom and Bust: The critical SOC integration is above the high-productivity integration,
so the normal state of this ecosystem will oscillate between accelerating growth and
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Figure C.2: Connected network of ecosystem niches, showing some cross-connections from long-distance
migration.
harsh collapses. This is shown in figure C.3.
Resilient Regime: The critical SOC integration is above the stagnation integration. Large
collapses will be rarer than the power law expectation, and the ecosystem quickly re-
turns to a highly productive regime.
Ironically, it might be exactly in the “Boom and Bust” region where fisheries try to
manage their stocks. The disconnected region is unproductive, so management will decrease
fishing effort in an attempt to allow the ecosystem to recover. The resilient regime is
considered to be under-harvested, since many regimes remain to support others.
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Figure C.3: Example run of the distributed model. Boom and bust dynamics immediately result from the





below critical value above critical value
Figure C.4: Three possible bioeconomic dynamics in the SOC-Ecosystem system.
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Appendix D
Diffusion and logistic growth
scenarios
The relative strengths of the growth and diffusion in a fishery with both determine the
amount of interaction between users. This is studied with a system that evolves under both
in discrete time:





+ γSi−1,t + γSi+1,t − 2Sit
The steady-state catch is determined by the ratio of r to γ, where a high ratio results in
each grid cell acting like a distinct fishery with little cross-boundary flows (shown in figure
D.1), and a low ratio produces high cross-boundary flows and strong interactions (shown in
figure D.2). The values from figure D.2 are applied in chapter 7.
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Figure D.1: One and two agents extracting from a logistic-diffusion system with low diffusion (γ = 0.01 and
r = 0.025). Low diffusion causes a single user to only partially draw down the resource, and two users do
not interact much. Top, Left: Steady state stock for a single user, at maximum sustainable yield. Top,
Right: Sustainable yield across levels of stock for a single user. Bottom, Left: Steady state stock for two
users, at maximum sustainable yield. Top, Right: Sustainable yield across levels of stock for two users.
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Figure D.2: One and two agents extracting from a logistic-diffusion system with high diffusion (γ = 0.1 and
r = 0.025). High diffusion causes a single user to entirely draw down the resource, and causes two users
to interact strongly. Top, Left: Steady state stock for a single user, at maximum sustainable yield. Top,
Right: Sustainable yield across levels of stock for a single user. Bottom, Left: Steady state stock for two
users, at maximum sustainable yield. Top, Right: Sustainable yield across levels of stock for two users.
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E.1 Spatial fisheries supplemental material
E.1.1 Data selection
We considered a variety of anchoveta landing series for Peru to analyze in conjunction with
the plankton data. FAO provides yearly production data since 1950, while IRIs EFFP
contains both monthly catches from 1953 to 1987 and weekly catches from 1993 to 1999.
All sources provide the catch in tonnes. The graph below displays these three sources,
scaled to daily values.
Between these, the weekly data set seems superior for three reasons. (1) It provides
the most data points within the time period for which plankton data is available (330
as compared to 34 (yearly) and 322 (monthly)). (2) It corresponds very well to the yearly
totals, while the aggregate monthly data diverges considerably after 1976 (see figure below).
(3) The weekly data is available separately at three ports, Pisco, Chimbote, and Paita.
These ports account for 65% of the Peru anchoveta catch during this time period.
The monthly data is available disaggregated into length classes (monthly tonnes by
length, 4 - 20 cm). Incorporating this length data as a proxy for age distributions could be
used to improve our life-cycle results.
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Figure E.1: Yearly (black), monthly (red), and weekly (green) catches of anchoveta.
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Figure E.2: Yearly (black), and monthly (red) and weekly (green) catches of anchoveta aggregated to the
yearly level.
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E.1.2 Isotrophy
The data does not show evidence of scaling issues between latitude and longitude. This is
diagnosed by comparing the distribution of squared derivatives in latitude and longitude,
as shown below. This is the distribution of the difference in sequential values of plankton,
























Zooplankton comparison of latitude and longitude derivatives
Figure E.3: Distributions of the point-to-point derivatives of phytoplankton and zooplankton along the
longitude and latitude axes, with means shown.
For phytoplankton, the squared derivatives in latitude has a slightly higher mean than
those in longitude (a ratio of 1.18), however for zooplankton, the squared differences in
latitude have a small mean (a ratio of 0.88).
This is a clear difference in plankton changes along the coast, compared to the radial
direction out from the coast, which is not accounted for in our analysis.
E.1.3 Autocorrelation
Temporal autocorrelation in the plankton data reduces the statistical significance of the
plankton-growth correlations we study. Figure E.4 shows the autocorrelation for average
plankton observations, across temporal lags. Figure E.5 shows the autocorrelation by grid-
cell with a one month delay.
For correlations with average observation values, we correct for autocorrelation by mul-
tiplying standard errors by 1−ρ1+ρ , where ρ is the phytoplankton and zooplankton autocorre-
lations, respectively. For spatial estimates, we correct within each grid-cell individually, by
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Autocorrelation of monthly average phytoplankton










Autocorrelation of monthly average zooplankton
Figure E.4: Autocrrelation in average plankton observations. The x-axis denotes lags in the autocorrelation
estimate. Single-month lags produce a 0.36 autocorrelation for phytoplankton and a 0.46 autocorrelation
for zooplankton.
first multiplying standard errors as above separately for phytoplankton and zooplankton,
setting insignificant values within each grid to zero, and than averaging them.
E.1.4 Expectation maximization procedure
As usual, the EM algorithm alternates between estimating a probability distribution and
identifying the maximum likelihood parameters under it. However, the complicated func-
tional forms involved make identifying the maximum likelihood parameters difficult. In-
stead, a randomized algorithm is used.
The estimation maximization procedure used the following steps:
1. Assume initial values for S0, α, β, and {γi}. The procedure is very sensitive to this
initial set of values. The values used are listed in the table below.
2. Model the stock growth under these parameters, producing a sequence {St}.
Estimation
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Figure E.5: Autocrrelation by grid-cell for plankton. Autocorrelations are calculated using a one month
delay separately for phytoplankton and zooplankton, and then averaged for each grid cell.
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as a kernel-estimated empirical distribution.
4. Determine the summed log-likelihood of the sequence of observed catch and estimated
stocks, under the estimated distribution.
Maximization
5. Construct a randomly adjusted new set of parameters, slightly changed from the most
optimal set identified.
6. Model the growth under these parameters.
7. Calculate the summed log-likelihood under the existing empirical distribution.
8. If the summed log-likelhood for the new parameters is greater than the previous most-
optimal parameter set, use these new parameters as the new most-optimal set and
return to step 3.
9. Otherwise, return to step 5.
Below are the initial parameters used, a rationale for selecting them, and the final
parameters determined by the EM algorithm. Rather than reporting α and β, we show the
underlying logistic parameters, R (the growth rate) and K (the carrying capacity).
Initial Rationale Final
S0 16 790 000 28 x maximum catch 22 790 000
R = α− 1 .01 arbitrary 0.007745
K = −(α− 1)/β 1 679 000 000 100 x S0 10 400 000 000
γ1 (Pisco) 0.4168 max(P1,t)/sum maxes 0.2127
γ2 (Chimbote) 0.1045 max(P2,t)/sum maxes 0.1395
γ3 (Paita) 0.3013 max(P3,t)/sum maxes 0.2692
γ4 (remaining) 0.1775 max(P4,t)/sum maxes 0.3785
The estimated distribution for catch/effective stock is below.
E.1.5 Some missing patterns
We failed to find some patterns that might be expected.
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Figure E.6: Distribution of the ratio of catch to effective stock.
• The correlation analysis of plankton with catch shows no pattern and no extended
regions of statistically significant correlation. This suggests that fishers do not use
plankton as an effective indicator for regions to fish. Based on the results above, the
low correlation of plankton with current fish stocks suggests that this is reasonable.
• Catches are not well-predicted by NINO3 or any combinations of it delayed. SSA
applied to yearly catches identified no cycles of the relevant length:
Figure E.7: Singular spectrum analysis of anchoveta catches.
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An AIC model selection from of two years of delayed monthly NINO3 values, linearly
predicting monthly catches, identified eight delays which combined produce a R2 of
only .056. The graph below shows the model parameter estimates for all delays, and
identifies (dots) the delays selected by the AIC criteria.
Figure E.8: Correlations between catches and NINO 3, showing no relationship.
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Appendix F
Global benefits of marine
protection supplement
F.1 Syntax for geocoding
Stock assessments in the RAM database are associated with named areas. We estimated
coordinates and bounding boxes for each of these areas, using country EEZs and fishing area
shapefiles when appropriate. In addition, we developed a simple language to encode the
GIS shapes of the areas, along with an interpreter to translate these codes into polygons.
The syntax supports using political entities, shapefile regions, circles and rectangles, clipped
versions of these, and combinations of these.
The various cases handled by the syntax are shown below:
Region Type Syntax and Example
FAO regions Space-delimited sequence of FAO fishing subareas or major areas followed by *
Example: Labrador - NE Newfoundland (Canada-DFO-23K)
2G 2H 2J 3K
Example: Indian Ocean (multinational-IOTC-IO)
51* 57*
FAO Regions Restricted Major area number followed by : for subareas or :: for divisions
Example: Eastern Baltic (multinational-ICES-25-32)
27: 25 26 27 28.1 28.2 29 30 31 32
Example: Baltic Sea (multinational-ICES-IIId)
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Region Type Syntax and Example
27::27.III.d
Shapefile regions Shapefile or region designator, followed by [sub]region names
Example: New Zealand Areas LIN 6b (New Zealand-MFish-LIN6b)
NZ: 607 608 609 613 614 615 621 622
Circular Disc Latitude, Longitude, Radius (in km)
Example: Queen Charlotte Islands (Canada-DFO-QCI)
52.683043, -131.791992, 100
Bounding Boxes ±Latitude1 ±Longitude1 ±Latitude2 ±Longitude2
Example: Cascade Plateau (Australia-AFMA-CASCADE)
-43.83 +150.38 -44.02 +150.54
Political Entities Quoted name of entity, or country followed by #
Example: Macquarie Island (Australia-AFMA-MI)
"Australia (Macquarie Island)"
Clipped Regions Region designations, followed \~ for NE, ~/ for NW, /~ for SE, ~\ for SW of the
following latitude, longitude point
Example: California (USA-NMFS-CAL)
77 \~ 32 -177.714844
Combinations Space-separated sequences of above commands
Example: South Africa South coast (South Africa-DETMCM-SASC)
47: 1.6 2.1 2.2 51: 8 ~\ -25 +36
The following table shows all RAM database regions as coded, as well as their calculated
size and centroid.
Region Name Encoding Size (km2) Latitude Longitude
Argentina-CFP-ARG-N 41: 2.3 979766 -36.33 -56.93
Argentina-CFP-ARG-S 41: 3.1 3.2 2924714 -50.00 -59.28
Australia-AFMA-CASCADE -43.83 +150.38 -44.02 +150.54 271 -43.92 150.46
Australia-AFMA-ESE -37.71859, 150.556641, 600 894716 -37.72 150.56
Australia-AFMA-MI -54.72305, 158.86208, 370 247031 -54.72 158.86
Australia-AFMA-GAB -35.746512, 131.308594, 1000 2557954 -35.75 131.31
Australia-AFMA-GAB-SESSF -35.746512, 131.308594, 1000 2557954 -35.75 131.31
Australia-AFMA-NAUST 57: 5.1 71: 71.5 71: 71.8 8355535 -17.24 133.18
Australia-AFMA-SESSF 6:57.6 81: 81.1 3041179 -35.27 157.28
Australia-AFMA-TAS -42.032974, 146.601563, 500 581887 -42.03 146.60
Australia-AFMA-SE Australia# /˜ -24.5 +129
Australia:Lord Howe Island#
5430238 -34.03 147.02
Australia-AFMA-WSE -36.879621, 138.691406, 700 1232722 -36.88 138.69
Canada-DFO-23K 2G 2H 2J 3K 1228864 54.40 -54.66
Canada-DFO-2J3KL 2J 3K 3L 1004991 51.43 -51.89
Canada-DFO-2J3KLNOPs 2J 3K 3L 3N 3O 3Ps 1556983 48.97 -51.74
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Canada-DFO-3Pn4RS 3Pn 4R 4S 505847 50.38 -65.12
Canada-DFO-3Pn4RSTVn 3Pn 4R 4S 4T 4Vn 913775 49.10 -65.88
Canada-DFO-3Ps 3Ps 125784 46.50 -55.89
Canada-DFO-4R 4R 70600 49.81 -58.02
Canada-DFO-4RST 4R 4S 4T 858583 49.22 -66.22
Canada-DFO-4T 4T 364842 47.51 -67.57
Canada-DFO-4TVn 4T 4Vn 399488 47.41 -66.87
Canada-DFO-4Vn 4Vn 35668 46.39 -59.58
Canada-DFO-4VsW 4Vs 4W 570694 41.86 -58.22
Canada-DFO-4VWX 4Vn 4Vs 4W 4X 816503 42.41 -60.11
Canada-DFO-4VWX5 4Vn 4Vs 4W 4X 5Y 5Zc 5Zu 5Zw 1076868 42.27 -62.39
Canada-DFO-4VWX5Zc 4Vn 4Vs 4W 4X 5Y 5Zc 944464 42.56 -61.27
Canada-DFO-4X 4X 218106 43.14 -65.16
Canada-DFO-4X5Y 4X 5Y 329151 43.36 -66.54
Canada-DFO-4X5YZ 4X 5Y 5Zc 5Zu 5Zw 511800 42.41 -67.30
Canada-DFO-5Zejm 40.5, -68, 200 92253 40.50 -68.00
Canada-DFO-5Zjm 40.5, -68, 200 92253 40.50 -68.00
Canada-DFO-ATL 2G 2H 2J 3K 3L 3M 3N 3O 3Ps 4Vn 4Vs 4W 4X 3171572 48.34 -53.94
Canada-DFO-CC 52.375599, -129.023437, 200 74251 52.38 -129.02
Canada-DFO-HS 53.120405, -130.825195, 150 39969 53.12 -130.83
Canada-DFO-PCOAST Canada# ˜\ 57 -120 1114534 52.18 -126.97
Canada-DFO-PRD 53.120405, -130.825195, 250 115649 53.12 -130.83
Canada-DFO-QCI 52.683043, -131.791992, 100 17952 52.68 -131.79
Canada-DFO-SOG 49.353756, -123.859863, 100 19260 49.35 -123.86
Canada-DFO-WCVANI 49.639177, -126.694336, 200 78771 49.64 -126.69
Iran-Iran-CS +47.115 +46.625977 +36.244273 +55.480957 885906 41.68 51.05
multinational-CCAMLR-RS -75.050354, -174.726562, 600 10060140 -75.05 -174.01
multinational-CCSBT-SO 88* 48* 58* 46033059 -70.49 -0.85
multinational-GFCMED-BLACKW 42.747012, 37.880859, 400 366951 42.75 37.88
multinational-IATTC-EPAC 61 71 81 35180027646 3.56 71.62
multinational-IATTC-NEPAC 61 8589330178 42.74 120.79
multinational-ICCAT-NATL 21* 27* 31* 34* 56168545 49.41 -22.72
multinational-ICCAT-WATL 21* 31* 41* 4730204 5.19 -50.66
multinational-ICCAT-MED 37: 1.1 1.2 1.3 2.1 2.2 3.1 3.2 5423167 37.04 15.86
multinational-ICCAT-EATL 27* 34* 47* 38136898 33.96 -1.26
multinational-ICCAT-SATL 41* 47* 23416509 -30.52 -24.68
multinational-ICES-22-24 22 23 24 98290 54.75 12.06
multinational-ICES-22-24-IIIa 22 23 24 IIIa 239628 57.04 10.99
multinational-ICES-22-32 27: 22 23 24 25 26 27 28.1 28.2 29 30 31 32 1104398 61.16 21.50
multinational-ICES-25-32 27: 25 26 27 28.1 28.2 29 30 31 32 1002955 61.68 22.26
multinational-ICES-28 28.1 28.2 84998 57.46 21.71
multinational-ICES-29 29 73469 59.63 20.42
multinational-ICES-30 30 234862 62.17 23.00
multinational-ICES-31 27: 31 295786 65.91 23.16
multinational-ICES-32 32 115565 59.92 26.76
multinational-ICES-I Ia Ib 2566804 77.14 46.78
multinational-ICES-IIa IIa1 IIa2 1824009 67.90 6.29
multinational-ICES-IIa-IIIabd-IV-Vb-VI-
VII-VIIIabcde-XII-XIV-Ixa
IIa1 IIa2 IIIa 23 27::27.III.d IVa IVb IVc Vb1a Vb1b
Vb2 VIa VIb1 VIb2 VIIa VIIb VIIc1 VIIc2 VIId
VIIe VIIf VIIg VIIh VIIj1 VIIj2 VIIk1 VIIk2 VIIIa
VIIIb VIIIc VIIId1 VIIId2 VIIIe1 VIIIe2 XIIa1
XIIa2 XIIa3 XIIa4 XIIb XIIc XIVa XIVb1 XIVb2
11045306 65.32 -12.56
multinational-ICES-IIb IIb1 IIb2 1180643 81.75 9.50
multinational-ICES-I-II Ia Ib IIa1 IIa2 IIb1 IIb2 5629995 76.92 26.36
multinational-ICES-IIIa IIIa 141326 58.49 10.31
multinational-ICES-IIIa-IV IIIa IVa IVb IVc 1066012 56.84 3.91
multinational-ICES-IIIa-IV-VI IIIa IVa IVb IVc VIa VIb1 VIb2 1580319 56.98 -1.01
multinational-ICES-IIIa-IV-VIId IIIa IVa IVb IVc VIId 1137714 56.47 3.67
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multinational-ICES-IIIa-IV-VI-VII-VIIIabd IIIa IVa IVb IVc VIa VIb1 VIb2 VIIa VIIb VIIc1
VIIc2 VIId VIIe VIIf VIIg VIIh VIIj1 VIIj2 VIIk1
VIIk2 VIIIa VIIIb VIIId1 VIIId2
2842784 54.14 -3.86
multinational-ICES-IIIb(23) 23 5693 55.73 12.57
multinational-ICES-IIIc(22) 22 47945 54.84 10.62
multinational-ICES-IIId 27::27.III.d 1050714 61.43 21.96
multinational-ICES-II-IIIa-IV-VI-VII-
VIIIabc
IIa1 IIa2 IIb1 IIb2 IIIa IVa IVb IVc VIa VIb1 VIb2
VIIa VIIb VIIc1 VIIc2 VIId VIIe VIIf VIIg VIIh




Ia Ib IIa1 IIa2 IIb1 IIb2 IIIa 23 22 27::27.III.d IVa
IVb IVc Va1 Va2 Vb1a Vb1b Vb2 VIa VIb1 VIb2
VIIa VIIb VIIc1 VIIc2 VIId VIIe VIIf VIIg VIIh
VIIj1 VIIj2 VIIk1 VIIk2 VIIIa VIIIb VIIIc VIIId1
VIIId2 VIIIe1 VIIIe2 IXa IXb1 IXb2 XIIa1 XIIa2
XIIa3 XIIa4 XIIb XIIc XIVa XIVb1 XIVb2
16299447 70.38 5.30
multinational-ICES-IV IVa IVb IVc 921642 56.58 2.88
multinational-ICES-IVa IVa 347372 59.77 1.92
multinational-ICES-IVb IVb 376667 55.40 3.40
multinational-ICES-IVc IVc 197903 52.19 3.84
multinational-ICES-IXa IXa 350956 39.41 -8.35
multinational-ICES-IXb IXb1 IXb2 467680 39.50 -14.50
multinational-ICES-Va Va1 Va2 485043 65.11 -19.26
multinational-ICES-Vb Vb1a Vb1b Vb2 193507 61.52 -9.58
multinational-ICES-Vb1 Vb1a Vb1b 173007 61.61 -9.66
multinational-ICES-Vb2 Vb2 20853 60.77 -8.84
multinational-ICES-VIa VIa 285871 57.29 -8.18
multinational-ICES-VIa-VIIb-VIIc VIa VIIb VIIc1 VIIc2 427820 56.12 -9.74
multinational-ICES-VIb VIb1 VIb2 221241 57.25 -15.00
multinational-ICES-VIIa VIIa 134226 53.46 -4.98
multinational-ICES-VIIb VIIb 52721 53.54 -10.20
multinational-ICES-VIIb-k VIIb VIIc1 VIIc2 VIId VIIe VIIf VIIg VIIh VIIj1
VIIj2 VIIk1 VIIk2
773580 50.81 -9.72
multinational-ICES-VIIc VIIc1 VIIc2 88531 53.50 -15.00
multinational-ICES-VIId VIId 74116 50.34 -0.25
multinational-ICES-VIIe VIIe 94165 49.58 -3.36
multinational-ICES-VIIe-k VIIe VIIf VIIg VIIh VIIj1 VIIj2 VIIk1 VIIk2 557231 50.13 -10.03
multinational-ICES-VIIf VIIf 34479 51.04 -4.52
multinational-ICES-VIIf-g VIIf VIIg 85513 51.10 -6.16
multinational-ICES-VIIg VIIg 50945 51.14 -7.26
multinational-ICES-VIIh VIIh 57089 48.89 -7.14
multinational-ICES-VIII VIIIa VIIIb VIIIc VIIId1 VIIId2 VIIIe1 VIIIe2 793200 45.40 -9.07
multinational-ICES-VIIIa VIIIa 88259 47.15 -3.53
multinational-ICES-VIIIb VIIIb 65318 44.72 -1.54
multinational-ICES-VIIIc VIIIc 150420 43.57 -6.21
multinational-ICES-VIIIc-IXa VIIIc IXa 501146 40.69 -7.69
multinational-ICES-VIIId VIIId1 VIIId2 181917 45.99 -7.71
multinational-ICES-VIIIe VIIIe1 VIIIe2 305209 45.50 -14.50
multinational-ICES-VIIj VIIj1 VIIj2 106942 50.25 -10.50
multinational-ICES-VIIk VIIk1 VIIk2 213068 50.25 -15.00
multinational-ICES-X Xa1 Xa2 Xb 2746301 42.00 -30.00
multinational-ICES-XII XIIa1 XIIa2 XIIa3 XIIa4 XIIb XIIc 2085132 54.29 -29.05
multinational-ICES-XIVa XIVa 1403557 79.37 -25.20
multinational-ICES-XIVb XIVb1 XIVb2 982556 64.38 -35.53
multinational-IOTC-IO 51* 57* 27809007 -15.25 80.65
multinational-IPHC-NPAC +66 +120 +20 +180 +66 -180 +20 -105 3664874159 43.00 -12.50
multinational-NAFO-01ABCDEF 0A 0B 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F 2732505 69.30 -57.46
multinational-NAFO-1 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F 1884144 69.27 -52.54
multinational-NAFO-23K 2G 2H 2J 3K 1228864 54.40 -54.66
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multinational-NAFO-23KLMNO 2G 2H 2J 3K 3L 3M 3N 3O 2278723 50.32 -51.88
multinational-NAFO-3L 3L 208594 47.63 -50.35
multinational-NAFO-3LN 3L 3N 492042 44.81 -49.45
multinational-NAFO-3LNO 3L 3N 3O 633125 44.56 -50.13
multinational-NAFO-3M 3M 409464 44.12 -44.25
multinational-NAFO-3NO 3N 3O 426476 42.92 -50.01
multinational-NAFO-3O 3O 140834 43.66 -52.55
multinational-SPC-WPO 67 77 87* 12970145 2.70 -124.65
multinational-SPRFMO-CH 87* /˜ -18.33 -90 8150045 -38.87 -79.31
multinational-TRAC-5Z 5Zu 5Zc 5Zw 185058 40.67 -68.69
multinational-UNKNOWN-NWPAC +66 -180 +20 -105 29420870 43.00 -142.50
multinational-WCPFC-SPAC 81 87* /˜ +25 -120 7308057451 -35.02 -70.33
New Zealand-MFish-8 NZ: 037 039 040 041 801 67280 -39.17 173.30
New Zealand-MFish-CR NZ: 020 021 022 023 401 402 403 404 405 406 407
408 409 410 411 412 049 050 051 052
879324881 -44.09 -26.98
New Zealand-MFish-CRA1 NZ: 046 102 \˜ -36 -165 047 048 103 104 105 001 002
003 106
399295 -33.63 172.65
New Zealand-MFish-CRA2 NZ: 004 005 006 007 008 009 009H 010 011 107 201 26699684693 -36.10 95.66
New Zealand-MFish-CRA3 NZ: 012 013 202 203 204 205 402 403 2303671631 -40.32 6.76
New Zealand-MFish-CRA4 NZ: 014 015 016 017 039 019 401 74563 -41.66 176.21
New Zealand-MFish-CRA5 NZ: 018 020 021 022 023 407 301 142860 -44.38 174.66
New Zealand-MFish-CRA7 NZ: 024 026 302 303 84814 -46.55 171.90
New Zealand-MFish-CRA8 NZ: 027 028 029 030 031 032 033 501 502 503 504
601 602 603 610 616 617 618 619 623 624 625 705 706
941730 -49.64 166.95
New Zealand-MFish-CIR NZ: 618 619 620 624 625 227989 -53.16 171.32
New Zealand-MFish-ENZ -38.203655, 176.044922, 600 45518619 -38.14 151.71
New Zealand-MFish-LIN3-4 -42.391009 +171.386719 -45.39845 +180 -42.391009
-180 -45.39845 -172.441406
275920239 -43.89 11.21
New Zealand-MFish-LIN5-6 NZ: 501 502 503 504 032 031 030 029 028 027 025
601 602 603 604 605 606 607 608 609 610 611 612 613
614 615 616 617 618 619 620 621 622 623 624 625
28354047681 -49.90 113.86
New Zealand-MFish-LIN6b NZ: 607 608 609 613 614 615 621 622 815277624 -49.07 -5.69
New Zealand-MFish-LIN72 NZ: 701 702 703 704 705 706 801 041 040 039 038
037 036 035 034 033 201 202 203 204 205 206 011
012 013 014 015 016 017
45764801564 -40.11 71.68
New Zealand-MFish-LIN7WC-WCSI NZ: 704 705 706 035 034 033 203793 -42.51 167.45
New Zealand-MFish-NZMEC NZ: 014 015 016 017 018 019 203 204 205 206 44232957484 -40.89 -14.94
New Zealand-MFish-PAU5A NZ: 030 031 032 54984 -45.68 166.37
New Zealand-MFish-PAU5B NZ: 025 027 029 030 59787 -47.11 167.39
New Zealand-MFish-PAU5D NZ: 024 026 31421 -45.99 171.20
New Zealand-MFish-PAU7 NZ: 036 /˜ -40.5 -171.5 038 017 018 24269 -41.62 173.67
New Zealand-MFish-NZ 7 4094877028 -35.70 32.11
New Zealand-MFish-SA New Zealand# ˜\ -46 +200 1665563263 -49.70 116.74
New Zealand-MFish-TRE7 NZ: 701 702 703 704 705 706 036 035 034 033 309307 -41.56 168.36
New Zealand-MFish-WECR NZ: 020 021 022 023 401 402 403 407 408 409 5463743046 -44.09 150.18
New Zealand-MFish-WNZ -44.087585, 169.453125, 600 812793 -44.09 169.45
Peru-IMARPE-NC Peru# ˜/ -13 -76 2592119 -6.11 -79.14
Russia-RFFA-NSO 59.534318, 149.414063, 700 783976 59.53 149.41
Russia-RFFA-WBS 58.813742, 174.726563, 800 1541792552 58.81 146.09
South Africa-DETMCM-1-2 -28.5 +16 -31.25 +18 58895 -29.88 17.00
South Africa-DETMCM-3-4 -31.25 +16 -32.5 +18.5 32801 -31.88 17.25
South Africa-DETMCM-5-6 -32.5 +16 -33.25 +18.5 19468 -32.88 17.25
South Africa-DETMCM-7 -33.25 +16 -33.6 +18.5 9029 -33.42 17.25
South Africa-DETMCM-8 -34.05 +16 -36 +19.5 69157 -35.02 17.75
South Africa-DETMCM-PEI South Africa:Marion Island# 120905 -46.88 37.20
South Africa-DETMCM-SA 10 3259438 -29.62 25.21
South Africa-DETMCM-SASC 47: 1.6 2.1 2.2 51: 8 ˜\ -25 +36 2389559 -34.33 27.53
USA-NMFS-5Y 5Y 111362 43.78 -69.21
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USA-NMFS-5YCHATT 5Y 6C 302113 39.12 -72.47
USA-NMFS-5YZ 5Y 5Zc 5Zu 5Zw 296009 41.87 -68.89
USA-NMFS-5YZSNE 5Y 5Zc 5Zu 5Zw 296009 41.87 -68.89
USA-NMFS-5Z 5Zc 5Zu 5Zw 185058 40.67 -68.69
USA-NMFS-5ZSNE 5Zc 5Zu 5Zw 185058 40.67 -68.69
USA-NMFS-AI +52 -175 +55 -160 331067 53.50 -167.50
USA-NMFS-AIES +52 -167.5 +55 -160 165872 53.50 -163.75
USA-NMFS-AIWS +52 -175 +55 -167.5 165845 53.50 -171.25
USA-NMFS-ATL 5Y 5Zc 5Zu 5Zw 6A 6B 6C 6D 6E 6F 6G 6H 31: 31.1
31: 31.5
4001904 34.74 -65.83
USA-NMFS-ATLC 5Y 5Zw 6A 6B 6C 31: 31.1 1237104 35.70 -75.55
USA-NMFS-BB 52.05249, -173.496094, 200 74842 52.05 -173.50
USA-NMFS-BS 57.657158, -178.242187, 1000 805634758 57.65 -45.42
USA-NMFS-BSAI 57.657158, -178.242187, 1200 1153939761 57.64 -36.03
USA-NMFS-CAL 77 \˜ 32 -130 1426282 35.11 -118.35
USA-NMFS-CBS 57.657158, -178.242187, 500 7143841 57.66 -85.62
USA-NMFS-CCOD5Y 5Y 111362 43.78 -69.21
USA-NMFS-CWPAC 77 \˜ 36 -130 428462 38.25 -125.03
USA-NMFS-EBSAIGA 67 ˜/ +50 -130 4196827 57.87 -152.56
USA-NMFS-EBSAI 67 ˜/ +50 -160 1539692 57.92 -167.54
USA-NMFS-EBS 67 ˜/ +54.5 -160 1032738 60.17 -167.55
USA-NMFS-EBSGA 67 ˜/ +54.5 -130 2710608 60.12 -152.58
USA-NMFS-EGM 31:: 31.2.2 31:: 31.2.3 31:: 31.2.4 31:: 31.2.5
31:: 31.2.6
1009201 27.54 -87.61
USA-NMFS-GA 57.984808, -146.689453, 700 819151 57.98 -146.69
USA-NMFS-GM 31:: 31.2.1 31:: 31.2.2 31:: 31.2.3 31:: 31.2.4
31:: 31.2.5 31:: 31.2.6 31:: 31.3.1 31:: 31.3.2
31:: 31.3.3
2496985 24.95 -91.62
USA-NMFS-GOMNGB 5Y 111362 43.78 -69.21
USA-NMFS-MATLC 6A 6B 6C 496532 38.02 -74.36
USA-NMFS-NATL 5Y 5Zu 5Zw 282174 41.88 -69.03
USA-NMFS-NCAL +42 -125 +37.07271 -121.311035 173215 39.54 -123.16
USA-NMFS-NPAC 67 10811935 52.91 -147.62
USA-NMFS-NPCOAST 67 /˜ +55 -130 1206543 47.75 -125.00
USA-NMFS-NWATL 1F 2G 2H 2J 3K 3L 3M 3N 3O 3Pn 3Ps 4R 4S 4T
4Vn 4Vs 4X 4W 5Y 5Zc 5Zu 5Zw 6A 6B 6C 6D 6E
6F 6G 6H
6290311 46.62 -57.41
USA-NMFS-NWATLC 2G 2H 2J 3K 3L 3Pn 3Ps 4R 4S 4T 4Vn 4X 4W 5Y
5Zu 5Zw 6A 6B 6C
3815571 48.47 -61.32
USA-NMFS-NS 63.849, -164.269, 150 29408 63.85 -164.27
USA-NMFS-ORECOAST +46.195042 -125.408936 42 -123.401184 74853 44.10 -124.41
USA-NMFS-PCOAST 67 /˜ +55 -130 77 \˜ +30 -130 3246712 39.54 -120.48
USA-NMFS-PI 56.824933, -169.980469, 300 153069 56.82 -169.98
USA-NMFS-SATL 31: 31.1 564206 31.09 -78.64
USA-NMFS-SATLC 31: 31.1 ˜/ +32 -75 31: 31.1 ˜\ +32 -79 392932 31.55 -79.34
USA-NMFS-SATLCGM 31: 31.1 ˜/ +32 -75 31: 31.1 ˜\ +32 -79 31:: 31.2.1
31:: 31.2.2 31:: 31.2.3 31:: 31.2.4 31:: 31.2.5
31:: 31.2.6 31:: 31.3.1 31:: 31.3.2 31:: 31.3.3
2894673 25.90 -89.85
USA-NMFS-SCAL +35 -125 +32.5 -117 205759 33.75 -121.00
USA-NMFS-SGBMATL 5Zu 6D 317858 38.39 -67.71
USA-NMFS-SMI 60.408611, -172.72, 400 247659 60.41 -172.72
USA-NMFS-SNE +43 -74 +41.5 -68 82498 42.25 -71.00
USA-NMFS-SNEMATL 5Zc 5Zw 5Zu 6A 6B 6C 6D 6E 6F 6G 6H 1700861 37.68 -62.50
USA-NMFS-SNEMATLB 5Zc 5Zw 5Zu 6A 6B 6C 685280 38.76 -72.78
USA-NMFS-SPCOAST +35 -125 +32.5 -117 205759 33.75 -121.00
USA-NMFS-WATL 4Vs 4X 4W 5Y 5Zc 5Zw 5Zu 6A 6B 6C 6D 6E 6F
6G 31: 31.1 31: 31.5 31: 31.4
8685164 29.67 -67.18
USA-NMFS-WGM 31:: 31.2.1 31:: 31.2.2 31:: 31.2.5 ˜/ 0 -90 31:: 31.3.2 1147829 24.97 -93.16
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USA-US State-ATKINS 33.5984422, -92.0468047, 0.2 0 33.60 -92.05
USA-US State-HUNT 44.860052, -84.153192, 0.5 1 44.86 -84.15
USA-US State-KAB 48.472921, -92.991028, 10 196 48.47 -92.99
USA-US State-MIN 47.36935, -122.697458, 1.2 3 47.37 -122.70
USA-US State-NIMROD 34.949554, -93.218307, 4 39 34.95 -93.22
USA-US State-OKA 32.514394, -88.80249, 5 62 32.51 -88.80
USA-US State-PWS 60.615, -147.168, 100 14542 60.62 -147.17
USA-US State-RI 41.664705, -71.499023, 50 5518 41.66 -71.50
USA-US State-ROSS 32.479646, -90.009613, 14 488 32.48 -90.01
USA-US State-SHAL 47.6378593, -124.2526924, 8 127 47.64 -124.25
USA-US State-SITKA 57.053, -135.33, 100 16107 57.05 -135.33
USA-US State-SKY 47.755021, -121.46347, 2 8 47.76 -121.46
USA-US State-SNAH 47.761389, -124.133333, 5 50 47.76 -124.13
USA-US State-SNOW 48.345411, -124.552517, 1 2 48.35 -124.55
USA-US State-SPRI 42.674863, -121.891766, 1 2 42.67 -121.89
USA-US State-TAYU 47.45, -124, 8 128 47.45 -124.00
USA-US State-WILD 47.601996, -124.285583, 6 72 47.60 -124.29
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F.2 Treatment and control matching
It is difficult to create matching pairs of “treated” stocks that have had increases in their
protection a “control” stocks that have not. Four factors have considerable importance for
matching stocks for comparison: their stock sizes and their surpluses during a “baseline”
period, their locations, and the size of their assessment regions. The baseline is determined
by the treated stock, and includes all of the years in which the protected area portion did
not increase significantly (as described in section 6.2).
We construct four measures of how well each of these features matches between any two
stocks, and treat the final match as a product of the four test measures. For stock size
and year-to-year surpluses, we construct distributions for each assessment in the “baseline”
years before the increase in protected region. We use the Mann-Whitney Wilcoxon tests
to compare these distributions, and take the logarithm to ensure that the results of this
test do not always dominate the other factors. The distributions of stock and year-to-year
surpluses reflect the bioeconomic dynamic of each stock: some stocks are very stable due
to both their biology and management, while other stocks are highly variable.
The four features measures are shown below, along with the 50-percentile, 75-percentile,
and maximum feature comparison value between any pair of treatment and control regions.
Feature Test Measures
Stock Distribution (− logWilcoxonTestP − value(BaselineStocksA,BaselineStocksB))−1





(LatitudeA− LatitudeB)2 + (LongitudeA− LongitudeB)2
)
Region Size Min(RegionSizeA,RegionSizeB)/Max(RegionSizeA,RegionSizeB)
Feature 50% 75% 100%
Stock Distribution 0.02694446 0.06184597 272.07847106
Surplus Distribution 0.03735511 0.14421754 139.66341320
Location 0.04216678 0.09633013 0.74351009
Region Size 0.0002629865 0.1197303684 0.9955717441
To match treated and control regions, we find the optimal match under which if a
treatment region A is not matched to a control region B, it must be because B is more
closely matched to a different control region (the Stable Marriage solution). The matched
regions are shown in figure F.1 for two cases: when only the stock distribution is used, and
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when all four features are used.
Figure F.1: Treatment (green) and control (red) assessment regions, and their pairing (blue). Left shows
the matches when only the stock distributions are used, right shows the matches when all four features are
used.
The results from this analysis are unstable, so we provide a collection of test combina-
tions below. The control and treatment change measured relative to each assessments own
baseline.
N Control Base. Treated Base. Control Chg. Treated Chg. P Value
stock 65 72119.66 92111.7 1.016591 1.023715 0.9948
stock, dynamics 65 97817.81 90624.1 -36.749505 1.147481 0.3305
stock, dynamics, dist. 63 98041.74 90837.06 1.367975 1.143872 0.7749
stock, dynamics, size 57 95000.75 89967.56 0.01151843 1.02446723 0.627
all 55 106892.4 67605.45 1.9238180 0.9740837 0.2367
In most cases, the treated stock change exceeds the control stock change, but under
none is it significant.
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F.2.1 Difference-in-difference checks
The difference-in-difference results are not very robust to differences in the way that dif-
ferences are normalized, and this is reflected in the robust standard errors clustered at the
assessment level: t-values for all three parameters are between 1 and 1.4. Residuals are
not normally distributed (Shapiro-Wilks test), however the linearity assumption supported
(Harvey-Collier test).
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F.3 Catch regressions
Regressions between country catches and country MPAs show positive marginal effects
(see table F.3), while regressions between country stock growth and country MPAs show
negative effects (see table F.4). Combined with the observation that regressions between
stock growth and local MPAs show positive effects, this suggests the following consequences:
• The effects of MPAs are local, so country averages are misleading.
• MPA designation corresponds to increases in exploitation. Stocks have decreased
while MPAs have increased.
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Cit = δ + βMPAit




Totals Only All Regions Country P(4)
(Intercept) 204119.15∗∗∗ 163321.54∗∗∗
(7498.53) (10156.04)






R2 0.02 0.03 0.93
Adj. R2 0.02 0.02 0.92
Num. obs. 9405 2166 9405
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Table F.3: Regressions between total MPA area and catch. The first column uses the equation at top. The
second includes into this equation total yearly sizes of marine-only and no-take potions of MPAs. The third
column uses a country-specific fourth-order polynomial, to capture the rise and fall characteristic of many
country’s catch series.
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Total Marine No Take Combined
(Intercept) 14789.9231∗∗∗13944.1925∗∗∗13820.7312∗∗∗14965.0093∗∗∗





No Take −0.0968∗∗ −0.0495
(0.0417) (0.6772)
R2 0.0021 0.0016 0.0015 0.0021
Adj. R2 0.0018 0.0013 0.0013 0.0012
Num. obs. 3500 3500 3500 3500
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Table F.4: Simple regressions between country-wide stock surplus and protected areas show negative rela-
tionships. This is because the effects of MPAs are largely local, and over this period stocks have diminished
despite the increase in MPAs.
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F.4 Logistic model checks
AIC criteria produce similar results for the five models shown in table 6.2, with only a
significant improvement with the inclusion of temperature, as shown below. Nonlinear
models have lower AIC values, except for the model without temperature.
Logistic: No Temp. Timeless Stock Trends Year FE Trends-Year
AIC 275121 274522 274182 274546 274225
Nonlinear: No Temp. Timeless Stock Trends Year FE Trends-Year
AIC 302265 274415 274034 274446 274069
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F.5 IUCN results
IUCN categorization can be used as a indicator of management regime. Of the 4259 MPAs
in our data set, 3545 have IUCN classification, as shown in table F.5.
Accounting for the total area designated across all IUCN classified MPAs, the coefficient
β is 1.2017 ± 0.3593***, under the time FE model. Accounting only for the marine area,
where available, the coefficient is 1.3207 ± 1.4715. The significance decreases considerably
due to the half of the MPA observations which are dropped due to missing marine-portion
data. A 10% increase in protected area increases the median growth rate by 35%. The
results are comparable to the total sample results.
The estimates of effects by IUCN category vary greatly, but estimates for classifica-
tions with more data tend to approach the general model. The results suggest that Habi-
tat/Species Management Area are amongst the most effective IUCN classifications. The
significance of this result may simply reflect the larger set of available data, representing
almost twice the MPAs of any other IUCN category. However, it may also derive from the
concerted management practices characterizing IUCN category IV regions. Protected Land-
scape/Seascape MPAs, which seek to secure the long-term capacity for human interaction,
do worst, shown in the negative point estimate and wide variation. The low performance
of Strict Nature Reserves is at odds with regression results that include all no-take reserve
areas, which are positive, but both are highly insignificant due to the lack of data.
IUCN N β Estimate (trends)
Ia Strict Nature Reserve 430 -1.9900 ± 2.3739
Ib Wilderness Area 59 (insufficient data)
II National Park 569 0.3430 ± 0.8792
III Natural Monument or Feature 130 (insufficient data)
IV Habitat/Species Management Area 1084 2.5883 ± 0.3576***
V Protected Landscape/Seascape 611 -5.8342 ± 13.0779
VI Sustainable use protected area 662 3.0647 ± 3.5272
Table F.5: MPAs with IUCN classification in the MPA Global database. The β Estimate column shows the
estimated coefficient β in the stock trends model for total MPA area.
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F.6 Case study comparison
We identified eight case-studies which provide information on the effect of marine protection
on exploited fisheries. In each case, we identify the portion of a contiguous region which is
protected, and the change in catch per unit effort (CPUE) before and after the creation of
a marine protected area. Table F.6 describes these studies.
There is no necessary connection between the additional surplus measure used in this
paper and CPUE. However, a general correspondence is expected, whereby the same level
of effort should catch additional fish to the same extent that additional fish are available
for catching.
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F.7 Fish distribution maps
Timeless Stock Trends Year FE Trends and Year
# MPA StD −0.0036 −0.0060∗ −0.0038 −0.0062∗
(0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028)
Sum MPA2 / Area2StD 4065.8408 7184.9990 4453.7294 7377.5907
(3407.5509) (3818.4495) (3405.7433) (3976.5737)
# MPA S̄D 0.0016 0.0049 0.0019 0.0051
(0.0019) (0.0029) (0.0019) (0.0030)
Sum MPA2 / Area2S̄D −2856.3715 −4919.2919 −3110.0414 −5041.1299
(2406.0669) (2621.0389) (2405.5161) (2730.4827)
# MPA St(1−D) −1868.0145 −5797.3068 −2036.3396 −5836.5614
(4372.4575) (5925.9287) (4290.8233) (5898.3006)
Sum MPA2 / Area2St(1−D) 0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0000∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
# MPA S̄(1−D) 1520.3748 −1019.7951 1842.3019 −1371.4873
(3168.6134) (8334.9102) (3133.6152) (8473.0339)
Sum MPA2 / Area2S̄(1−D) 0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0000∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
R2 0.5161 0.5536 0.5198 0.5571
Adj. R2 0.4370 0.4631 0.4372 0.4633
Num. obs. 8791 8791 8791 8791
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table F.7: Coefficient estimates for non-linear, stock-dependent model, with both overlapping (D) areas and
remaining (1−D) areas.
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F.8 Gompertz model
The Gompertz model has also been shown to provide a plausible description of stock dy-
namics in the absence of age classes and other ecosystem features.
The Gompertz growth model is,
Sit − Si,t−1 + Ci,t−1 = rSi,t−1 log (K/Si,t−1)






+ ζ1,iTi,t−1 + ζ2,iTi,t−2
)
Si,t−1+κiSi,t−1 logSi,t−1+δi+εit
The results are similar to the logistic model results, and are shown in table F.8.
Timeless Stock Trends Year FE Trends-Year
Data: MPA variables represent Total MPA areas
β 1.0537 1.5525∗∗ 1.1955∗ 1.5205∗∗
(0.6593) (0.5464) (0.6055) (0.5490)
R2 0.5839 0.6291 0.5878 0.6314
Adj. R2 0.5155 0.5534 0.5170 0.5534
Data: MPA variables represent Marine-only MPA areas
β 2.0210 1.5245 2.3513∗ 1.4315
(1.4454) (1.8279) (1.3156) (1.8166)
R2 0.5839 0.6279 0.5878 0.6303
Adj. R2 0.5154 0.5520 0.5169 0.5520
Num. obs. 10093 10093 10093 10093
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table F.8: Estimated marginal change in growth rate for a Gompertz model; the columns are analogous to
the Logistic regression model table.
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F.9 Growth model











+ δi + εit
As before, β is the coefficient of interest, and δi is an assessment FE. The left-hand side
is the log of the fractional growth of the stock. The independent variable is the protected
area, divided by the total assessment area. This formulation better handles the long tails
in the data, but has less theoretical justification for adding stock-dependent controls.
In the first model, we include only assessment FE. In the remaining models, we modify











+ ζ1,iTi,t−1 + ζ2,iTi,t−2 + κiSi,t−1 + δi + εit
The coefficient for the time FE model of total MPA area suggests that a doubling of
the protected area results in a .25% increase in growth rate. Given the low median portion
protected, this is roughly similar to the results above.
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No Controls Timeless Stock Trends Year FE Trends-Year
Data: MPA variables represent Total MPA areas
β 0.0058 −0.0095∗ 0.0054 0.0037 0.0036
(0.0034) (0.0041) (0.0044) (0.0042) (0.0043)
R2 0.6947 0.8251 0.8608 0.8293 0.8620
Adj. R2 0.6850 0.8005 0.8354 0.8039 0.8357
Num. obs. 9208 9208 9208 9208 9208
Data: MPA variables represent Marine-only MPA areas
β 0.0042 −0.0084∗ 0.0047 0.0047 0.0029
(0.0026) (0.0034) (0.0048) (0.0042) (0.0053)
R2 0.4751 0.6737 0.7201 0.6808 0.7233
Adj. R2 0.4575 0.6252 0.6661 0.6303 0.6672
Num. obs. 7633 7633 7633 7633 7633
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table F.9: Estimated marginal change in growth rate for a fractional growth model; the columns are
analogous to the Logistic regression model table.
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Trends and Year
# MPAs −2.950 942× 10−3 (1.012 573× 10−3)∗∗
Total MPA Area / Assessment Area 1.752 632 (4.066 812× 10−1)∗∗∗




∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table F.10: Estimate for the quadratic effect of total MPA area.
F.10 Nonlinear benefits
We estimate the following model to study how the marginal effect changes with increasing
total protected area.
Rit =











i,t−1 + θit+ φt + δi + εit
In the expression above, the quadratic term is divided by the assessment area, Areai,
rather than the square of that area, since this was found to provide a better fit. The
interpretation is that the effect decreases with increasing total square kilometers of MPA,
rather than increasing portion of an assessment area protected.
The coefficient on the quadratic term is significant at a 10% level. Across the observa-
tions, the median protected area is 3600km2, decreasing the marginal benefit of a portion
of area protected from a growth rate increase of 1.753 to a growth rate increase of 1.749.
Of the observations, 1.7 % have decreasing marginal benefits, from having protected regions
greater than 872 000 km2. However, no observations exceed the level at which total benefits
would be negative (the largest MPA area at 1 560 000 km2 is estimated by this model as
having a positive benefit from MPAs of a 0.19 increased growth rate per portion protected.
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F.10.1 Colinearity of variables











include the quadratic term in the preferred model.
Figure F.2: Relationship between total MPA area, as a fraction of assessed area, and MPA count and sum
of squared MPA sizes. Each year is a distinct observation, so regions that have a long-running campaign
to designate small MPAs show up as vertical streaks in the top-left corner. As shown in the bottom-right
corner, the MPA area and sum of squares of MPA areas are nearly colinear. Points show up as grey if they
only represent a single year.
F.10.2 Comparison to MPA effect
A direct comparison between the linear MPA effect and the quadratic effect is difficult, due
to the wide range in the numbers of MPAs that represent a given protected area portion.
As an example, we take a region which achieves 10% protection with 16 MPAs, as compared
in figure F.3.
The example uses a linear increase in MPA count, as a function of the portion of area
protected. The quadratic variable, the sum of squared areas divided by the assessment area,
is also a linear function portion of area protected, fit in log-log space. The stock size, as
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a fraction of mean stock size, is 0.77, the median value of the values across assessments in


















Linear Model Quadratic Model
Growth Rate Effects Comparison
Figure F.3: The linear model (green) and quadratic model (red) for a region that grows from 0 to 16 MPAs
as the area protected increases from 0 to 10%.
In the result, the quadratic model measures a smaller effect than the linear model,
eventually surpassing around 8% protection. For examples with smaller average MPA sizes,
or with larger relative stock sizes, the quadratic model would predict a lower effect than
the linear model.
F.10.3 MPA size distribution comparison
The relationship between the total protected area and the sum of squared areas can be very
different for different regions, depending on the distribution of MPA sizes. This distribution
has two extremes, when every MPA is equally sized and where one MPA is large and the














= ρ2 for extreme sizing.
A summary metric that allows us to explore the range between these extremes is τ , the
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ratio between the largest MPA and the second-largest, where MPA sizes are assumed to
follow a geometric progression.
Figure F.4 shows the growth rate boost for τ at 0 (extreme sizes), 0.5, and 1 (even

















Extreme Sizes Geometric Halving Even Sizes
Growth Rate Effects for 100 Additional MPAs
Figure F.4: The effect of size distributions on growth rate effects. The largest effect occurs where one MPA
is large and the remaining are infinitesimally small, while very little effect is observed for evenly sized MPAs,
since 100 evenly sized MPAs each cover only a small area.
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Figure F.5: Observed MPA size distributions, as a histogram of approximate values for τ . The distribution
is fairly even, suggesting a wide range of MPA distributions.
F.11 Estimated economic surplus
Figure F.6 shows the estimated cost and benefit of marine protected areas by country, where
the two tend two correlate.
Below are the estimated break-even points for economic gain, comparing the additional
surplus due to protecting a given area against the cost of maintaining the area’s protection.
Country EEZ (km2) Landed Value ($) Breakeven Current Cost ($) Benefit ($) Status1 Status2
Russia 8095881 4539086 0.24962 0.04146 16427766 317282 Loss Loss
Australia 6362934 543693004 0.00059 0.08219 159877643 75337829 Gain Loss
Indonesia 6079377 954862067 0.00029 0.01371 13043852 22070873 Gain Gain
Canada 6006154 2737412010 0.00008 0.04152 178484288 191626682 Gain Gain
France (French Polyn ... 4767242 86125455 0.00552 0.00003 471751 4429 Loss Loss
Japan 4469020 1815410 0.67649 0.00259 56975600 7923 Loss Loss
Alaska (USA) 3770021 1397534333 0.00016 0.05939 25771694 139942313 Gain Gain
Kiribati 3437345 236619169 0.00144 0.11954 444053 47688191 Gain Gain
New Zealand 3423231 643402312 0.00041 0.00154 8696561 1673562 Gain Loss
Mexico 3269386 1007118228 0.00023 0.02436 20225148 41365638 Gain Gain
Brazil 3179693 979543861 0.00024 0.01293 30578527 21351922 Gain Loss
Micronesia 2992597 158507960 0.00229 0.00001 5645 2449 Loss Loss
Hawaii 2474884 11965998 0.05526 0.28187 29533738 5686722 Gain Loss
United States 2449144 1579438872 0.00012 0.03767 129811833 100306358 Gain Loss
Papua New Guinea 2396214 1287686364 0.00016 0.00147 4671824 3189041 Gain Loss
Denmark (Greenland) 2353703 909030202 0.00024 0.40985 2495229 628141001 Gain Gain
China 2285872 10694332164 0.00001 0.00367 6592902 66156528 Gain Gain
Philippines 2265684 1439761734 0.00014 0.00729 14206360 17702724 Gain Gain
Chile 2009299 705281173 0.00032 0.00039 2047996 467479 Gain Loss
Marshall Isl. 1992232 264785476 0.00109 0.00035 132405 157083 Loss Gain
Cook Isl. (New Zealand) 1960135 1571841 0.65916 0.00001 506437 21.8 Loss Loss
India (mainland) 1630356 3138268241 0.00005 0.00238 2026000 12606863 Gain Gain
Solomon Isl. 1597492 588690954 0.00038 0.00007 2895587 69713 Loss Loss
South Georgia & San ... 1449532 8700818 0.07199 0.00000 0 26.2 Loss Gain
France (New Caledonia) 1422543 130801479 0.00242 0.00053 8900265 116076 Loss Loss
Viet Nam 1396299 1616696874 0.00010 0.00183 1491065 4996856 Gain Gain
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Norway 1395753 1142401126 0.00016 0.00091 11566816 1754596 Gain Loss
Seychelles 1332031 31784907 0.01396 0.00033 1114165 17920 Loss Loss
Fiji 1281122 169546952 0.00170 0.00016 259504 45459 Loss Loss
Mauritius 1272787 67251290 0.00541 0.00007 1464693 8341 Loss Loss
Madagascar 1198722 169513300 0.00168 0.00008 361154 23141 Loss Loss
Taiwan 1149189 566041498 0.00037 0.00116 2233618 1103064 Gain Loss
Argentina 1084386 812527743 0.00023 0.00661 10636240 9062028 Gain Loss
South Africa 1066655 219220885 0.00118 0.00428 7721048 1580156 Gain Loss
Azores Isl. (Portugal) 1056156 19953068 0.02357 0.00078 3004516 26114 Loss Loss
Maldives 916189 506513914 0.00040 0.00000 0 0 Loss Gain
Peru 906454 899263510 0.00019 0.00373 1126748 5653007 Gain Gain
Pitcairn (UK) 836108 111140 2.00000 0.00000 0 0 Never Gain
Ecuador (Galapagos Isl.) 835936 44349276 0.00819 0.15910 1518133 11896596 Gain Gain
Somalia 830389 45892537 0.00784 0.00402 1418720 311218 Loss Loss
Vanuatu 827891 62274746 0.00535 0.00008 1552356 8671 Loss Loss
Colombia 817816 40714539 0.00907 0.09516 6254613 6532565 Gain Gain
Cape Verde 796840 24693701 0.01683 0.00000 46863 26.1 Loss Loss
United Kingdom 773676 1178934670 0.00013 0.06691 133801544 132993707 Gain Loss
Iceland 772218 824516895 0.00021 0.00454 4679458 6313736 Gain Gain
Tristan da Cunha Isl ... 754720 1690229 0.47418 0.00017 355335 492 Loss Loss
Tuvalu 751797 36846142 0.01006 0.00005 447131 2971 Loss Loss
Northern Marianas (USA) 749268 19562417 0.02217 0.00002 1930 621 Loss Loss
Chile (Easter Isl.) 720395 8481587 0.06241 0.00000 1.36 36.6 Loss Gain
Kermadec Isl. (New Z ... 678402 18599547 0.02304 0.01103 85977 345760 Loss Gain
Tonga 664853 757240 2.00000 0.01509 2365297 19265 Never Loss
Andaman & Nicobar I ... 659912 77748127 0.00383 0.00081 0 106788 Loss Gain
Chagos Archipel., Br ... 638568 9438790 0.05298 0.00430 924727 68503 Loss Loss
Bahamas 629293 69291997 0.00437 0.00415 7724328 484753 Loss Loss
Palau 604289 46007372 0.00721 0.00043 3074975 33599 Loss Loss
Crozet Isl. (France) 574558 1292128 0.61963 0 unknown unknown
Costa Rica 572014 17084086 0.02455 0.01114 6879975 320973 Loss Loss
Mozambique 571955 37015049 0.00934 0.03313 2543029 2067680 Gain Loss
France (Kerguelen Isl.) 567732 9534078 0.05080 0.00000 0 0 Loss Gain
Namibia 560152 310171607 0.00065 0.00000 0 0 Loss Gain
Spain 551874 601671091 0.00028 0.01251 19438169 12686236 Gain Loss
Falkland Isl. (UK) 550872 193000798 0.00117 0.00013 22296 42235 Loss Gain
Yemen 544416 198976658 0.00113 0.00666 85955 2233762 Gain Gain
Australia (Lord Howe ... 543346 11083702 0.04162 0.00984 431732 183915 Loss Loss
Italy 537932 311236023 0.00064 0.17279 30633583 90668588 Gain Gain
Oman 535912 204900908 0.00108 0.00900 1094645 3109032 Gain Gain
Sri Lanka 530684 53828677 0.00574 0.00353 1456183 320133 Loss Loss
Myanmar 520262 896792700 0.00017 0.00196 2716611 2969918 Gain Gain
Amsterdam & St Paul ... 509015 1962912 0.35644 0.00072 0 2386 Loss Gain
Chile (J. Fernandez, ... 502490 52579772 0.00583 0.00019 29322 16885 Loss Loss
Angola 501050 191824218 0.00116 0.05808 4071490 18784636 Gain Gain
Greece 494605 395639172 0.00047 0.00524 5642755 3494511 Gain Loss
Australia (Macquarie ... 475847 1305099 0.58377 0.34241 93988 753439 Loss Gain
Korea (South) 475469 989486809 0.00015 0.00713 2041326 11890890 Gain Gain
Prince Edward Isl. ( ... 473380 383784 2.00000 0.00000 0 0 Never Gain
Venezuela 471507 206481342 0.00104 0.04585 10053722 15961990 Gain Gain
Brazil (Trindade & ... 468615 10250677 0.04423 0.00000 0 0 Loss Gain
Australia (Cocos (Ke ... 467249 4350981 0.12900 0.00011 22892 842 Loss Loss
Canary Isl. (Spain) 455397 193939815 0.00111 0.00165 1509716 539697 Gain Loss
Madeira Isl. (Portugal) 454495 16083771 0.02499 0.00007 268168 2029 Loss Loss
Bermuda (UK) 450370 628382 2.00000 0.00033 3307704 350 Never Loss
Chile (Desventuradas ... 449805 47405474 0.00646 0.00000 0 0 Loss Gain
Malaysia (Peninsula ... 447276 485624691 0.00035 0.02661 21667027 21786996 Gain Gain
Saint Helena (UK) 444916 37633 2.00000 0.00000 197018 0.302 Never Loss
Johnston Atoll (USA) 442635 2687160 0.23245 0.00029 4419 1331 Loss Loss
Ascension Isl. (UK) 441658 2400456 0.26751 0.00000 0 0 Loss Gain
Bouvet Isl. (Norway) 441163 0.9 2.00000 0.00013 32.4 0.000199 Never Loss
Howland & Baker Isl ... 434921 4992302 0.10670 0.00060 0 5034 Loss Gain
Clipperton Isl. (France) 431263 3158640 0.18869 0.00000 0 0 Loss Gain
Australia (Norfolk Isl.) 431121 12137798 0.03507 0.00000 0 0 Loss Gain
Norway (Svalbard Isl.) 426119 159320438 0.00140 0.54444 36498001 146244707 Gain Gain
Australia (Heard & ... 417015 32470303 0.01017 0.15491 0 8480302 Gain Gain
Ireland 410534 483248827 0.00035 0.00007 2209016 55669 Loss Loss
USA (Wake Isl.) 407241 7588760 0.06218 0.00000 0 0 Loss Gain
American Samoa 404391 5044339 0.10342 0.00050 586252 4263 Loss Loss
Cuba 365448 108726150 0.00217 0.01250 3061128 2291629 Gain Loss
Libya 355120 9649092 0.04451 0.00273 1214433 44437 Loss Loss
Palmyra Atoll & Kin ... 352300 2852513 0.20376 0.01150 0 55301 Loss Gain
France (Mozambique C ... 352117 9406608 0.04585 0.00000 0 0 Loss Gain
France 334604 394308194 0.00042 0.00950 14436999 6314367 Gain Loss
Panama 331465 100779952 0.00233 0.02083 6086088 3539178 Gain Loss
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Portugal 322197 121468768 0.00183 0.00494 5745893 1011164 Gain Loss
New Zealand (Tokelau) 319031 220170 2.00000 0.00000 0 0 Never Gain
Jarvis Isl. (USA) 316665 2330526 0.25542 0.00048 6394 1884 Loss Loss
New Zealand (Niue) 316629 78006 2.00000 0.00000 137285 0.115 Never Loss
France (Runion) 315058 4136782 0.12451 0.00001 700643 98.3 Loss Loss
Nauru 308502 62556864 0.00415 0.00000 0 0 Loss Gain
Equatorial Guinea 308337 3707632 0.14201 0.00426 1283007 26660 Loss Loss
Thailand 306365 411391554 0.00039 0.02011 4248600 13949506 Gain Gain
Jan Mayen Isl. (Norway) 292567 29051493 0.01069 0.00000 0 0 Loss Gain
Australia (Christmas ... 277345 3655500 0.14077 0.00031 208427 1939 Loss Loss
Morocco 272059 248203848 0.00072 0.00514 1780243 2152555 Gain Gain
France (Tromelin Isl.) 270455 6397201 0.06950 0.00000 0 0 Loss Gain
Denmark (Faeroe Isl.) 269866 308363023 0.00055 0.00000 0 0 Loss Gain
Dominican Republic 269285 29872601 0.01011 0.11071 4579934 5576167 Gain Gain
Jamaica 263283 46214990 0.00583 0.00839 2707330 653468 Gain Loss
Egypt 261824 21432399 0.01521 0.17686 960473 6390980 Gain Gain
France (Wallis & Fu ... 258269 9278632 0.04316 0.00000 0 0 Loss Gain
Turkey (Black Sea) 255787 275927242 0.00062 0.01799 7169036 8371174 Gain Gain
Liberia 246152 10487808 0.03659 0.00225 475969 39797 Loss Loss
Tanzania 241541 19278087 0.01702 0.01745 1710822 567021 Gain Loss
Honduras 240240 20218567 0.01601 0.01033 3133688 352200 Loss Loss
Ghana 224908 82934991 0.00270 0.00000 0 0 Loss Gain
Guam (USA) 221504 9705916 0.03926 0.00079 8989 12941 Loss Gain
Pakistan 221435 336894391 0.00047 0.00985 441661 5597315 Gain Gain
Saudi Arabia (Persia ... 219905 126260051 0.00159 0.01506 643101 3206112 Gain Gain
Nigeria 216789 192676108 0.00093 0.00000 0 0 Loss Gain
Gabon 193627 37911125 0.00691 0.01539 1867597 983727 Gain Loss
Barbados 186107 527244 2.00000 0.00001 148449 10 Never Loss
Puerto Rico (USA) 177685 18662253 0.01641 0.01568 8096022 493269 Loss Loss
Cte d’Ivoire 174545 35156606 0.00740 0.00169 595724 100180 Loss Loss
Sweden 170086 198703320 0.00084 0.03180 151466134 10653258 Gain Loss
Sao Tome & Principe 165364 5336083 0.07709 0.00000 0 0 Loss Gain
Comoros Isl. 164691 4589363 0.09298 0.00245 476699 18981 Loss Loss
Iran 164051 325867283 0.00045 0.04577 1659250 25145278 Gain Gain
Sierra Leone 159744 57490737 0.00392 0.00000 0 0 Loss Gain
Senegal 157550 256383603 0.00060 0.00430 1134737 1858579 Gain Gain
Mauritania 155422 272112304 0.00056 0.07854 695139 36033443 Gain Gain
Turks & Caicos Isl. ... 154068 22999891 0.01220 0.00461 0 178782 Loss Gain
Ukraine 144038 25897643 0.01034 0.02102 3071900 918021 Gain Loss
Guyana 135900 145304993 0.00118 0.00000 0 0 Loss Gain
France (French Guiana) 133949 19927104 0.01409 0.00059 287058 19694 Loss Loss
Uruguay 132286 84170617 0.00232 0.00049 882908 69000 Loss Loss
Samoa 131812 680532 0.95578 0.00079 464537 907 Loss Loss
Algeria 128865 28936374 0.00875 0.00743 833525 362649 Loss Loss
Suriname 128318 71198861 0.00284 0.00938 1737799 1126527 Gain Loss
Nicaragua 127488 61752338 0.00338 0.00631 943345 656595 Gain Loss
Cayman Isl. (UK) 119137 102438 2.00000 0.00087 6620809 151 Never Loss
Guatemala 117743 11890022 0.02601 0.00157 998636 31511 Loss Loss
Korea (North) 115649 186670921 0.00083 0.00000 0 0 Loss Gain
Haiti 112025 16279701 0.01735 0.00000 0 0 Loss Gain
Kenya 111999 2860471 0.15247 0.02725 1937028 131408 Loss Loss
Guinea 109456 92581341 0.00196 0.00000 0 0 Loss Gain
Antigua & Barbuda 107914 5748820 0.06313 0.00111 0 10770 Loss Gain
Denmark 107579 346659443 0.00038 0.03747 31482989 21899655 Gain Loss
Guinea-Bissau 106117 31149016 0.00760 0.02792 1447341 1466486 Gain Gain
Tunisia 102362 146446726 0.00109 0.00063 430005 154496 Loss Loss
Cyprus 98550 12728922 0.02285 0.00016 967838 3500 Loss Loss
France (Guadeloupe) 95978 20254230 0.01270 0.00093 1664729 31620 Loss Loss
El Salvador 93761 38600587 0.00564 0.00000 0 0 Loss Gain
Anguilla (UK) 92178 864912 0.64769 0.00074 1844433 1076 Loss Loss
Finland 90828 51254751 0.00392 0.01329 9734769 1148483 Gain Loss
Sudan 88067 21853405 0.01130 0.00014 98166 5020 Loss Loss
British Virgin Isl. (UK) 80117 2023876 0.21609 0.00063 3979160 2144 Loss Loss
Eritrea 78703 4329718 0.08315 0.00000 0 0 Loss Gain
Bangladesh 78538 196356430 0.00071 0.00583 562800 1929613 Gain Gain
Trinidad & Tobago 77502 9753438 0.03001 0.00103 0 16962 Loss Gain
Timor Leste 77256 17100051 0.01486 0.00000 0 0 Loss Gain
Aruba (Leeward Nethe ... 68783 310469 2.00000 0 Never unknown
Netherlands 63912 123944517 0.00119 0.01105 5974239 2308543 Gain Loss
France (Mayotte) 63078 3268143 0.11182 0.00073 504076 4044 Loss Loss
Germany 57259 69436840 0.00239 0.18629 20140131 21808761 Gain Gain
United Arab Emirates 57194 119719077 0.00121 0.07440 779347 15016545 Gain Gain
Croatia 56374 111077500 0.00132 0.00767 2539004 1437347 Gain Loss
Malta 55556 15015987 0.01610 0.00024 598345 6053 Loss Loss
Cambodia 47827 75262345 0.00207 0.04021 355622 5102012 Gain Gain
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France (Martinique) 47640 4117730 0.07809 0.03127 6444097 217100 Loss Loss
Congo, R. of 40499 10004148 0.02472 0.02469 667456 416479 Loss Loss
Estonia 39940 18101523 0.01174 0.03627 2478752 1106988 Gain Loss
Saint Vincent & the ... 36314 415180 2.00000 0.00107 0 749 Never Gain
Belize 35995 11187250 0.02087 0.07094 5407858 1338116 Gain Loss
Bulgaria 35156 884748 0.49477 0.00041 166764 613 Loss Loss
US Virgin Isl. 33744 7065866 0.03648 0.00512 2105885 60939 Loss Loss
Latvia 32021 23338382 0.00809 0.00470 499467 184817 Loss Loss
Qatar 31870 10324998 0.02238 0.00427 624452 74389 Loss Loss
Poland 31600 31907446 0.00545 0.01928 1639363 1037445 Gain Loss
Benin 30024 3537087 0.08414 0.00000 0 0 Loss Gain
Dominica 28626 4891976 0.05543 0.00019 168927 1530 Loss Loss
Israel 27346 5392390 0.04852 0.01884 3216120 171299 Loss Loss
Grenada 26158 1450827 0.24763 0.00004 89379 103 Loss Loss
Brunei Darussalam 25427 2925267 0.10234 0.00670 601285 33035 Loss Loss
Georgia 22765 211080 2.00000 0.00164 303142 583 Never Loss
Gambia 22630 27703810 0.00598 0.00704 334337 329004 Gain Loss
Romania 20598 491163 0.90334 0.31368 3886846 259762 Loss Loss
Lebanon 19196 8988387 0.02345 0.00026 145186 3947 Loss Loss
Saint Lucia 15484 2901100 0.09135 0.00053 514069 2590 Loss Loss
Togo 15375 2982050 0.08810 0.00059 120087 2943 Loss Loss
Cameroon 14693 56889334 0.00218 0.26462 1261184 25380735 Gain Gain
France (Saint Pierre ... 12334 387017 2.00000 0.00000 0 0 Never Gain
Kuwait 12236 23491810 0.00631 0.02207 624798 873974 Gain Gain
Netherlands Antilles ... 12169 255936 2.00000 0.01066 0 4600 Never Gain
Channel Isl. (UK) 11658 37867645 0.00343 0.00000 0 0 Loss Gain
Haiti (Navassa Isl.) 11494 3068268 0.07905 0.12850 384753 664753 Gain Gain
Albania 11138 9906014 0.01812 0.02568 1415726 428860 Gain Loss
Syria 10222 5352484 0.03829 0.00489 1168791 44142 Loss Loss
Saint Kitts & Nevis 10201 922964 0.34444 0.00000 0 0 Loss Gain
Bahrain 8884 47661302 0.00240 0.06545 602942 5259744 Gain Gain
Montserrat (UK) 7582 98135 2.00000 0.00004 785522 6.55 Never Loss
Montenegro 7415 10708858 0.01485 0.01621 380507 292681 Gain Loss
Djibouti 6947 170801 2.00000 0.00187 331714 539 Never Loss
Lithuania 6104 6780330 0.02505 0.09186 1577665 1050122 Gain Loss
Belgium 3453 5100763 0.03101 0.00076 290193 6500 Loss Loss
Gaza Strip 2584 3983356 0.03928 0.00000 0 0 Loss Gain
China (Hong Kong) 2097 59922763 0.00126 0.28185 9725488 28475270 Gain Gain
Congo (ex-Zaire) 1072 1521463 0.10499 0.00000 0 0 Loss Gain
Singapore 823 25302203 0.00293 0.01369 481669 584067 Gain Gain
Iraq 597 695604 0.24125 0.00000 0 0 Loss Gain
Slovenia 186 687470 0.18291 0.00640 382617 7416 Loss Loss
Jordan 95 256661 0.52986 0.42105 161262 182203 Loss Gain
Bosnia & Herzegovina 14 1744323 0.02990 0.00000 0 0 Loss Gain
Ecuador 36230183 3.00000 1101231 unknown unknown
Morocco (Western Sahara) 255936 3.00000 0 unknown unknown
F.11.1 Catch-to-stock ratios
In our economic analysis, we use the observed catch as a lower bound on the level of stock.
The RAM database provides some information the typical relationships between catch and
stock, which can be used to provide better bounds on the estimate.
Across all years and stocks, the ratio of catch to stock follows an exponential distribution,
suggesting a wide variance of observed ratios (see figure F.7). Over time, this ratio of catch
to stock has increased for many stocks (see figure F.8), although the shape of the distribution
of ratios has remained similar.
The average ratio of catch to stock (excluding observations for which catch is greater
than stock in a given year), is 0.1834 ± 0.0042.
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Cost to Benefit Comparison
Figure F.6: Estimated costs and benefits by country. MPA costs use the full model from Balmford et al.
(2004). Benefit estimates use our linear model.


















Figure F.7: A histogram of the ratios of catch to stock, across all years and stocks used in our analysis. The
distribution of ratios follows an approximately exponential decay.
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Ratio of Catch to Stock
Figure F.8: The ratio of catch to stock for all years and stocks. Each point represent a different year-stock
observation, with darker points produced by several points overlayed. A wide range of ratios is observed in
all time periods since 1950, although the average ratio has decreased since 2000.
F.12 Additional robustness checks
The preferred specifications treat the growth rate effects of MPAs as additive with the
stock-specific growth rate. For stocks with very low baseline growth rates, this predicts
very large proportional increases in the growth rate. Another alternative theory is that
MPAs increase growth rates proportionally.
As a proxy for the growth rate, we use the average proportional surplus (see figure F.9).
The results are very similar to the preferred specification, and if slightly easier to inter-
pret at face value, fit the data slightly less well.
F.12.1 Temporal delay
Our model assumes that the benefits of an MPA can be observed in the following year, and
will underestimate benefits that take years to build. Some studies find that MPA benefits
are not realized for many years for slow-growing species, with the maturity age of a species
representing the necessary wait (Roberts et al., 2001).
This approach is motivated by an attempt to build a delay into the model, finding that
it was most effective without the delay. This corroborates evidence that the benefits of
many MPAs appear rapidly (Halpern and Warner, 2002).
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Figure F.9: Comparison between the estimated carrying capacity, K, and mean stock biomass, ESt (left),
and estimated growth rate, r, and average proportional surplus, E|St+1−St+Ct
St
|. The directly observed
statistics match these derived values fairly closely.
Timeless Stock Trends Year FE Trends and Year
# MPA Str0 −0.0083∗∗ −0.0110∗∗∗ −0.0085∗∗ −0.0111∗∗∗
(0.0031) (0.0027) (0.0031) (0.0027)
Sum MPA2 / Area2Str0 −146.7291∗∗∗ −159.7456∗∗ −155.6076∗∗∗ −169.4580∗∗
(43.1178) (53.9743) (46.0673) (56.4474)
# MPA S̄r0 0.0040 0.0066 0.0043 0.0063
(0.0023) (0.0074) (0.0023) (0.0074)
Sum MPA2 / Area2S̄r0 205.3712
∗∗∗ 227.7053∗∗∗ 213.1385∗∗∗ 235.5406∗∗∗
(31.1600) (54.0216) (33.8301) (56.2433)
R2 0.6122 0.6444 0.6150 0.6470
Adj. R2 0.5483 0.5717 0.5487 0.5721
Num. obs. 10093 10093 10093 10093
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table F.12: Estimates of the main coefficients of interest for the relative estimates.
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Mean Stock Half Mean Double Mean
Growth Rate Effects for 1 Additional MPA
Figure F.10: The effects of a single MPA across possible sizes. The relative effect increases to a 15% in
the growth rate (at the mean stock size), for an MPA accounting for 5% of an assessed region. This effect
decreases for large stocks (green) and increases for small stocks (blue).
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G.1 Plankton ocean currents estimates
A proper comparison between plankton diffusion and the larval drift estimate requires
checking that for differences between the two ocean current velocity profiles. The northern-
most reaches of Peru touch the high-velocity equitorial current. However, as shown in
























Ocean current speeds in plankton sampling locations
Figure G.1: Ocean currents in the plankton study region, across space and by month. Left: Colors denote
the speed of ocean currents (in m/s), with the greatest speeds to the north, near the equator. Right: The
speed of ocean currents by month. Each point represented in the boxplots is a grid-cell sampled in the
plankton surveys, and each such grid cell is represented in every month for which the velocity is available. .
247
APPENDIX G. DISTRIBUTED FISHERY MODEL SUPPLEMENT
G.2 Plankton diffusion model parameters




F 2.0× 107 2.1× 107
γ̂(2) 2.0× 107 2.1× 107
γ̂η(2) 2.0× 107 2.1× 107
γ(2) 0.066 0.035
Table G.1: Table of parameters for the variogram-based estimates of plankton diffusion. γ̂ and γ̂η are
semivariances, while γ is the calculated diffusion parameter, each as a function of distance. The variogram
values are highly uncertain, producing a wide variety of estimates at different times. However, the values at
2 degree, after the sill of the variogram, are very close to the estimated values for F .
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